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PREFACE

The mythical Cyclops was a one‐eyed giant. That must have made for an
impressive anatomy. And yet, the lack of perspective that came with
it proved fatal against the wit of Ulysses and his men. The rest is
mythology.
CICLOPs, Duke Law's newly established Center for International &
Comparative Law Occasional Papers series, is the exact opposite. CI‐
CLOPs may look relatively small in print, but we hope it will provide
multiple views on issues, and enough wit to withstand much criticism.
And CICLOPs avoids mythology in favor of analysis of real life issues
and concerns in all aspects of international and comparative law.
As an occasional papers series, CICLOPs does not compete with law
reviews, or with paper series available on SSRN. Rather, CICLOPs will
provide an outlet for Duke‐related scholarship on international or
comparative law that would otherwise go unpublished or that are hard
to find, but are too important to go unnoticed. Sometimes this will in‐
clude presentations given at Duke, by visitors or by members of our
own community. Sometimes it will contain papers or articles for which
no better venue exists, or which exist in a form too preliminary to be
submitted elsewhere but so substantial that they deserve visibility even
at that stage. And sometimes we will republish papers or speeches be‐
cause they deserve a wider audience and better accessibility.
All CICLOPs issues will be freely available in PDF form on our website, at
www.law.duke.edu/cicl/ciclops. Some issues will also be available in printed
hardcopy form. If you are interested in hearing about new publications in the
series, please send an e‐mail to CICL@law.duke.edu, and we will include you
in our list of subscribers to the CICL newsletter where new CICLOPs issues
are announced.
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INTRODUCTION
The Herbert L. Bernstein Memorial Lecture
At Duke University School of Law
The Bernstein lecture series celebrates the life’s work of Professor Her‐
bert L. Bernstein, a wonderful teacher, colleague and scholar at Duke
Law School for 17 years before he passed away in 2001.
Born in Hamburg, Germany, Professor Bernstein had a harrowing
boyhood during World War II. He was educated at the University of
Hamburg, and eventually came to the United States in 1962 to study at
the University of Michigan Law School. He then taught at the universi‐
ties of Hamburg, Berkeley, and Southampton before coming to Duke in
1984. His fields of scholarship included comparative law and private
international law.
Professor Bernstein was a much beloved professor at Duke Law. I
did not have the pleasure of knowing him personally, but I have heard
much about him from those who did. Words and phrases such as “re‐
spect,” “warmth,” “kindness,” “commitment to justice,” and “humor”
recur. It is clear that he had a profound effect on all who were fortunate
enough to come to know him.
The Bernstein Memorial Lecture is sustained by contributions from
alumni and friends of Duke Law School, and by the Duke Law Center for
International & Comparative Law, which has undertaken the compilation
of this volume. This publication is but one of many ways in which the
Center has cultivated, nurtured, and expanded Duke Law’s international
and comparative law program. Professor Bernstein would be proud.

 David F. Levi
Dean and Professor of Law
Duke University
May 2009
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FOREWORD
CICLOPs Volume 1
The Bernstein Memorial Lecture
The First Six Years
CICLOPs, the Center for International & Comparative Law Occasional
Papers, could not be launched with a better issue than one dedicated to
Duke Law's named lecture series in the field, the Annual Herbert L.
Bernstein Memorial Lecture in Comparative Law.
Herbert Bernstein was Duke's much‐beloved professor of compara‐
tive law. His early life is warmly described in a meticulously researched
article by my colleague and friend Paul Haagen, published in a special
issue of the Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law (2003)
that was dedicated to Prof. Bernstein's memory and is available at
www.law.duke.edu/bernsteinlecture/. The lecture series, established
in Prof. Bernstein’s honor after his sudden death in 2001, has drawn
leading scholars from all around the world to speak at Duke Law School
on comparative law. This first issue of CICLOPs contains the text of the
first six lectures, some of them previously published in hard‐to‐access
venues and some not at all. As such, it serves as a tribute not only to
Herbert Bernstein, but also to Duke Law's vibrant and active compara‐
tive law community, which encompasses both numerous faculty
members and also students pursuing Duke's JD/LLM degree in interna‐
tional and comparative law as well as other student groups.
The issue contains all lectures in the order in which they were de‐
livered. The inaugural Bernstein lecture was given in 2002 by Hein
Kötz, former director of the Max Planck Institute for Comparative and
International Private Law in Hamburg, perhaps the leading institution
worldwide in its field [Civil Justice Systems in Europe and the United
States, pp. 1–16]. Hein Kötz takes on a pet theme of comparative law—
the comparison of German and U.S. principles of civil procedure—
and brings, in his hallmark elegant style not just a lucid assessment of
the debate but also a number of useful insights. Perhaps the most
important among these is one based in Kötz's long‐standing emphasis
on functional equivalence: Comparatists, in comparing German and
U.S. court rules, are dealing with nonequivalent things: U.S. rules are
made with big cases in mind, for which German civil procedure may
ix

be inadequate. German rules by contrast are made for small cases,
which in the U.S. would be dealt with not in ordinary courts but in
small claims courts, with rules not so dissimilar to those in German
civil procedure.
Christian Joerges, then of the European University Institute in
Florence and now again a professor at Bremen University, gave the next
lecture in 2003 [Europeanization as Process: Thoughts on the Europe
anization of Private Law, pp. 17–40]. Prof. Joerges suggests an ambi‐
tious reconceptualization for private law in Europe, combining insights
from European law, comparative law, and private international law or
conflict of laws, in the tradition of Brainerd Currie, a leading figure of
U.S. conflict of laws and a former Duke Law professor. A much‐
extended version of this lecture has been published by the Duke Journal
of Comparative & International Law and is widely cited. In this issue,
we republish a text that resembles more closely the original lecture as
it was presented.
For the third Bernstein Lecture in 2004, we took our focus away
from European law schools but not necessarily from Europe itself. The
speaker was Chibli Mallat, a Jean Monnet Professor of Law at the Uni‐
versity of St Joseph in Beirut, former candidate for the Lebanese
presidency, now a professor at Utah Law School, and perhaps the
world's leading expert on what he calls Middle Eastern Law [Constitu
tions for the TwentyFirst Century, Emerging Patterns: The EU, Iraq,
Afghanistan…, pp. 41–62]. Prof. Mallat provides a fascinating comparison
of new constitutions in the 21st century that may at first sight look in‐
comparable, namely those of Iraq, Afghanistan, and the European Union.
He not only shows how comparison between them can provide exciting
insights but also provides comparative constitutional law with mile‐
posts, simplifiers, acid tests as tools, and with an outlook on emerging
patterns that are valuable beyond just his own analysis.
The fourth Bernstein Lecture, in 2005, was given, perhaps untypi‐
cally, by a U.S. scholar, but one of unusually broad and cosmopolitan
erudition—Richard Buxbaum from Berkeley [Comparative Law as a
Bridge Between the NationState and the Global Economy: an Essay for
Herbert Bernstein, pp. 63–78]. Prof. Buxbaum offers nothing less than a
reconceptualization of the field of comparative law itself, away from its
focus on disinterested comparison between national legal systems, and
towards acknowledgement of both the supranational nature of much
contemporary law and a new emphasis on economic, as opposed to pri‐
vate or public, law. The lecture has not previously been published, so
we are especially grateful to Prof. Buxbaum for updating it for publica‐
tion in this issue and are sure that the comparative law community will
join in these thanks.
x

In 2006, Duke Law was fortunate that Zhu Suli accepted the Dean's
invitation to speak [Political Parties in China's Judiciary, pp. 79–110].
Prof. Zhu is Dean of Peking University Law School, China's most highly
regarded law school, and a scholar of unusually extensive interest and
expertise not only in Chinese but also in U.S. law and legal philosophy.
His lecture begins as a response to a review of one of his books but
soon turns into a fascinating suggestion that Western notions of judicial
independence are inadequate for an analysis or even critique of Chi‐
nese law. Provocative for a Western audience, the lecture highlights a
core theme in modern comparative law: the contingency and frequent
Western bias of many of our frames of reference, and the difficulty (and
promises) of intercultural comparison and critique. Jonathan Ocko, a
professor of history at North Carolina State University and an adjunct
professor at Duke Law School, adds an immensely helpful introduction.
Finally, 2007 saw a lecture by a close friend and collaborator of the
late Prof. Bernstein: Joseph Lookofsky, an American graduate from New
York University Law School who is now a professor at the University of
Copenhagen [Desperately Seeking Subsidiarity: Danish Private Law in
the Scandinavian, European, and Global Context, pp. 111–130]. Prof.
Lookofsky provides an insight into Danish legal culture, but not as mere
illustration. Rather, he views that culture as endangered by the Europe‐
anization of law, and his view on that Europeanization from the
perspective of a small country with a very peculiar identity, both national
and Scandinavian, greatly enriches our standard pictures of Europe.
Viewed together, these lectures provide a glimpse of the richness of
comparative law today and prove the high value that the field has at
Duke. The six authors came from universities in six different countries,
and where a topic occurs in more than one lecture—the constitution‐
alization of European law for example, or the direction of comparative
law as a field—their views often differ. The variety of perspectives and
viewpoints among these articles reflects quite effectively what may be
the best of comparative law today. As compared to the lone perspective
available to the mythological Cyclops, this variety bodes well for the fu‐
ture of CICLOPs.
In finishing, I thank Stephen Bornick, Associate Director of the Cen‐
ter for International & Comparative Law, and Jonathan White, a first‐
year student in Duke's JD/LLM program, for their editorial work on the
individual papers. Susan Manning and Melinda Vaughn from Duke
Law’s communication department formatted the papers; I am grateful
to them as well. I thank Neylân Gürel, program coordinator at the Cen‐
ter, for her work and her contributions, including especially the design
of the CICLOPs cover.
xi

I would also like to thank each of the copyright holders: Kluwer
Law International, Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law
and Peri Bearman, Wolfhart Heinrichs, and Bernard G. Weiss for their
consent to allow republication of these articles in CICLOPs. The articles
and citations contained herein are unchanged from their respective
original or published versions, with the exception of minor editing
and formatting.
Each of the lectures can be viewed in its entirety at:
http://www.law.duke.edu/bernsteinlecture/archive/ .

 Ralf Michaels
Professor of Law and Director,
Center for International & Comparative Law 20072009
Duke University
May 2009
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Civil Justice Systems in Europe
and the United States*
Hein Kötz**

I. INTRODUCTION
Allow me first to say what an honor it is to be invited to present Duke’s first
Herbert L. Bernstein Memorial Lecture. Herbert’s death at the Law School a
little more than a year ago was a great shock not only to the Duke Law
School community but also to the many friends he had in Germany. I knew
him for nearly 40 years, and I am very grateful indeed for this opportunity
to pay tribute to him and his contribution to the law and legal education.
When Dean Bartlett agreed to the topic of my lecture she must have
realised that letting a foreign lawyer touch upon American civil
procedure would be a hazardous affair. Not only is a foreign lawyer who
ventures into this field bound sooner or later to fall into error, but also he
will expect you to forgive him and kindly put him right when he does so.
Not only is he apt to rush in where local angels fear to tread, but also
courtesy may require you to call his views original and refreshing when
they are heretical or bizarre. There is one countervailing argument
supporting the choice of my subject, however, and that is that it was very
dear to Herbert’s heart. He and I discussed it on many occasions, and
while we both felt that comparing the machinery of civil justice in the
common law and the civil law was a most challenging and interesting
undertaking, we also agreed that it was a subject fraught with greater
risks of fundamental misunderstanding of foreign law than those which
beset the comparative endeavours in substantive law.1

* First Annual Herbert L. Bernstein Memorial Lecture in Comparative Law, Duke
University School of Law, Sept. 10, 2002. Reprinted with permission from The Duke Journal
of Comparative and International Law: CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEMS IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED
STATES, 13 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW 61 (2003).
** Emeritus Director, Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law,
former president of the Bucerius Law School. Professor Kötz delivered the inaugural Herbert
L. Bernstein Memorial Lecture on September 10, 2002, at Duke University School of Law. A
friend and colleague of Professor Bernstein, Professor Kötz is co-author of Konrad Zweigert
& Hein Kötz, Introduction To Comparative Law (3rd ed. transl. Tony Weir 1998).
1. Herbert L. Bernstein, Whose Advantage After All?: A Comment on the Comparison
of Civil Justice Systems, 21 U. Cal. Davis 587 (1988).
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Our shared interest in the comparison of civil justice systems goes
back to the early 1960s when both Herbert and I were graduate students
at the University of Michigan Law School. All graduate students with a
European Law background were given an introductory course on
American Law. Procedure was an important subject of this course, and
adversariness was held up to us as the hallmark of the American proce‐
dural system. The introductory course itself followed the adversary
model in that we were asked to read Roscoe Pound’s celebrated article,
“Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice,”
with its sharp attack on the excesses of the adversary system.2 We were
told that Jerome Frank had described the American mode of trials as
being based on what he called the “fight theory”, a theory which in his
view “derives from the origin of trials as substitutes for private out‐of‐
court brawls” and “frequently…blocks the uncovering of vital evidence or
leads to a presentation of vital testimony in a way that distorts it.”3 At the
time, however, this had no great impact on us. We were enthralled to
watch lawyer‐dominated civil and criminal trials at the Ann Arbour
Circuit Court on closed‐circuit television in a viewing room at the law
school. We also enjoyed the moot court cases with their colourful and
dramatic confrontation between partisan student advocates, and any
lingering doubts about the attractions of adversariness were dispelled by
reading Earl Stanley Gardner, Raymond Chandler and Robert Traver’s
novel entitled Anatomy of a Murder.4
For those of us who remained in contact with American law,
however, a gradual process of disenchantment set in. Like most readers
of Robert Traver’s novel we were delighted by the defendant’s acquittal
on the basis of a successful plea of impaired mental capacity. But the not‐
guilty verdict was based on facts supplied by the defendant only after his
lawyer had impressed upon him what type of fact would constitute that
defence. Can it be right to allow or even require a lawyer to arm his client
for effective perjury? There were other questions we asked. It is all very
well to say that cross‐examination is, in the words of John Wigmore, “the
greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth” and that it
is a most effective weapon to test dishonest witnesses and ferret out the
truth.5 But isn’t it a weapon equally lethal to heroes and villains? There is
no doubt that all procedural systems aim at an intelligent inquiry into all

2. Roscoe Pound, Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice,
40 Am. L. Rev. 729 (1906).
3. See Jerome Frank, Courts on Trial: Myth and Reality, in American Justice 80–90
(1949).
4. Robert Traver, Anatomy of a Murder (1958).
5. John H. Wigmore, Evidence § 1387, at 29 (3d ed. 1940).
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the practically available evidence in order to ascertain, as near as may be,
the truth about the facts. But suppose a businessman were to decide
whether or not to build a new plant: Would he think of obtaining the
needed information by subjecting his informants to the experience of
standing as a witness at a common law trial? Is there no more businesslike
method to unearth the relevant facts?
II. CIVIL PROCEDURE IN GERMANY
It is indeed a routine business meeting an American lawyer will believe
he is attending when he is led into a German courtroom.6 What is most
likely to strike him is the fact that mainly the court conducts the
interrogation of witnesses.7 It is the court that will ask for the witness’s
name, age, occupation, and residence.8 It is the court that will then invite
the witness to narrate, without undue interruption, what he knows about
the matter on which he has been called. After the witness has given his
story in his or her own words the court will ask questions designed to
test, clarify, and amplify it. It is then the turn of counsel for the parties to
formulate pertinent questions. But in an ordinary case there is relatively
little questioning by counsel for the parties, at least by common law
standards. One reason is that the judge will normally have covered the
ground. Another reason is that for counsel to examine at length after the
court seemingly has exhausted the witness might appear to imply that
the court does not know its business, which is a dubious tactic. There is
no cross‐examination in the sense of the common law, nor is there a full
stenographic transcript of the testimony. Instead, the judge himself
pauses from time to time to dictate a summary of what the witness has
said so far.9 At the close of testimony the clerk will read back the dictated
summary in full, and either witness or counsel may suggest improve‐

6. For more detailed information in English on the German civil justice system, see the
seminal study by Benjamin Kaplan, Arthur T. von Mehren & Rudolf Schaefer, Phases of
German Civil Procedure (pts. 1 & 2), 71 Harv. L. Rev. 1193, 1443 (1958), now over 40 years
old but fundamentally accurate. Comparative articles based on this study are Benjamin
Kaplan, Civil Procedure – Reflections on the Comparison of Systems, 9 Buff. L. Rev. 409
(1960); William B. Fisch, Recent Developments in West German Civil Procedure, 6 Hastings
Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 221 (1983); Arthur T. von Mehren, Some Comparative Reflections on
First Instance Civil Procedure: Recent Reforms in German Civil Procedure and in the Federal
Rules, 63 Notre Dame L. Rev. 609 (1988). See also David J. Gerber, Extraterritorial
Discovery and the Conflict of Procedural Systems: Germany and the United States, 34 Am. J.
Comp. L. 745, 748–69 (1986).
7. Michael Bohlander, The German Advantage Revisited: An Inside View of German
Civil Procedure in The Nineties, 13 Tul. Eur. & Civ. L.F. 25, 43 (1998).
8. Kaplan, von Mehren & Schaefer, supra note 6, at 1234–35.
9. John Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 823,
828 (1985) [hereinafter German Advantage].
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ments in the wording. If the exact phrasing of a particular part of the
testimony is believed to be of critical importance, counsel may insist on
having it set down verbatim in the minutes.
A similar system is used with respect to expert witnesses. Suppose a
case requires an expert’s evidence, for example an action for damages
brought by a patient against his physician on the ground of the
defendant’s failure to use ordinary care in his treatment. In Germany, as
indeed in most Continental countries, the expert will be selected and
appointed by the court after consultation with the parties.10 It is the court
that will conduct his examination, and it is the court that will advance the
expert’s fees eventually to be borne by the losing party.11 In the common
law it is up to the parties, or rather their lawyers, to find suitable experts
who will then be examined and cross‐examined in the same way as
ordinary witnesses. I have served both as a court‐appointed expert on
foreign law in cases pending before a German court, and as party‐
selected expert witness on German law in litigation before the High Court
in London, and I assure you that there are substantial differences
between the two roles. As a court‐appointed expert you are an ally and
partner of the court. You assist the court to the best of your ability in
reaching a correct result, and it is with the court that your duty of loyalty
lies. What struck me most in my role as party‐selected expert witness in
the English cases was not the experience of being examined and cross‐
examined, but the difficulty to resist the subtle temptation to join your
client’s team, to take your client’s side, to conceal doubts, to overstate the
strong and downplay the weak aspects of his case and to dampen any
scruples you might have by reminding yourself that the other side will
select and instruct another expert witness and that, when the dust has
settled, the truth will triumph.
The examination of witnesses in the Continental style may not be
free from certain risks. One might say, for example, that the technique of
inviting the witness to tell his story in narrative form and without undue
interruption provides an incentive, in the interest of presenting a
conclusive, logically coherent, and convincing story, to fill in gaps by half‐
truths or fiction. There is also a danger that the judge, in acting as chief‐
examiner of the witnesses, may sooner or later appear to favour one side
over the other. By putting questions to the witness, in the words of Lord
Denning, he “drops the mantle of the judge, and assumes the robe of an
10. Id. at 835–41.
11. For a detailed and accurate description of the process of selecting, instructing and
examining experts in Germany, see id. Much of what follows on the characteristic features of
German civil procedure is based on this brilliant article. See also Bohlander, supra note 7, at
41–43.
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advocate.”12 In general, however, a competent judge in questioning
witnesses knows how to play his cards close to his chest. If he pursued
one line of questioning with undue vigour or in some other way revealed
his evaluation of the testimony this would at any rate have no influence
on a jury as the sole trier of facts because there are no civil juries on the
Continent, nor any even in the United Kingdom. As to counsel, they may
ask follow‐up questions as an antidote against unfair or incompetent
questioning by the judge.13
On the other hand, under the Continental system there is no need,
as in common law jurisdictions, to prepare the prospective witness for
counsel’s questions during the examination‐in‐chief and cross‐
examination.14 Consequently, the “coaching” or “sandpapering” of
witnesses is not a problem. Indeed, German lawyers will generally be
reluctant to engage in extensive out‐of‐court contact with prospective
witnesses.15 A canon of professional ethics promulgated by the German
Bar Association in 1973 provided that out‐of‐court contact with
witnesses was advisable only when special circumstances justified it and
was at any rate limited to clarifying what the witness would be able to
say.16 This rule was dropped when new provisions on professional ethics
were enacted in 1996, probably because there seemed no need for it.17
After all, it is fairly clear to an attorney that the judge would take a dim
view of the reliability of a witness who previously had been closeted for
long periods with counsel.
Civil procedure in Germany and in other civil law jurisdictions
differs from the American system by making the judge responsible for
the selection of expert witnesses, for the examination‐in‐chief of both fact
12. Jones v. National Coal Board, [1957] 2 Q.B. 55, 63.
13. Bohlander, supra note 7, at 43.
14. Langbein, German Advantage, supra note 9, at 835–37.
15. Kaplan, von Mehren, Schaefer, supra note 6, at 1200–01.
16. Section 6, entitled Questioning and Advising of Witnesses, provides as follows: (1)
The lawyer may question persons out of court who might be considered witnesses if this is
necessary with a view to the obligation to provide for clarification of facts, advice or
representation. (2) The lawyer may inform these persons as regards their rights and duties as
well as give advice to them. (3) The lawyer is allowed to establish a record of such
questioning and to have the person sign a declaration. Such a record may be used by the
lawyer in order to confront the witness with these statements in a judicial or administrative
proceeding. However, the lawyer may present the record itself only in exceptional cases to
the court or the administrative agency, for example, in those cases where the witness is
unable to testify in the pre-trial discovery stage or during the proceedings. [. . .] (5) In any
event, the appearance of undue influence is to be avoided. Grundsaetze Des Anwaltlichen
Standesrechts, Hrichtlinien Gemaess § 177 Absatz 2 Nr. 2 Bundesrechtsanwaltsordnung
(Brao).
17. See new provisions of Brao available at http://jurcom5juris.de/bundsrecht/
brao/index.html.
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and expert witnesses, and for creating the record based on those
examinations.18 The judge’s conspicuous role in the actual taking of
evidence, especially in the taking of witness testimony, has led common
lawyers to label Continental civil procedure as “inquisitorial” or “non‐
adversarial”. This is misleading because it conjures up the Spanish
Inquisition, Kafka’s Castle, and bureaucratic omnipotence and has indeed
led an English judge to say, in comparing English and Continental proce‐
dure, that “our national experience found that justice is more likely to
ensue from adversary than from inquisitorial procedures – Inquisition
and Star Chamber were decisive, and knowledge of recent totalitarian
methods has merely rammed the lesson home.”19 In my view, however,
this is not only misleading, but also downright wrong. All arguments
generally praising the virtues of the adversarial system of the common
law and contrasting them with the vices of the inquisitorial system
ascribed to the civil law are misguided and, in Herbert Bernstein’s words,
“cannot advance, even by an inch, the comparative analysis of German
and American civil procedure.”20
The truth is that both in the American and Continental civil justice
systems, the power to establish the facts on which the judicial decision
rests is reserved to the decision‐makers, whether the trial judge or jury
in the United States, or the court on the Continent.21 On the other hand, it
is in both systems exclusively for the parties and their lawyers to identify
the facts they think will support the claim or defence, to make the
appropriate factual allegations, and to nominate the witnesses and the
facts of which they allegedly have knowledge. In the United States, just as
on the Continent, the civil courts must work with what they are given,
and they must establish the factual basis of their judgments from the
materials the parties supply, and no others. Facts not in dispute between
the parties are beyond judicial scrutiny, nor can the judge do anything
about a fact alleged by one party and not specifically challenged by the
opponent. He must take that fact as established and if he believes that the
facts presented by the parties are not true he has no power to unearth
what he thinks might be the truth by introducing independent evidence.
True, this does not apply to criminal procedure. In a criminal case the
Continental judge may disregard the defendant’s guilty plea or a
confession or admission and introduce independent evidence, including
witness testimony, to determine what is called the “material truth”
18.
19.
231.
20.
21.

Langbein, German Advantage, supra note 9, at 835–36.
D. v. National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children, [1978] A.C. 171,
Bernstein, supra note 1, at 589–90.
von Mehren, supra note 21, at 609.
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(materielle Wahrheit). In civil matters, however, the principle of “formal
truth” (formelle Wahrheit) applies. “Formal truth” is what the court, to
the best of its ability, believes to be true having regard to the evidence
placed before it by the parties. The court’s task is to do, and be seen to be
doing, justice between the parties; it is not to ascertain some inde‐
pendent truth. It often happens, from the imperfection of evidence, or the
withholding of it, sometimes by the party in whose favour it would tell if
presented, that an adjudication has to be made which is not, and is
known not to be, the whole truth of the matter. Yet provided the decision
has been in accordance with the available evidence and with the law,
justice will have been fairly done.
It follows that in their own ways both the German and American
systems are adversary systems of civil procedure.22 In both systems the
lawyers advance partisan positions from first pleadings to final argu‐
ments. In both systems the parties and their lawyers investigate and
identify in their briefs the facts they think will support their claims and
defences. In both systems the court cannot go beyond the parties’ factual
contentions nor can the court strike out on its own in the search for what
it believes might be the real truth.
III. PROCEDURAL CONTRASTS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
To be sure, quite a few features of German civil procedure are in marked
contrast to American practises. First there is the judge’s prominent role
in the actual taking of witness testimony.23 This should not be overrated,
however, because the judge, even though he serves as the examiner‐in‐
chief of the witnesses, is prohibited from inducing them to testify on facts
other than those for which they were named. Another characteristic of
German and indeed Continental civil procedure is that no party is
allowed to call as many witnesses as he pleases. There is no rule requir‐
ing all of plaintiff’s witnesses to be heard before the defendant’s
witnesses, nor is there a compulsion to take proof on all the apparently
contested issues at one sitting or to call first the witnesses nominated by
the party carrying the burden of proof.
What the parties can do and will do is to nominate witnesses in
support of specific factual allegations.24 It is then for the court to make an
evidentiary order identifying the witnesses to be heard, describing with

22. Langbein, German Advantage, supra note 9, at 841–48.
23. Id. at 832–35.
24. Ronald J. Allen, Stefan Kock, Kurt Riecherberg & D. Toby Rosen, The German
Advantage in Civil Procedure: A Plea For More Details and Fewer Generalities in
Comparative Scholarship, 32 NW. U. L. Rev. 705, 720–21 (1988).
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some precision the facts on which each witness is to be examined and
fixing the order in which they are to be called. In making this evidentiary
order the court will consult with the parties who will direct the court’s
attention to particularly cogent lines of inquiry. However, the final
decision rests with the court whose discretion will be guided by a strict
standard of relevance as well as by the principle that evidence is to be
taken only to the extent and in the order most likely to result in a speedy
disposal of the case.
If, for example, witnesses have been nominated for a factual
contention, which the judge believes on legal grounds to be immaterial to
the party’s claim or defence, he will not allow the witness to be called.
Nor will he order the examination of a witness in support of a factual
allegation, which the judge finds is not really in dispute between the
parties or which has not been specifically challenged by the opposition. If
the court perceives that there is a matter that is likely to be determi‐
native, it may confine the evidentiary order to that matter and await the
results before issuing a further evidentiary order. Suppose that in a
seller’s action for the price the buyer’s defence is, first, that no contract
was formed; second, that the goods delivered were defective; and, third,
that in any event the seller’s claim is barred by the Statute of Limitations.
In this situation it is within the judge’s discretion to select the defence
most likely to lead to a dismissal of the action, and to postpone consider‐
ation of the other defences.
In a brilliant, if controversial, article John Langbein characterized
the German procedural system as one in which the gathering of the facts
was entrusted to, and controlled by, the judge.25 In his view, judicially
dominated fact‐gathering is the hallmark of the German system and
constitutes the major “German advantage” as compared with the system
prevailing in the United States. I am not sure whether it is wholly
appropriate to describe the court’s job as that of “gathering the facts”.
After all, it is the parties and their lawyers who will investigate the facts,
discuss them with their clients, select what will be presented to the court,
indicate means of proof, and thus “gather” the factual materials with
which the court must work.26 This is why the German system is an
adversarial system. However, once the parties have supplied the factual
materials and the time has come to investigate the truth of the parties’
allegations, evaluate the evidence, and find the facts on which the
decision is to be based, the German judge has fairly strong control over

25. Langbein, German Advantage, supra note 9.
26. Allen, Kock, Reichenberg & Rosen, supra note 24 at 722–26.
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the procedure.27 He may disregard proof offers, which, according to strict
criteria of relevance, might safely be overlooked. Nor are there any
binding rules on sequence, such as “plaintiff’s case before defendant’s
case”. Instead the judge is encouraged to range over the entire case and
concentrate the inquiry on those issues most likely to result in an
expeditious disposal of the matter. While the court can only call
witnesses nominated by the parties, it does exercise discretion as to the
order and number of the witnesses and plays a vigorous role in acting as
the examiner‐in‐chief of the witnesses.
John Langbein’s attack on American civil procedure and his praise
for the German counterpart have stirred up a lively debate in this
country.28 Some critics accept that strengthening the court’s role in the
evidentiary process would save time and money, reduce the
wastefulness and complexity of pre‐trial and trial procedure, and cut
down on the distortions inherent in the system of partisan preparation
and production of witnesses and experts.29 They argue, nevertheless,
that such a move would be incompatible with the traditional roles of
lawyers and judges in this country and fly in the face of significant and
ineradicable features of American legal culture.30 On the one hand, John
Langbein has rightly admonished us not “to allow the cry of ‘cultural
differences’ to become the universal apologetic that permanently
sheathes the status quo against criticism based upon comparative
example.”31 On the other hand, cultural differences do explain some‐
thing of why institutional and procedural differences arise in different
legal systems and why transplanting legal institutions from one society
to another may be more difficult in one case than in another. The
important question is what weight to attach to this factor for present
purposes. John Langbein’s answer is: “Not much.”32

27. Id. at 727.
28. See Samuel R. Gross, The American Advantage: The Value of Inefficient Litigation,
85 Mich. L. Rev. 734 (1987); Allen, Kock, Reichenberg & Rosen, supra note 26. See also
Langbein’s reply: John Langbein, Trashing the German Advantage, 82 NW. U. L. Rev. 763
(1988) and the rebuttal: Ronald Allen, Idealization and Caricature in Comparative
Scholarship, 82 NW. U. L. Rev. 785 (1988). For a thoughtful critical reaction to Langbein’s
article, see John C. Reitz, Why We Probably Cannot Adopt the German Advantage in Civil
Procedure, 75 Iowa L. Rev. 987 (1990). I found this article most helpful for the following
discussion, although perhaps not always in a direction that John Reitz would have preferred.
29. Gross, supra note 28, at 752–56.
30. Oscar G. Chase, Legal Process and National Culture, 5 Cardozo J. Int’l & Comp. L.
1, 7-9 (1997).
31. Langbein, German Advantage, supra note 9, at 855; see also John Langbein,
Cultural Chauvinism in Comparative Law, 5 Cardozo J. Int’l & Comp. L. 41 (1997) [hereinafter
Cultural Chauvinism].
32. Langbein, Cultural Chauvinism, supra note 31, at 48–49.
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But this is surely a point on which reasonable people may differ.
The possibility of transplanting legal institutions is indeed one of the
most controversial topics of comparative law.33 It is also a topic much
ventilated these days in Europe. We are currently embarking in Europe
on a process of unifying the contract law of the Member States.34
Although work on a Uniform European Code of Contract Law has not yet
received the official blessing of the European Commission, the academic
debate on what is surely the largest current comparative law enterprise
in Europe is intense. In this debate, a small but articulate minority holds
the view that each of the European nations is the product of a unique
legal, political, and social history and that each nation’s social and
political values and goals are so different that the unification of law in
Europe, like the merger of the French, English and German languages, is a
barren and pointless exercise and indeed a chimera.35
I do not share this view. There is today what Oliver Wendell Holmes
might have called a far‐reaching free trade in legal ideas in all that relates
to economic activity, trade and transport, banking, and insurance. In
these fields, the possibility of transplanting legal institutions and indeed
of unifying the law should not be ruled out at the start because of
supposed cross‐cultural differences. However, we are concerned here not
with business‐related fields of substantive law, but with procedure.
There is much to be said for the view that all rules organizing constitu‐
tional, legislative, administrative, or judicial procedures are deeply rooted
in a country’s peculiar features of history, social structure, and political
consensus and as such are more resistant to transplantation. “Procedural
law is tough law,” said Otto Kahn‐Freund. Since “all that concerns the
technique of legal practice is likely to resist change” he concluded that
“comparative law has far greater utility in substantive law than in the law
of procedure, and the attempt to use foreign models of judicial
organization and procedure may lead to frustration and may thus be a
misuse of the comparative method.”36

33. See, e.g., Alan Watson, Legal Transplants: An Approach To Comparative Law (2d
ed. 1993); Alan Watson, Legal Transplants and Law Reform, 92 Law Q. Rev. 79 (1976). See
also the debate between Otto Kahn-Freund, On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law, 37
Mod. L. Rev. 1 (1974) and Eric Stein, Uses, Misuses—and Nonuses of Comparative Law, 72
NW. L. Rev. 198 (1977).
34. See Law Reform Projects, European Contract Law, available at http://
www.jura.unifreiburg.de/ipr1/reform.html.
35. See, e.g., Pierre Legrand, Book Review, 58 Mod. L. Rev. 262 (1995); Pierre
Legrand, European Legal Systems are Not Converging, 45 Int. & Comp. L. Q. 52 (1996);
Pierre Legrand, Against a European Civil Code, 60 Mod. L. Rev. 44 (1997).
36. Kahn-Freund, supra note 33, at 20.
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Must we accept this as the last word on the matter? Another
distinguished comparative lawyer and proceduralist, Arthur von Mehren,
reached a different conclusion. While not challenging the view that a
procedural system’s general structure and principal features express
society’s social and political values and goals he nevertheless said that
“very real differences between first‐instance procedural arrangements in
the United States, on the one hand, and in France and Germany, on the
other, derive much less from differences in social or political values or in
institutional, sociological, or psychological assumptions than from the
institutional fact of the concentrated or discontinuous nature of the trial”.37
One salient characteristic of European civil procedure lies indeed in
the fact that it is wholly unfamiliar with, and knows nothing of, the idea
of a “trial” as a single, temporally continuous presentation in which all
materials are made available to the adjudicator. Instead, proceedings in a
civil action on the Continent may be described as a series of isolated
conferences before the judge, some of which may last only a few minutes,
in which written communications between the parties are exchanged and
discussed, procedural rulings are made, evidence is introduced and
testimony taken until the cause is finally ripe for adjudication.38
Procedure in the common law jurisdictions, on the other hand, has been
deeply influenced by the institution of the jury.39 Since a jury cannot be
convened, dismissed and recalled from time to time over an extended
period, a common law trial must be staged as a concentrated courtroom
drama, a continuous show, running steadily, once begun, toward its
conclusion. This in turn entails a separate pre‐trial process for the parties
enabling them not only to gather the evidence that they may need at trial
but also to prevent surprise by informing themselves of the details of all
positions the opponent may advance when the controversy is ultimately
presented to the court. This solution requires elaborate pre‐trial inter‐
rogatory and discovery procedures because once the trial commences,
there is no opportunity to go back, search for further information, and
present it to the court at some later date.40
Clearly, elaborate pre‐trial probing of the arguments of fact and law
on which the other party proposes to rely provides a solution to the
surprise problem. However, this solution is not without its cost. First, it is
intrinsically duplicative. Witnesses are prepared, examined, and cross‐
37. Arthur von Mehren, The Significance for Procedural Practice and Theory of the
Concentrated Trial: Comparative Remarks, in: 2 Europäisches Rechtsdenken In
Geschichteund Gegenwart, Festschrift Für Helmut Coing 361, 362 (München 1982).
38. Langbein, Cultural Chauvinism, supra note 31, at 42–44.
39. Reitz, supra note 28.
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examined during pre‐trial, then prepared, examined, and cross‐examined
again at trial. Second, it tends to be overbroad. Only rarely can a litigator
tell at the beginning precisely what issues and what facts will prove
important in the end. Since the judge customarily has little contact with
pre‐trial investigation, he has no opportunity to signal what information
he thinks relevant to his decision. As a result, litigators must strain to
investigate and analyse everything that could possibly arise at trial. They
tend to leave no stone unturned, provided, of course, as is often the case,
that they can charge their fees by the stone. Because of their active role in
the pre‐trial phase, lawyers typically have a greater understanding of the
case than does the judge when the controversy is presented at the trial. It
follows that lawyers run the show at trial and that they frame the issues,
question the witnesses, and stage and present even uncontroversial facts
as if in a drama. Since the judge comes to the trial with little more
understanding of the controversy than he can have from the complaint
and other documents filed with the court, he is hardly in a position to act
as the examiner‐in‐chief of the witnesses and to confine the scope of the
evidentiary process to those avenues of inquiry he thinks are relevant or
most likely to resolve the dispute.
It would seem therefore that the institution of the jury is the cause
of the strict segmentation of American procedure into pre‐trial and trial
compartments, and that this segmentation in turn is the cause for the
waste and duplication of lawyer‐dominated pre‐trial discovery
procedures. Strengthening the court’s control over the evidentiary
process would then be practicable only if the United States followed the
example of most, if not all, major common law jurisdictions and abolished
the civil jury. In England, trial by jury has almost disappeared from civil
litigation except where a person’s reputation is at stake, for example
where he sues for libel,41 and the civil jury has also withered to
insignificance in Canada42 and Australia,43 not because of dissatisfaction
with its results, but because of the costs and inefficiencies imposed by it
on the civil litigation process. Clearly, abandoning the civil jury or
restricting its availability would be a most controversial matter in the
United States. Not only is the right to trial by jury enshrined in the
Seventh Amendment and in comparable state constitutional guarantees,

41. See generally Sally Lloyd-Bostock & Cheryl Thomas, Decline of the “Little
Parliament”: Juries and Jury Reform in England and Wales, 62 Law & Contemp. Probs. 7
(Spring 1999).
42. See William A. Bogart, Guardian of Civil Rights . . . Medieval Relic: The Civil Jury in
Canada, 62 Law & Contemp. Probs. 305 (Spring 1999).
43. See Michael Tilbury & Harold Luntz, Punitive Damages in Australian Law, 17 Loy.
L.A. Int’l & Comp. L.J. 769, 775–76 (1995).
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there is also a substantial body of opinion that both the criminal and the
civil jury are worthwhile bulwarks against biased, eccentric or
incompetent trial judges and enable the public to take an active part in
the administration of both civil and criminal justice.44
I do not think, however, that the civil jury is the only or even major
villain of the piece. True, it is because of the jury that the trial must be
carried out as a single‐episode courtroom drama, and it is because of the
trial as a concentrated event that pre‐trial discovery procedures are
needed to handle the surprise problem. But it seems to me that discovery
in the form practised today in the United States goes far beyond the mere
prevention of courtroom ambush. Rather, discovery allows a party to
search and indeed “fish” for information in opponent’s and non‐parties’
hands under a very liberal standard of relevancy requiring only that the
search be “reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence.”45 It has been said that it is possible and by no means rare in
the United States for a plaintiff to bring a lawsuit in order to discover
whether he might actually have one. Aggressive discovery in the
American style is unknown not only in Continental procedure, but also in
English procedure as well. Of course, all procedural systems must
balance the importance of truth for the fact‐finding process against the
need to protect areas of business and personal privacy from
unreasonable invasion. But not all systems will strike the same balance
between the two goals. It is evident that the breadth of American
discovery rules comes down more heavily on the side of privacy in civil
litigation. Judge Rifkind had a point when he said that “[a] foreigner
watching the discovery proceedings in a civil suit would never suspect
that this country has a highly‐prized tradition of privacy enshrined in the
Fourth Amendment.”46
Nonetheless, I think an argument can be made for American
discovery methods despite the excesses to which they are prone.
Consider the type of case in which full‐dress discovery proceedings will
normally take place. In many of those cases the lawsuit is not only a
dispute between private individuals about private rights, but also a
grievance about the operation of public policy or the vindication of the
public interest. In his famous book Democracy in America, Alexis de
Tocqueville noted that “scarcely any political question arises in the
United States that is not resolved, sooner or later, into a judicial

44. Id. at 996-97.
45. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
46. Simon H. Rifkind, Are We Asking Too Much of Our Courts?, 70 F.R.D. 96, 107
(1976), quoted in Langbein, German Advantage, supra note 9, at 845.
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question.”47 This observation seems to have lost none of its pertinence
today. If a European lawyer looks at the contemporary legal scene in the
United States, he is impressed by the extent to which court litigation,
rather than legislation and administrative action, is used as a means to
cure defects in the structures and practises of important social
institutions. Class actions are a good case in point.
By allowing plaintiffs to sue for the aggregated damages suffered
by many other similarly situated individuals, the class action provides
an effective means of vindicating the rights of groups of people who
individually would not have the strength to bring their opponents into
court. In this sense, class‐action plaintiffs may be viewed as private
attorneys‐general advancing and protecting substantial public
interests. The Supreme Court has described treble damages actions
under section 4 of the Clayton Act as “a vital means of enforcing the
antitrust policy of the United States”48 and it is not the SEC, but the
shareholders’ derivative suit, that the Supreme Court regarded as “the
chief regulator of corporate management.”49 What surprises the
European observer about American product liability litigation is not the
preconditions for liability, which are just as strict in Europe as in the
United States; what he finds indeed astonishing is the stupendous
volume of litigation, the size of awards made to successful claimants,
and the fact that it is not uncommon for many thousands of claims to be
bundled together and dealt with in a single trial. All developed legal
systems must ensure the safety of products in the interest of the
consumer. It would seem, however, that Americans, with their
traditional mistrust of governmental authority, rely not so much on the
initiative of administrators or public prosecutors, but rather on private
litigation as the chief regulator of corporate action in the product safety
field. If this analysis is correct, a strong case can be made for the view
that to the extent to which private litigation serves the vindication of a
public interest, the parties must be equipped with robust discovery
procedures to ferret out the truth, even at the expense of business or
personal privacy. Nor would it seem plausible to put the discovery tools
in the hands of judges or parajudicial officials, if only because discovery
conducted by a judge or magistrate would not be as thorough as
discovery conducted by the parties’ lawyers.
Civil litigation as a means of vindicating the public interest is far
less significant in Europe. Class actions for the recovery of damages

47. Alexis De Tocqueville, Democracy In America 280 (1945).
48. Perma Life Mufflers Inc. v. Int’l Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968).
49. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 547–48 (1949).
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suffered by hundreds or thousands of persons are unknown on the
Continent. Derivative suits by shareholders, product liability cases and
actions based on a violation of the antitrust law are not unusual, but
have attained nowhere the dimension, vigour and force that would
qualify them as significant checks on corporate behaviour.
It is much harder to argue the case for the American civil justice
system where it deals with cases in which the lawsuit is merely a dispute
between private individuals about private rights, as, for example, in an
ordinary personal injury action. True, the vast majority of all civil matters
in the United States do not result in a jury trial, and most are resolved by
settlement.50 In Germany, too, the great majority of personal injury claims
are settled rather than resolved by court decision. However, in both
systems the parties are bargaining in the shadow of the law, and the law is
very different indeed. In the United States due to the cost and number of
attorney hours spent on investigating the case and on pretrial motions,
discovery, and trial, the economic pressure to settle is intense. Moreover,
the outcome of an American jury trial is less predictable than that of a case
tried by a German judge. Let me illustrate this by looking at one important
area of the law in which the differences are indeed striking: the law
relating to the assessment of damages for personal injuries. Legal doctrine
in Germany and the United States does not differ greatly in most such
cases. Far more significant are differences in the mode of trial. Because
these cases are tried by a judge alone in Germany, and damages are
assessed by judges, who give full and detailed reasons, the calculation of
damages has become much more regularized, systematic and uniform in
Germany while the range of awards in similar cases is very much larger in
the American system of trial, almost entirely as a result of the use of juries.
Accordingly, the probable range of damages is less predictable in the
United States than in Germany. Unpredictability leads to uncertainty, and
uncertainty increases the importance of good legal representation, which
may be easily available to repeat players like insurance companies but
raises concerns about access to justice for the poor and procedural equality
of litigants with disparate economic resources.
IV. CONCLUSION
In conclusion I would like to emphasize that what is often overlooked in
the literature on comparative civil procedure is that different procedural
systems may focus on different categories of cases. The typical case at
which the German system is aimed involves a comparatively small

50. See Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, “Most Cases Settle”: Judicial Promotion and
Regulation of Settlements, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 1339 (1994).

15

Duke Law CICLOPs | Hein Kötz

Vol. 1

amount of money, raises no major issue of public policy, and is merely a
dispute between private parties about private rights. In such cases it
obviously makes sense to give the judge a leading role in the examination
of witnesses and wider powers over the evidentiary process, thereby
reducing considerably the amount of lawyer effort and cost in exchange
for a modest increase in effort and activity on the part of the judge. This is
where I think the advantages and the strength of the European
procedural systems lie. If there is a desire to reform American civil
procedure so as to provide effective justice for the “little guy”, either by
making changes within the traditional system or by developing
alternative methods of dispute resolution, then the Continental
experience may well be a worthwhile object of study.
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Europeanization as Process
Thoughts on the Europeanization
of Private Law*

Christian Joerges**
The present efforts in Europe to achieve more uniformity in private law
and the debates on a European civil code need to be understood in a
wider context. Europe is plagued by concerns over its problem‐solving
potential and its acceptance amongst citizens. The response is ambi‐
tious projects: Eastern Enlargement, a Constitution, a Code. The project
of a European civil code is the least visible among the three—and yet
specifically instructive. Europe has to learn how the openness of na‐
tional markets can coexist with differences in legal cultures, differently
shaped relations between state and society. In its multi‐level system of
governance none of the established legal disciplines can provide guid‐
ance for the denationalization and Europeanization of private law. The
Europeanization process needs to be understood and organized as a
process of discovery and learning. Only then can Europe make produc‐
tive use of its diversity.
INTRODUCTION
European law is affecting more and more areas within national legal
systems. The processes of change that it initiates are complex and di‐
verse, to an extent that there are good reasons to concentrate in their
analysis on the discipline one feels most at home with. Hence, constitu‐
tional lawyers observe and comment on the constitutionalization of
Europe, administrative and commercial lawyers primarily on the emer‐
gence of complex European governance arrangements throughout the
fields of regulatory politics. At the same time, an autonomous epistemic
community is engaging in a discussion on the Europeanization of pri‐
vate law with a growing number of individual themes, fora, organisa‐
* Second Annual Herbert L. Bernstein Memorial Lecture in Comparative Law,
Sept. 16, 2003. Reprinted with the permission of Kluwer Law International: EUROPEANIZATION
AS PROCESS: THOUGHTS ON THE EUROPEANIZATION OF PRIVATE LAW, 11 EUROPEAN PUBLIC LAW
JOURNAL 63 (2005).
** Research Professor, University of Bremen; Collaborative Centre on “Transformation of
the State.” Centre of European Law and Politics.
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tions and publications. Leading in terms of literary productivity are
German‐speaking academics. The most recent habilitation thesis I am
aware of was submitted in Munich. It looks beyond the traditional bor‐
ders between legal sub‐disciplines and focuses instead on the trans‐
formation of private law in the light of the integration process. It is 740
pages long (single spaced).1 But its German speaking predecessors
(there are around 10 of them), albeit more limited in scope, are not
significantly shorter.2
This is no coincidence. A tradition of legal science that under‐
stands the systematic analysis of the law as its core commitment, will
naturally feel challenged by the manifold impacts of the Europeaniza‐
tion process, and the less it becomes possible for legal science to com‐
ply with its own systematic expectation, the more its scepticism
towards that process will be fostered. To pose the question in an ironi‐
cally sounding, but nonetheless serious, form: should Europe be about
to take suit, to proceed, against our law (bring the law to trial)?3 Taking
the question seriously also means not to condemn Europe just because
it does not correspond with our inherited notion of the law. The chal‐
lenge flowing from the Europeanization process could be that it will
force us to redefine the normative proprium of the law.
This, in fact, is the thesis of my contribution. It sets out to show,
for one, that the Europeanization of private law should be seen as a
process that triggers disintegration within national private law systems
and affects their systematic consistency. But I also wish to demonstrate
how that process manages to uncover productive and innovative op‐
portunities. For this, as I suggest by way of conclusion below, it merits
recognition: Europeanization must derive its legitimacy from the nor‐
mative quality of the processes within which it takes place. There are
three steps to my argument. The first is fundamental, in the literal
sense; the legal disciplines instructing the Europeanization process
assume each in their own way that legal systems are organized nation‐
ally; Europe on the other hand constitutes a post‐national constellation;
it is no longer an aggregation of nation States, but a multi‐level system
(part A). The second part examines three different patterns of juridifi‐
1. Christoph Schmid, Die Instrumentalisierung des Privatrechts durch die Europäische
Union, 2004.
2. Since Drexl, Die wirtschaftliche Selbstbestimmung des Verbrauchers, 1998.
3. The formulation can be found by Wiethölter, ‘lst unserem Recht der Prozeβ zu
machen?’, in Honneth et al. (eds.), Zwischenbetrachtungen im Prozeβ der Aufklärung, 1989,
794. l have previously thought to show, referring to the emergence of ‘new modes of governance’, that it should be addressed to the European process; see Joerges, ‘Law, Economics
and Politics in the Constitutionalisation of Europe,’ 5 (2002-2003) The Cambridge Yearbook
of European Legal Studies, 2004, 123.
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cation, of RechtFertigung (‘justification’), induced by Europe, to docu‐
ment the opportunities and risks borne by the Europeanization proc‐
ess—and to demonstrate why the process itself cannot but disappoint
the dogmatic and systematic expectations of legal science (part B). In
the final part, I will further elucidate the normative perspectives that
can be associated with my title, ‘Europeanization as Process’ (part C).
A. THE CONTEST OF LEGAL DISCIPLINES AND THE MISERY OF
METHODOLOGICAL NATIONALISM
Three legal disciplines are trying to unravel and understand the proc‐
ess of Europeanization: European law, private international law and
comparative law. They all have different perspectives and introduce
contesting criteria of law. How are we to resolve the contest between
those legal disciplines4? Should European law Europeanize private law,
replace national private laws with a European private law? Is it for
comparative law to guide the quest for a suitable system of legal rules
for Europe? But surely, it is private international law’s vocation to in‐
struct Europe as to how it can reconcile its legal differences, to combine
the construction of a functioning European private law system and the
respect for national legal traditions? None of them, it is my claim, can
win the contest of the disciplines. None is equipped to deal with the
Europeanization process.
To be sure, the intention is not to pass judgment on the capabili‐
ties or disabilities of entire legal subjects. My argument, which pro‐
poses the insolubility of the contest of legal disciplines, rather follows
the specific tradition that underlies the statement, indicated above, that
legal science should be prepared to acknowledge Europe’s postnational
constellation.5 To follow up on a concretisation of this term, first coined
by Jurgen Habermas 6 and analysed by the political scientist Michael
Zürn: the individual legal disciplines must overcome their ‘methodo‐
logical nationalism,’7 their adherence in terms of concepts and method‐

4. In his famous treatise in 1798, which this section`s heading alludes to, Kant referred
not only to the sub-disciplines of one faculty. Alluding to Kant`s valuation of philosophy is
justified: jurisprudence, much to the contrary of Kant’s derisory remarks, cannot limit itself to a
function that serves given authorities, but must become productive and make use of what
Kant names ‘reason.’ See Joerges. “The Europeanisation of Private Law as a Rationalisation
Process and as a Contest of Disciplines—An Analysis of the Directive on Unfair Terms in
Consumer Contracts,” 3 ERPL 3 (1995) 175.
5. Above, pre A.
6. “Die postnationale Konstellation und die Zukunft der Demokratie,” in: Habermas, Die
postnationale Konstellation, Politische Essays, 1998, 91.
7. Zürn, “Politik in der postnationalen Konstellation,“ in Landfried (ed.), Politik in der
entgrenzten Welt, 2001, 181. Not only Zürn uses the term (see e.g. Beck, Beyond Methodo-
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ologies to national shapes; these shapes are being eroded as a conse‐
quence of European integration together with ‘globalization’ (de‐
territorializing (Entgrenzung) and denationalising) processes. Again: I
do not wish to pass judgment on the state of those disciplines; the in‐
tention is rather to highlight and reinforce the developments that are
verifiably taking place within the law and that should also be reflected
by legal science.
I. European Law
My claim, that legal science rather stubbornly adheres to national cate‐
gories of thought, must sound surprising, if not strange, in relation to
the discipline I discuss first, namely European law. Is not the European
construction exactly the negation, the Überwindung, of the nation state?
Is not the specific characteristic of European law precisely that, a claim
to supranational validity 8 without any need for Europe to become a
state first? And could not maybe private law, even though it is a ‘late
comer’ of the integration process, become somewhat of a test case for
transnational state‐free law, in particular when it would require no
more of private law than to revise its own traditions?
A dominating and most instructive topic currently under discus‐
sion within legal science and legal policy concerns the case for—or
rejection of—a European Civil Code. Numerous institutional and aca‐
demic groupings have contributed to the debate on the codification
project, in manifold ways.
The European Parliament (EP) in its resolutions of 1989 and 1994
pleaded for a European Civil Code.9 They did not have an immediate
impact,10 but did help to keep the idea alive. By now, the EP has become
more cautious, or at least more patient.11 The Commission is more sib‐
ylline. In its Communication on contract law in 2001,12 it presented four
options and asked: Should the European private law be generated
through a contest between legal orders? Should Europe draft Restate
ments following the American model? Should it ‘consolidate’ first what
logical Nationalism, Towards a New Critical Theory with a Cosmopolitan Intent, Constellations 10 (2003), 453), but I keep to Zürn’s interpretation sketched out at IV below.
8. ECR [I963], 24 f. Van Gend en Loos.
9. OJ C 158/1989, 400 and C 205/1994, 518.
10. Cf. Tilmann, ‘Eine Privatrechtskodifikation für die Europäische Gemeinschaft’, in
Müller-Graff (ed.), Gemeinsames Privatrecht in der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, 1993, 485.
11. See the Decision of the European Parliament on the approximation of Member
States’ civil and commercial law, [COM(2001) 398–C5-047l/2001–2001/2187(COS)] of 15
November 1001, A5-0384/2001.
12. Commission Communication on European Contract Law, COM (2001) 398 final, 11
July 2001.
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it has accomplished in terms of existing elements of European private
law? Or should Europe embark on further legislative measures? The
Commission summarized responses to these questions in its Action
Plan of 12 February 2003.13
The Commission carefully avoids taking a definitive position. But
the project of a European Civil Code has had a mobilising effect
throughout legal science.14 The most prominent academic writer and
also one of the most ardent advocates in favour of a European code is
Christian von Bar.15 Which of the arguments expressed in his views
seem to suggest a position of methodological nationalism? Von Bar
more than others emphasizes that legislation should draw on the
authority of science and scholarly deliberation rather than politics. His
views quite accurately reflect the self‐understanding of German schol‐
arly thought in the 19th century during the construction of the German
Civil Code.16 The German Civil Code put into effect the uniformity of the
German Reich and thus symbolizes the emergence of a German nation
state. A European Civil Code could play a similar part, as contribution
towards European state‐building, supplementing the political constitu‐
tion of Europe.
II. Comparative Law
The process of European integration has brought about a renaissance
of comparative law. For long decades it was—in Germany and else‐
where—virtually self‐evident that comparative research would focus
on American law, and only on American law. In the meantime, the
Common Core project alone attracts, year after year, a growing number
of comparative lawyers from all over Europe and the rest of the world
to Trento.17 Comparative case books are available.18 European universi‐
13. Communication of the Commission and the European Parliament and the Council: A
Coherent European Contract Law, Action Plan, OJ C 43/2003, 1.
14. See summary by Schmid. Juristenzeitung, 2001, 694, updated in his habilitation
thesis (note 1), part 3, section 2; especially on the expert working groups on the Europeanization of private law, see: Riedl, Vereinheitlichung des Privatrechts in Europa, 2004.
15. See programmatically Von Bar, ‘From Principles to Codification: Prospects for
European Private Law,’ Columbia Journal of European Law 9 (2002), 379.
16. See poignantly Jakobs, Wissenschaft und Gesetzgebung im bürgerlichen Recht
nach der Rechts- quellenlehre des 19, Jahrhunderts, 1983, 160: the German Civil Code is ‘…
a code of law, the sources of which can be found not in itself, but in the legal science that has
created it; a code of law seeking to be dominated by, rather than to dominate, science...’ (my
translation); see for closer analysis Joerges, Kritische Justiz, 1987, 166.
17. Bussani/Mattei (eds.), The Common Core of European Private Law, Essays on the
Project, 2002; on this and with a further impressive summary of the discipline’s status quo,
Gambaro, ‘The Trento Theses,’ Global Jurist 4 (2004), No. 1, Article 2.
18. Von Bar, The Common European Law of Torts, vol. l, I998; Van Gerven/Lever/
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ties have extended their intra‐European comparative research with
some enthusiasm, provoking not only quantitative but also qualitative
improvements—a real renaissance.
Again, it would be adventurous to try to force what has become a
rich and diverse theoretical debate into a uniform agenda. And just as is
the case for European law, the claim that comparative law is pervaded
by methodological nationalism may alienate the reader at first. But it
holds true, in my view, as shall be demonstrated by turning to the views
of two important exponents and opponents. Reinhard Zimmermann, on
the one hand, reveals in his numerous works that the common Euro‐
pean legal heritage, the ius commune europaeum continues to have a
considerable impact in continental civil law systems and throughout
the English (but not the American) common law. He seems to be
sketching out the foundations of a position in favour of transnational
and non‐state private law.19 But in his theoretical approach, Zimmer‐
mann combines historical studies and practical work on law. His writ‐
ings on legal history are meant to provide support to non‐legislative
codification movements. It comes as no surprise that the title of the
first section of the Introduction to the Historical‐Critical Commentary
on the German Civil Code reads: ‘The European Codification Move‐
ment’.20 The section reads further: ‘the codifications have not rendered
learned jurists redundant, nor have they led to a permanent consolida‐
tion (or fossilisation) of private law. But they did facilitate, on the one
hand, national fragmentation of legal traditions…on the other, the codi‐
fications ended the ‘second life’ of Roman law, the history of its direct
practical application… .’21 The Europeanization of private law cannot
and should not rewind the clock of history. But historical legal scholar‐
ship is trying to feed into it an awareness of its pan‐European founda‐
tions—to boost the European codification project which would create
and symbolise a uniform European legal space.
At the opposite end of the spectrum of comparative contributions
is Pierre Legrand.22 His non‐convergence thesis, his rigid opposition

Larouche/von Bar/Viney, Cases, Materials and Text on National, Supranational and International Tort Law, Scope of Protection, 1998.
19. See Zimmermann, Archiv für die civilistische Praxis, 193 (1993), 122–169: idem,
Roman Law and European Legal Unity, in Hartkamp/Hesselink/Hondius/Joustra/Du Perron
(eds.), Towards a European Civil Code, 2nd ed. 1998, 21; idem. ‘Savignys Vermächtnis,’ in
Caroni/Dilcher (eds.), Norm und Tradition, Welche Gerschichtlichkeit für die Rechtsgeschichte?, 1998, 281.
20. Zimmermann, Historisch-Kritischer Kommentar, paras. 1 ff. before § 1 (2003).
21. My translation.
22. Poignantly, e.g.: ‘European Legal Systems are not Converging,’ International and
Comparative Law Quarterly, 45 (1996), 52; ‘Against a European Civil Code,’ Modern Law
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against functionalism in comparative law and against codification
movements is based upon the assertion that common law and civil law
cannot communicate because the law is a cultural phenomenon and
European legal cultures have developed, quite simply, in an incompati‐
ble way. Both Zimmermann and Legrand loosen ties between law and
the nation state. Yet, both remain themselves tied to a methodological
nationalism. Zimmermann in that he seeks to follow the example of
historical legal science in the codification movement, Legrand in that he
deduces from the cultural features of common law and civil law their
political autonomy.23
III. Private International Law
European and Private International Law (PIL) lived separate lives for a
long time, encouraged by a culture of non‐communication where Euro‐
pean lawyers were part of public law and PIL‐lawyers part of private
law. Thus, for a long time it went practically unnoticed that the Euro‐
pean Court of Justice (ECJ) adjudicated constellations that had already
been thoroughly thought through by PIL. Nowhere did overlaps receive
greater attention and were discussed earlier than in Germany. Discus‐
sions can be separated into several stages: One phase, where PIL was
recommended as an alternative to projects suggesting unification of
law.24 A second one, still ongoing, where European law—in particular
its fundamental freedoms and the ban of discrimination, but also its
provisions on mutual recognition of binding law—was and is used to
correct PIL.25 A third phase is approaching. This phase will see the
choice‐of‐law methodology pulling away from its traditional home
discipline and in particular from its orientation towards a geographical
idea of justice. This is happening in two ways. For one, inconsistencies

Review 60 (1997), 44.
23. These are no more than cursory remarks. Hein Kötz, representing the leadingfunctionalistschool of comparative law, has always been sceptical towards the idea
of codification, see his Gemeineuropäisches Zivilrecht, Festschrift Konrad Zweigert. 1981,
481; methodologically strict exponents of the common core project are agnostic in terms of
legal policy: e.g. Bussani, ibid. (note 17), but also Mattei, ‘Hard Code Now!’, Global Jurist
Frontiers, Vol. 2, No. 1 (2002), Art. 1. The Gretchen question, however, remains whether
comparative law can give up its perception of autonomous legal systems. How can we conceptualise their interdependencies and the emergence of multi-level systems with interconnected competences?
24. See e.g. Kreuzer, ‘Die Europäisierung des internationalen PrivatrechtsVorgaben
des Gemeinschaftsrechts,’ in: Müller-Graff, Gemeinsames Privartecht in der Europäischen
Gemeinschaft, 1993, 273.
25. See Grundmann, Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationals Privatrecht
64 (2000), 457. Summary and analysis of current developments in Schmid (note 1), especially in part 3, section 1.
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within and between national law 26 and European law 27 will be recon‐
structed as ‘collisions’ and conflicts arising from the institutionalization
of different rationality criteria. Accordingly the idea that law could be
set up as a stable, permanent and ‘uniform’ system will be done away
with. Contributions describing the law of a multi‐level system and in
particular European law as a Kollisionsrecht, a ‘collision law’, increas‐
ingly demonstrate a thinking of law in constantly recurring collisions.28
More on this will be said below.29
IV. Interim Conclusion and Anticipation: the Misery of Methodological
Nationalism in Europe’s Postnational Constellation
The claim that our categories of legal science and our individual disci‐
plines attach themselves to the nation state is anything but exciting.
Equally, it should not come as a surprise that legal science—in constitu‐
tional and administrative as well as private law—draws on national
and federal examples. The connected question, however, whether—in
legal sociological terms—it is possible to halt the evolution of law be‐
yond the nation state, and—in legal theoretical terms—the debate sur‐
rounding the normative legitimacy of these developments, bear some
potentially explosive issues.
The situation in the European Union inevitably requires a look, as
indicated above, into the political science research on integration. For a
long time, we have been reading that Europe is more than an interna‐
tional organization, but less than a federation.30 To understand its posi‐

26. Intellectually groundbreaking but little noticed: Wiethölter, Begriffs- oder Interessenjurisprudenzfalsche Fronten im IPR und Wirtschaftsverfassungsrecht: Bemerkungen zur
selbstgerechten Kollisionsnorm, Festschrift Kegel, 1977, 223; analysis by Teubner. ‘Der
Umgang mit den Rechtsparadoxien: Derrida, Luhmann, Wiethölter,’ in: Joerges/Teubner
(eds.), Rechtsverfassungrecht, Recht-Fertigung zwischen Privatrechtsdogmatik und Gesellschaftstheorie, 2003, 22.
27. See Joerges, ‘Legitimationsprobleme des europäischen Wirtschaftsrechts und der
Vertrag von Maastricht,’ in: Brüggemeier (ed.), Verfassungen für ein ziviles Europa, 1994, 91.
28. Joerges, ‘The Impact of European Integration on Private Law: Reductionist Perceptions, True Conflicts and a New Constitutionalist Perspective,’ European Law Journal 3
(1997), 378; Furrer, Zivilrecht im gemeinschaftsrechtlichen Kontext. Das Europäische Kollisionsrecht als Koordinierungsinstrument für die Einbindung des Zivilrechts in dax europäische
Wirtschaftsrecht, 2002; Amstutz, Zwischenwelten, Zur Emergenz einer interlegalen Rechtsmethodik im europäischen Privatrecht, Joerges/Teubner, ibid. (note 26), 213; Vesting, Veröffentlichungen der Vereinigung der Deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer 63 (2004), 41, 65 ff.; Schmid
(ibid. note 1) part 3, section 1; Teubner/Fischer-Lescano, ‘Regime-Collision: How the Emergency of Private Governance Regimes Changes Global Legal Pluralism,’ Michigan Journal of
International Law, 2004 (forthcoming).
29. Below B. II. and C. I.
30. W. Wallace, `Less than a Federation, More than a Regime: The Community as a
Political System,’ in H. Wallace/W. Wallace (eds.), Policy-Making in the European Commu-
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tion between these two poles as a ‘multi‐level systems sui generis’ is
somewhat of a dominating view in political science31 which is being
further substantiated in respective studies. Before introducing the idea
into legal science, it should be reconstructed in normative categories.
But this is anything but easy. In his essay introducing the ‘postnational
constellation’ as a term of art,32 Jürgen Habermas posed the crucial
question whether there was a future for democracy. Democracy was
institutionalised in (national) constitutional states.
Therefore, postnational constellations are highly ambivalent; they
constitute not an achievement but rather a challenge. The thesis in
which Michael Zürn diagnoses the misery of methodological national‐
ism33 suggests that we cannot avoid the challenge, because our entry
into the postnational constellation is not at our disposition. His diagno‐
ses affect mostly the contextual conditions of political action:34 The
nation state is no longer in a position to define its political priorities
autonomously (as sovereign), but instead is forced to coordinate them
transnationally. Not only must their members (national citizens) rec‐
ognise their political action; states have also become accountable to
transnational bodies where their politics are being subjected to evalua‐
tion. To be sure, national governments continue to vehemently defend
their fiscal powers. “Whilst resources remain (in most part) at national
level, the formulation of politics has been internationalised and recog‐
nition transnationalized.”35
How will this type of multidimensional disaggregation of state‐
hood affect the law? First of all, we should be prepared to find the
transnational (European) level of politics confronting national law with
a range of demands arising from the interconnectedness of nation
states (in other words, the logic of integration of societal sub‐systems),
and from the project of integration and its institutionalised political
telos manifested in the European Treaties. Neither the national nor the
transnational dimension gives a firm halt; both are instead themselves
in a state of contingent development. The thesis suggesting that we are
and will be witnessing tensions between a functionalist logic of market
integration institutionalised in the Treaties and a normative logic of
justification, of RechtFertigung, institutionalised at national level, in

nity, 1983, 403.
31. Instructive are contributions to Jachtenfuchs/Kohler-Koch (eds.), Europäische
Integration, 2nd ed., 2003.
32. Above note 6.
33. Above note 7.
34. Ibid., 188-191.
35. My translation; ibid., 188.
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my view continues to have much persuasive force as a starting point
and basis for approximation.36 It implies: law has to learn how to ac‐
commodate disaggregated competences of action and the fact that in a
European multi‐level system the ‘higher’ level’s competences are re‐
stricted to the fields enumerated in the Treaty, that Europe hence can‐
not form a hierarchical system but instead relies on a plethora of policy
networks and on cooperative problem solving. Any attempt to illustrate
or concretise these formulae is bound to fail the systematic expecta‐
tions and traditional thought patterns.
B. EXEMPLA TRAHUNT: THREE PATTERNS OF EUROPEANIZATION OF
PRIVATE LAW
‘Less than a “system”, but more than just a set of contingent case law’—
thus the claim of the following analyses of the practice of
Europeanization of private law. It would be unrealistic to accredit to
the law the power to assert itself as a ‘system’ within the complex and
conflict ridden territory of the European multi‐level system. But any
suggestion to break the law down into a string of individual cases
would be equally far from reality. Three sets of examples are being
introduced, exemplifying in turn some significant patterns of
Europeanization of private law. Their ‘exemplicity’ is manifested
particularly in the range of options they uncover for integration policy.
In saying this, I implicitly suggest that these options include diverse,
even opposite perspectives. I also assert that their contest will not
come to a rest, that we should not expect any one pattern to acclaim a
monopoly at any time in the future. Rather, each individually will be
subjected to a range of experiences that in turn will provoke further
learning processes. Here is not the place to advocate normative
agnosticism. Having said that, it should be stressed that the law will
have to be prepared to deal with colliding concepts of Europeanization.
I. Product Liability Law: on the Destitution of Orthodox Supranationalism
The European Community Product Liability Directive was adopted
unanimously, under (the old version of) Article 100 TEC, on 25 July
1985.37 This explains why it records product liability law so incom‐
pletely,38 why it disappointed expectations especially of those who ex‐

36. See Joerges/Brüggemeier, ‘Europäisierung des Vertrags- und Haftungsrechts,’ in:
Müller·Graff (ed.), Gemeinsames Privatrecht in der Eurupäischen Gemeinschaft, 1993, 233.
37. OJ L 2l0/1985. 29.
38. Koch, Zeitschrift für das gesamte Handels- und Wirtschaftsrecht 152 (1988), 537.
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pected it to be the flagship of European consumer protection law.39
Intense debates surrounded the Directive’s implementation. It was
widely considered a marginal piece of legislation with little impact on
the general law of obligations because Article 13 of the Directive evi‐
dently did not respect claims pursuant to other legal bases.40 There was,
at any rate, broad agreement that the Directive would preclude further
advances in consumer protection law by establishing a set of conclusive
minimum standards.
For a long time, these expectations appeared justifiable, until, in
three relatively recent judgments of 25 April 2002,41 the ECJ shattered
them quite dramatically. The Court recognised to the great surprise of
most observers that the Directive’s consumer protection provisions
were not intended to introduce protective minimum standards, but
rather to achieve ‘complete harmonisation’ As a consequence, the Di‐
rective enjoys the standing of fully‐fledged European law: it is supreme
to national private law, takes precedence over subsequent national
legislation and creates a duty for national courts to refer to the ECJ.
The three decisions just mentioned concern the French, the Greek
and the Spanish implementation of the Directive. The Spanish case is
particularly frightening.42 Mrs. Gonzalez Sanchez had to have a blood
transfusion in the hospital run by the defendant institution (Medicina
Asturiana SA). As a consequence of the transfusion, she was infected
with the Hepatitis C virus. She based her action on the law by which
Spain had transposed the Directive into Spanish law and, in addition, on
the general liability provisions of Spanish civil law, and on the Spanish
General Law for the Protection of Consumers and Users of 19 July 1984,
under which the claimant had only to prove damage and a causal con‐
nection. Under the Product Liability Directive, implemented 10 years
after the 1984 law,43 she also had to prove that the hospital had pro‐
duced the blood conserves, which she failed to show. Therefore, the
success of her claim depended on the relationship between the three
legal bases. Article 13 of the Directive provides that the Directive “shall
not affect any rights which an injured person may have according to the

39. See Brüggemeier/Reich, Wertpapier Mitteilungen 1986, 149.
40. E.g. Brüggemeier, Zeitschrift für das gesamte Handels- und Wirtschaftsrecht 152
(1988), 511, 531.
41. Case C-52/00, ECR [2002] I-3827 Commission v. France; Case C-183/00, ECR
[2002] I·3901 Mari}: MarÍa Victoria González Sánchez v. Medicina Asturiana SA; Case C154/00, ECR [2002] I-3879 Commission v. Greece.
42. On the following, see analyses by Arbour, ELJ 10 (2004), 87 and Schmid (ibid., note
1), especially part 2, section 4, chapter 5.
43. Case C-183/00 para. 7, 8.
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rules of the law of contractual or non‐contractual liability or a special
liability system existing at the moment when this Directive is notified.”
Does this mean, the Spanish court asked the ECJ, that the Directive
could “be interpreted as precluding the restriction or limitation, as a
result of transposition of the Directive, of rights granted to consumers
under the legislation of the Member State?”44 To the unversed reader,
the question may sound rhetorical. But the Court responded: “Article
13 of the Directive cannot be interpreted as giving the Member States
the possibility of maintaining a general system of product liability dif‐
ferent from that provided for in the Directive.”45
The provision that Article 13 does not affect claims on a different
basis cannot “be relied on in such a case in order to justify the mainte‐
nance in force of national provisions affording greater protection than
those of the Directive.”46
In its analysis of the Community law provisions, the ECJ refers to
Recital 1 in the preamble of the Directive, according to which “ap‐
proximation is necessary because legislative divergences may distort
competition and affect the movement of goods within the common
market and entail a differing degree of protection of the consumer
against damage caused by a defective product to his health or prop‐
erty.”47 It had been necessary at the time to introduce this sentence, in
order to ‘establish’ the Community’s (functional) legislative compe‐
tence. Since then, the paragraph has become neither more empirically
relevant, nor normatively more correct. Nevertheless, the Court’s
judgment reaffirmed its value as a virtually teleological motivation for
restricting Member States’ legislative autonomy.48
European law, understood this way, does not contribute much to
the Europeanization process. The preliminary rulings procedure has
good institutional sense because it links the judiciary in Member States
to the jurisdiction of the ECJ. But it can bear painful consequences for
those who seek justice in a case that would not normally seem prob‐
lematic.49 After long years of litigation, Mrs. Sanchez finally knew whom
she would have had to sue in order to enforce her rights. A result such
as this one would be easier to accept, if we could see in the ECJ’s judg‐

44. Ibid., para. 13.
45. Ibid.. para. 30.
46. Ibid., para. 33.
47. Ibid., para. 3.
48. Ibid., paras. 24, 25.
49. More generally Joerges, ‘The Bright and the Dark Side of the Consumer’s Access to
Justice in the EU,’ Global Jurist Topics 1 (2001): No. 2, Article 1.
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ment a constructive contribution to the development of product liabil‐
ity law. But this is hardly possible.50
II. Company Law: Economic Freedom and Political Rights of European
Citizensand their Bars
The judgments in Centros,51 Überseering52 and Inspire Art53 are part of a
single complex which should be discussed in unity, but at this point I
will focus on a particular aspect often shaded by a plethora of literary
analysis. From the interplay between the economic freedoms, the legis‐
lative and the judiciary, emerges the right to hold the national sover‐
eign to account for its legislation and to confront it with the legal
rationality of its European neighbours—this to me is the normative
significance of the Centros case law, but equally its practical weakness.54
The judgment in Centros concerns the core of the European legal
acquis, namely the freedoms of market citizens which apply directly and
ought therefore to take primacy over national law. The decision was
widely praised as a milestone in the realization of the market freedoms,
as a contribution to the so‐called negative integration and the opening up
of regulatory competition; but it also has wider implications.
A Danish married couple, Marianne and Tony Bryde, wished to
import wine into Denmark. For this they planned to set up a company,
but did not want to pay the fee of the DK 200,000 (28,000 Euro) that
Denmark required for the registration of companies. In May 1992 they
founded a private Limited company in England, the now legendary
Centros Ltd., and set up a subsidiary in Copenhagen—for none of these
steps did they need the money that a regular registration in Denmark
would have required. Unsurprisingly, the Danish authorities refused
registration. The Brydes went to court. Seven years later, the ECJ
handed down the following judgment to the referring Danish
Højesteret. It found, rightly, that:
It is contrary to Articles 52 and 58 of the Treaty for a Mem‐
ber State to refuse to register a branch of a company formed

50. See below C. III.
51. Case C-212/97, ECR [1999] I-1459 Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen.
52. Case C-208/00, ECR [2002] I-9919 Überseering BV v. Nordic Construction Company Baumanagement GmbH (NCC).
53. Case C-167/01, Kanter van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v. Inspire Art
Ltd, U. of 30 September 2003.
54. See Joerges, ‘Zur Legitimität der Europäisierung des Privatrechts. Überlegungen zu
einem Recht-Fertigungs-Recht für das Mehrebenensystem der EU,’ in Joerges/Teubner, ibid.
(note 26), 183, 189–194.
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in accordance with the law of another Member State in
which it has its registered office but in which it conducts no
business where the branch is intended to enable the com‐
pany in question to carry on its entire business in the state
in which that branch is to be created, while avoiding the
need to form a company there, thus evading application of
the rules governing the formation of companies which, in
that state, are more restrictive as regards the paying up of a
minimum share capital.55
Did the Court permit the Brydes, in Gerhard Kegel’s well phrased
words,56 to ‘cock a snoot’ at the law? Or, and this may be the case’s most
popular reading, was it the ECJ’s intention to allow for a more efficient
legal framework for company law in Europe?57
Maybe the truth lies in the middle? What is so abusive, really,
about setting up a company in another Member State with a seemingly
more beneficial regulatory system? Should we not simply understand
it—as the ECJ does—as the exercise of a right afforded to European
citizens, a right which however will cede to legitimate regulatory con‐
cerns—foreclosing the concerns of those who warn against the superi‐
ority of economic against political reason. The ECJ did not push aside
Denmark’s right to enact compulsory provisions dealing with company
law. It placed Denmark under pressure to justify why Danish registra‐
tion fees would better serve the protection of creditors, which, accord‐
ing to the Danish government’s presentation, was the object of the
Danish legislation. The Court remained unconvinced, partly because
foreign companies were allowed to set up branches in Denmark with‐
out having to pay a registration fee.
There are obvious parallels to the jurisdiction on Article 28 TEC,
which since Cassis de Dijon, thus for the past 34 years, has repeatedly
found that Community law must preserve and respect national auton‐
omy (‘autonomieschonend’), whilst national laws must pursue their
legitimate regulatory interests in conformity with Community law
(‘gemeinschaftsverträglich’). In other words: Danish citizens have the
right to test their national sovereign in a European court—the Brydes
made use of their right. In case it is found to be in breach of European
law, the Danish legislator is given the chance to amend its laws—and it

55. Sentence 1 of the tenor of the judgment, ECR [1999] I-1947.
56. In his editorial in Zeitschrift für Europäisches Wirtschafts- und Steuerrecht (8) 1999
(`Es ist was faul im Staate Dänemark und anderswo...`).
57. See Eidenmüller, ‘Wettbewerb der Gesellschaftsrechte in Europa,’ ZIP 2002, 2233.
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has done so.58 The new regulation, justified by legitimate concerns of
the Danish government to secure tax demands, may be called into ques‐
tion again. It remains to be seen—e.g. whether the Brydes are again
prepared to invest 10 years to challenge existing Danish law.
Centros has not remained without consequences. The possibility
that interested actors would try to test how far their new freedoms
would reach and how much money they would save, was easily pre‐
dictable yet little investigated.59 Debate about the implications of Cen
tros in terms of legal systematique was however, dense; it helps us in
better understanding the two following decisions. In a reference for a
preliminary ruling by the Federal High Court of 30 May 2002 (Überseer
ing),60 the ECJ was asked whether German law could prevent a Dutch
plaintiff from suing for over 1,000,000 DM by, firstly, restricting in § 50
(1) of its Zivilprozessordnung locus standi to those legally competent
(rechtsfähig) companies, and secondly, by prescribing that a company
incorporated according to Dutch law could lose its legal capacity once it
transferred its activities to Germany in a way which constitutes, accord‐
ing to German law, a transfer of its ‘seat’ or legal headquarters (Ver
waltungssitz).61 In an internal market where freedom of establishment
exists as a right, such legal principles seem downright incredible.62 In
Inspire Art63 the ECJ continued its line of reasoning, and established: the
right of a company set up under English law to carry on business in the
Netherlands should be respected in principle; only for ‘good’ reasons,
not accounted for in European secondary legislation, may this funda‐
mental freedom be restricted.
The Centros judgment found Denmark’s regulatory interests per
se legitimate. In the follow‐up decisions, there was no need for the

58. See Trefil, Centros und die Niederlassungsfreiheit von Gesellschaften in Europa,
EUI Working Paper Law 2003/9, http://www.iue.it/PUB/law03-9.pdf, 3l ff., referring to
www.retsinfo.dk and the doubts about the solidarity of the Danish ‘Sonderweg.’
59. lnstructively Baudisch. ‘From Status to Contract? An American Perspective on
Recent Developments in European Company Law,’ in Snyder (ed.), The European Union and
Governance, 2003, 24, 44 ff., who considers a ‘race to the bottom’ unlikely, because of
existing interests for businesses in their reputation.
60. German Federal Court, BGH Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht 2000, 412.
61. See para. 45 of the Opinion of Advocate-General Colomer on 4 December 2001 for
Case C-208/00 Überseering BV v. NCC GmbH.
62. Eventually the representation made by the German government, that the plaintiff
could have acted as a company without legal personality under German law (cited in AG
Colomer`s Opinion at para. 55: see also Roth, Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts 2003, 117, 123 f.), will not suffice; poignantly Schanze/Jüttner, Die Akteingesellschaft 2003, 30.
63. Case C-167/01, U. v. 30.09.2003, Kamer van Koophandel v. Inspire Art Ltd., Neue
Juristische Wochenschrift 2003, 3331.
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Court to discuss the bars to the fundamental freedoms. But these ques‐
tions have become increasingly pressing: how are the general reasons
in favour of the ‘seat’ theory (Sitztheorie)—protection of creditors and
of subsidiary companies; co‐determination; avoidance of double taxa‐
tion—to be accounted for in the future? Not by invoking the seat the‐
ory! In Europe’s multi‐level system, the latter is equally as obsolete as
its counterpart, the ‘incorporation’ theory (Gründungstheorie). Both
have no place in Europe’s postnational constellation.64 Their objectives
must be expressed in different terms 65 and addressed in a way so as to
conform with Community principles.66

III. Altmark Trans: Public Services after Privatization
One of the most important characteristics of the Europeanization proc‐
ess is that it disconnects what is traditionally considered ‘private law’
from its regulatory context. This is one of the inevitably disintegrative
effects of integration, legally rooted in one of the Community’s core
principles: the EU’s competences are restricted to the fields enumer‐
ated in the Treaty. Amongst them we find practically the whole field of
regulatory law, and the Community has used those competences exten‐
sively.67 The real world, however, continuously brings up constellations
where the demarcation of competences in the Treaty does not corre‐
spond with real existing and interconnected regulatory problem con‐
stellations. Typically, the European level is competent to regulate one
aspect of a problem, whereas Member States remain competent to

64. Clearly Schanze/Jüttner, Die Aktiengesellschaft 2003, 681, 685.
65. Especially Schanze/Jüttner, ibid., and Ulmer, Juristenzeitung 999, 662 and Neue
Juristische Wochenschrift 2004, 1201 illustrate convincingly how this is possible.
66. The German co-determination rules are the most complicated, because they lack
any functional equivalent elsewhere (see Dammann, 8 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 607).
Co-determination may not be imposed on an undertaking simply because it uses its right to
establishmentand vice versa: Community law may not dispense with an institution such as
the German co-determination procedure, simply because it disturbs companies' freedom of
establishment. It is instead left to initiate political processes through institutionalisation of
existing tensions. An example, at first sight a little remote: the practices engaged by Microsoft
in the US and in the EU are judged differently in either legal order. But where the EU, as was
declared by the Commission on 24 March 2004, imposes its law in Europe, then it takes away
de facto rights and freedoms Microsoft enjoys under US law. The EU can avail itself of a legal
framework that does not leave these types of dilemmas to lie [with expected effects: see
Sadowski/Junkes/Lindenthal, Labour Co·determination and Corporate Governance in Germany, in: Schalbach (ed.). Corporate Governance, Essays in Honor of Horst Albach, 2nd ed.
2003. 144].
67. Jacques Delors in a slightly outdated but much cited statement announced that 80
per cent of the economic law in Member States should be determined by the Community.
Delors. ‘Europa im Umbruch. Vom Binnenmarkt zur Europäischen Union.’ in Kommission der
EG (ed.), Europäische Gespräche, vol. 9. 1992, 12.
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regulate another one. The term ‘diagonal’ is used to distinguish such
constellations from, on the one hand, ‘vertical’ conflict resolutions
where Community law trumps national law, and from ‘horizontal’ con‐
flicts which arise from differences among the Member States’ legal
systems and which belong to the domain of PIL on the other.68 The term
‘diagonal conflicts’ captures a structural characteristic of the European
multi‐level system. Neither the European level nor the national level is
in a position to address a specific problem in its entirety: European and
national actors are forced to coordinate.
Examples are legion, even though they do not always appear in the
literature under the heads I have just indicated.69 I restrict myself to
one: The Altmark Trans judgment of 24 July 2003 70 illustrates the impli‐
cations of the privatization71 of public services, induced by European
law; these Europeanized so‐called ‘Services of General Interest’ or
‘Daseinsvorsorge’ are controversial because they meet with firmly em‐
bedded national regulatory traditions, expectations and interests. The
regulations they affect are not as much intertwined with private law as
they may be in constellations where national private law pursues regu‐
latory goals that may collide with some goals of European regulatory
law. However, privatization initiatives are a major concomitant of inte‐
gration; they affect the realm of private law as they determine to what
extent services can be brought by and in conformity with the market.
‘Daseinsvorsorge’ was brought under the auspices of public law on
the basis that it affected basic human requirements in industrialised
times. The German term was coined by no less than Karl Jaspers before
1933. The fact that Ernst Forsthoff in 1938 re‐applied the term in the
context of administrative law 72 is no argument as such. In any case, it is
correct to say that in the first place Daseinsvorsorge had to gain the
social and democratic legitimacy used today in its defence. Those who
acknowledge its value, e.g. the British social philosopher Steven Lukes,
must fear the ‘invasions of the market’73 in Europe; those who find no

68. See also Schmid (note 1), part 3, section 1, sub-section 1, chapter 2.
69. But see Schmid (note 1), part 3, chapter 2.
70. Case C·280/00, Altmark Trans GmbH v. Regierungspäisidium Magdeburg und
Nahverkehrsgesellschaft Altmark GmbH, nyr.
71. On this process see ‘Communication on Services of General Interest in Europe`
(COM (1996) 443 final of 11 September 1996), ‘Report on Services of General Interest`
(COM (2001) 598 final of 17 October 2001) and the ‘Green Paper on Services of General
Interest` (COM(2003) 270 final of 21 May 2003).
72. ‘Daseinsvorsorge als Aufgabe der modernen Verwaltung,’ idem., Die Verwaltung als
Leistungsträger, 1938.
73. Lukes, ‘Invasions of the Market,’ in Dworkin et al. (eds.), From Liberal Values to
Democratic Transition, 2003. Lukes argues within the anglo-saxon tradition: ‘As Marshall
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place for it in a social welfare state, such as the expert committee to the
German Federal Ministry of Commerce, would regard its protection by
legal norms as an encroachment of ‘the citizens’ subjective rights, guar‐
anteed by the Community, to unhampered participation in the cross‐
border transfer of goods and services’.74
Altmark Trans concerned subsidies awarded to public transport
undertakings in the Landkreis of Stendal in Germany. The case itself
may seem insignificant, yet the ensuing questions are of fundamental
importance: should availability of public transport be organised on the
basis of social welfare and distributional justice or on the basis of effi‐
ciency? Is this an openly political question to be decided by the German
Lander and communes, or a legal question for Community law to an‐
swer? The ECJ knew not to decide these questions definitively, but in‐
stead to design a legal framework which leaves room for political
processes and decisions—and still protects European concerns. This is,
it seems to me, the core message of the decision which also brought up
difficult questions of law concerning the interplay between secondary
Community law and the German public transport law (Personenbe
förderungsgesetz) as amended in 1995. Altmark Trans GmbH and
Nahverkehrsgesellschaft mbH both sought to organise public transport
in the Landkreis of Stendal in Sachsen–Anhalt, one of the German
Lander. Altmark had been licensed, and got the license renewed by the
Regierungspräsidium, whereas the bid of Nahverkehrsgesellschaft mbH
was rejected. The central question of law occupying the ECJ was: did
the subsidies given to Altmark Trans after it had been granted the li‐
cense to organise bus traffic in the Landkreis Stendal qualify as state
aid within the meaning of Art. 87 TEC? If yes, then they would be sub‐
ject to the Commission’s competences under the Treaty provisions on
state aid.
The Court’s response sounds like old‐fashioned legal formalism:
following its own case law, the Court finds that an official act does not
constitute state aid within the Treaty unless it includes an ‘advantage’
to the beneficiary undertaking. Advantages for the purpose of state aid
exclude financial means provided by the state by way of compensation
argued, the first half of the twentieth century saw the acquisition by citizens of a range of
basic services to which they could claim entitlement as citizens, services funded and provided
by the state and thus excluded from the scope of the market. These are sometimes seen as
constituents of ‘social citizenship’ but they can, equally, be seen as supplying the preconditions for core citizenship by enabling citizens to acquire and maintain the capacities needed
for its equal exercise.’
74. My translation; see Expert Committee to the German Federal Ministry of Commerce
[Wissenschaflicher Beirat beim Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft], ‘Daseinsvorsorge’ im
europäischen Binnenmarkt, 2002, 7.

34

2009

Europeanization as Process

for public service obligations taken on by the service provider. But the
Court goes further, operationalizing its own distinction by four crite‐
ria:75 (1) The recipient must be required to discharge clearly defined
public service obligations; (2) The parameters of the calculated com‐
pensation must be established in advance in an objective and transpar‐
ent manner; (3) The compensation must not exceed costs plus a
reasonable profit; (4) Decisions are to be taken either after a public
procurement procedure or the level of compensation is to be deter‐
mined on the basis of an analysis of the costs of typical undertaking,
well run and adequately provided with adequate means of transport.
These responses do bear some problems. They need to be further
concretized and their implementation will be challenging. But they
have high normative qualities: European law does not take a stand for
or against the organisation of public services through national welfare
states; it decides neither for nor against the market. Instead it puts
justificatory pressure on national politics and forces those who organ‐
ise public services to explain how they fulfil their social mandate. It
‘constitutionalizes’ the multi‐level system so as to accommodate the
decentralised exercise of formative (national) political freedom, whilst
at the same time allowing for European concerns to afford market ac‐
cess to non‐local suppliers. And if this were to prove a successful solu‐
tion guaranteeing and manifesting some social sense in national
practices, then it would be an achievement that so far has remained
hardly conceivable in most integrated political systems 76—a ‘proce‐
dural’ conflict solution par excellence.
C. VERBA DOCENT: ON THE PROCEDURAL LEGITIMACY OF THE
EUROPEANIZATION PROCESS
What I am now trying is to bring the abstract deliberations in the first
part and the analyses of the second part into a synthesis. I will proceed
in three steps. The first follows the understanding of Europe as a multi‐
level system, to demonstrate its implications for integration policy.
Normative dependencies of political action become apparent in this
process and are being re‐conceptualised, in a second step, in legal cate‐
gories. In a final step l will sketch out the legal constitution of the Euro‐
peanization process itself, which, it is my claim, must be designed
procedurally, in order to overcome the impasses of European law and
the methodological nationalism in comparative law and PIL.

75. Case C-280/00 (note 68), paras. 89–95.
76. See, Zürn/Joerges (eds.), Governance and Law in Post-National Constellations.
Compliance in Europe and Beyond, 2005.
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I. Farewell to Orthodox Supranationalism
Europe is no federation, but more than a regime. It is a heterarchically
structured multi‐level system. It must organise its political action in
networks. Since the powers and resources for political action are lo‐
cated at various and relatively autonomous levels in the EU, the coping
with functionally interwoven problem‐constellations will depend on
the communication between the various actors who are relatively
autonomous in their various domains, but at the same time mutually
dependent.77 Jürgen Neyer formulated his thesis in a most concrete
fashion, usually avoided by political scientists: the EU‐specific condi‐
tions for political action favour a deliberative mode of communication
that is bound by rules and principles and where arguments are ac‐
cepted only if they are capable of universal application.78 These consid‐
erations can help legal science to satisfy an undeniable need to afford
its declarative statements some normative value. But they cannot sub‐
stitute the argumentative construction of normative statements specific
to law, and they leave room for additional argumentation. To translate
Neyer’s argument: the European legal framework is not designed
merely to secure fundamental freedoms; but neither to create a new
European state. The purpose of European law is instead to discipline
the interactions necessary within the Community to act politically. It is
to guide strategic action into a deliberative style of politics. It should
leave behind ‘vertical’ (‘orthodox’) supranationalism and instead found
its validity as law on the normative (deliberative) quality of the political
processes that create it.79 To which we may add:80 No state in Europe
can make or refrain from making decisions without causing ‘extra‐
territorial’ effects on its neighbours. Provocatively put, but brought to
its logical conclusion, this means: nationally organised constitutional
states are becoming unable to act democratically. They cannot include
in the electoral processes, determining the democratic sovereign, all
those who will be affected by their decisions. And vice versa: their citi‐
zens cannot influence the behaviour of those political actors who are
77. See above A. IV.
78. ‘Discourse and Order in the EU. A Deliberative Approach to Multi-Level Govemance,’ Journal of Common Market Studies 41 (2003), 687; more detailed in his habilitation
thesis, Postnationale politische Herrschaft, 2004.
79. See Joerges/Neyer, with Jürgen Neyer. ‘From Intergovernmental Bargaining to
Deliberative Political Processes: The Constitutionalisation of Comitology,’ 3 (1997) European
Law Journal 273; Joerges, ‘Good Governance’ in the European Internal Market: Two Competing Legal Conceptualisation of European Integration and their Synthesis,’ in: von Bogdandy/Mavroides/Mény (eds.), European Integration and International Co-ordination. Studies
in Transnational Economic Low in Honour of Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, 2002, 219.
80. See Joerges, ‘The Impact,’ ibid. (note 28).
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taking the relevant decisions for them. It would thus seem legitimate
for Europe to require its Member States to design their national laws
with a view to accommodate Community law. It would also seem sensi‐
ble to afford Member States’ citizens legal rights that are truly Euro‐
pean because they allow national citizens to compare their own laws
with the laws and the experiences in other Member States.
II. European Law as Choice of Law and the Constitutionalization of
Transnational Governance
The normative claims identified above of ‘deliberative supranational‐
ism’ should not be portrayed as some remote wish list. They are well
documented and somewhat canonised in real existing European law:
Member States of the Union may not enforce their interests and their
laws unboundedly. They are bound to respect European freedoms.
They may not discriminate. They may only pursue ‘legitimate’ regula‐
tory policies approved by the Community. They must coordinate in
relation to what regulatory concerns they can follow, and design their
national regulatory provisions in the most Community‐friendly way.
What is the meaning of all this, for the relationship between European
and national law in general, and the Europeanization of private law in
particular?
Two complementary patterns of legalisation, of Verrechtlichung,
and responsibilities for the law, may be differentiated. All of the above
principles and rules substantiating a ‘deliberative suprnationalism’
affect how we deal with differences between laws. They impose a duty
on Member States to take into consideration ‘foreign’ affairs and inter‐
ests. To European law, they have assigned the task of making sure that
national law is compatible with Community principles. In that sense,
the law of the Community is a ‘choice‐of‐law’ (‘Kollisionsrecht’). It does
more than traditional PIL, in that its decision‐making criteria are not
there to identify the geographically closer or factually preferable law or
decide between colliding interests in the application of the law. It does
not work on the assumption that between equally involved national
laws a choice should be made. Rather, it requires national laws to be
made Community‐compatible through innovation and modification,
and the development and observance of principles and rules, in order
to organise the differences between them. All these factors impose
limits on national sovereignty. In addition, Union citizens are afforded
rights that are directly applicable in their own as much as in foreign
Member States—forcing a duty on the national legislator to justify its
actions in a European forum.
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Member States are being asked to make changes to their legal sys‐
tems—changes that should in principle take place there, for them to
effectively guarantee that Europe’s innovative impact will help national
legal systems to evolve sensibly.81 However, this is but one side of the
process. Building on just those measures that are promoting free trade
and the Europeanization of our markets and rejecting the individual
states’ interests and orientations, European transnational governance
structures have developed and unfolded their own logic and signifi‐
cance.
This holds true for all domains of regulatory policy 82—including
the traditional realm of ‘private law’, at least indirectly.83 And in all
those fields where private law instruments are being deployed for the
organization of transnational activities, suitable arrangements are
likely to establish themselves. Regulatory politics have seen an intense
debate for some time on the question of how these new forms of trans‐
national governance can be conceptualised legally (‘constitution‐
alized’). Discussions are equally intense in the area of competition pol‐
icy after its ‘modernization’ in Regulation 1/2003.84 85 It is only a matter
of time for those discussions to reach private law.
III. Juridifying the Europeanization Process
Private law cannot ignore the postnational constellation it finds itself
placed in. It cannot pretend there is still a set of autonomous national
legal systems. It can do equally little about the fact that Europe is not a
state, and is not on its way to statehood. All it can do is try to bind po‐
litical processes to legal principles and to influence law making in the
European multi‐level system. The literature on Europeanization of
private law talks too little about these framework conditions. It is not
obvious which legislative institution in Europe would be competent to
write a Civil Code that could absorb the rich diversity of European legal
traditions. It is not obvious how any such Code could keep pace with
the evolutionary dynamic of regulatory politics. There are no signs of
an expansion of the European judiciary, yet an expansion seems indis‐

81. See the remarks in note 28 and also Deakin, ‘Regulatory Competition versus Harmonisation in European Company Law,’ Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 2
(1999), 231.
82. See Joerges, Europarecht 2002, 17.
83. See above B. III.
84. OJ L 2003/1 of 4 January 2003. See also: http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition
/antitrust/legislation/proceduraI_rules/comments/
85. The Commission home page gives an impression: http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/legislation/proceduraI_rules/comments/
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pensable, if the new law is to enjoy effective validity.86 The status quo is
anything but ideal. Europeanization takes place in an incremental and
fragmented fashion. Citizens seeking to enforce their legal rights are
being subjected to unacceptable burdens. Yet, over all we are facing an
innovative process full of opportunities.
Typically, the most problematic amongst the case law constella‐
tions analysed in part two is the one that rigorously brings to bear the
principles emerging from the formative period of European law. The
ECJ ‘s thesis that the provisions of the Product Liability Directive have
effected a ‘complete harmonisation’, undeniably ignores that if product
liability law is to be applied sensibly, it should be placed in the particu‐
lar context of elements of fault and liability, objective standards of neg‐
ligence, product safety legislation and self‐regulation (standardization
and certification). It is hard to imagine how the ECJ could not have
taken these circumstances into account, but equally difficult to see how
its punctual intervention could contribute sensibly to the Europeaniza‐
tion of product liability and product safety law.
Things are different for company law. Here the ECJ pronounced
clear and consistent orientation points in a way that is manageable for
secondary Community law as well as national legal systems. The ECJ
has conferred political rights on the ‘market citizen’, without affording
either the market or market citizens law‐making powers. The Court’s
findings on the privatisation of public services appears to me equally
productive. Legal traditions, social expectations, political preferences,
administrative know‐how and market innovation—all these are very
different between Brittany and Estonia, between Faroe Islands and
Sicily. Europe seems destined to institute innovation and to encourage
social learning. It is not Europe’s job to subject the continent to a uni‐
tary regime.
The incrementalism of the Europeanization process is challenging
but also full of opportunities. Europe is no polity in the way nation
states are. It will have to live with its complex diversity illustrated in
the case law above: primary law granting fundamental freedoms and
basic rights; transnational governance arrangements in numerous

86. ‘Kommt die Geschäftswelt nicht ganz gut zurecht?’—‘but isn’t the business world
doing quite well?’—Ernst Steindorff asked more than a decade ago (see the report of the
symposium ‘Alternativen zur legislatorischen Rechtsvergleichung‘ by Oliver Remien in Rabels
Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationals Privatrecht 56 (1992), 261 ff., 300 ff.], just to
re-pose the question now (Aufgaben künftiger europäischer Privatrechtssetzung angesichts
deutscher Erfahrungen, Festschrift Peter Ulmer 2003, 1393, 1407, note 63) and to add to its
context: those who lobby for greater legislative ambit in Europe should also ask for a corresponding expansion of Europe's judiciary’s powers which nobody will be eager to finance.
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fields of regulatory politics; legislative and judicial interventions affect‐
ing only a section of the national legal systems and leading to irritation.
This diversity creates by no means a comfortable situation. Maybe we
will find that its complexity exceeds our learning capacities. But I am
confident that it makes no sense simply to imagine a more simplistic
legal landscape.
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Constitutions for the 21st Century
Emerging Patterns—the EU, Iraq, Afghanistan…*

Chibli Mallat**

I. INTRODUCTION: CONSTITUTIONALISM’S INTERNATIONAL DRIVE
Amongst the furthest encompassing contemporary reflections on law
stand the works of Paul Kahn. In a contribution to a Latin
American/New England seminar on law and violence in 2003, he had
this to say about the EU:
The political project of the EU, for example, is about displacing
a sacrificial politics with a set of bureaucratic arrangements for
the administration of markets and social‐welfare. If the
romantic element in Western politics has been in its
attachment to sacrifice of the body, the EU project is just the
opposite: it is politics as management of the well‐being of the
body. The bureaucrat in Brussels is the very opposite of the
romantic politician. The longing to join the EU among the
countries of Eastern Europe is not just about economics, but
also about depoliticalization, i.e., about an emerging perception
of sacrificial politics as a form of pathology. Indeed, the entire
effort of the international human rights movement is rooted in
this vision of well‐being. No one, on this view, should die or
1
suffer for politics.

* The Third Annual Herbert L. Bernstein Memorial Lecture in Comparative Law, Duke
University School of Law, Sept. 28, 2004. Reprinted with permission from CONSTITUTIONS FOR
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, EMERGING PATTERNS: THE EU, IRAQ, AFGHANISTAN…, in THE LAW
APPLIED, CONTEXTUALIZING THE ISLAMIC SHARIA’A 194 (PERI BEARMAN, ET AL. EDS., I.B. TAURUS &
CO LTD, 2008).
** Presidential Professor of Law, University of Utah, Jean Monnet Chair in Law, EU
Centre of Excellence, University Saint Joseph. Principal, Mallat law offices, Beirut. This is a
lightly footnoted version of the Third Herbert L. Bernstein Annual Memorial Lecture in
International and Comparative Law read at Duke Law School on September 28, 2004. I have
updated the text slightly considering the important changes in both the EU and Iraqi
constitutional scenes; the central argument has not changed.
1. Paul W. Kahn, “Sacred Violence,” SELA 2003, 13. SELA, acronym of Seminario en
Latinoamérica de Teoría Constitucional y Democracia, brings together a group of leading
academics mostly from Latin American and North American law schools, who meet usually
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There are several strands in the Kahnian view which will appear
elusive for those who have not followed his fertile search for the
triangle love‐law‐religion, and the meanings relevant to the triangle for
such issues as war and international relations, the body, or human
rights. In a vision which tends to be overall bleak, the silver lining is a
peculiar form of legal optimism, which is of significance to anyone
2
interested in reform despite the less humane aspects of human beings.
Here we need to bifurcate:
One bifurcation regards the EU and constitution‐making, the other
is Kantian, and regards constitutions and war.
Strong moments in constitution‐making often result from
traumas—sacrificial politics, amongst which the archetype stands as
Abraham’s offer to sacrifice his son for God in order to save his people,
religion and nation. The case of the EU, which is universally considered a
triumph of Europe over its 20th Century most tragic traumas, two World
Wars for the Europe of 6, the Cold War for Europe of the 25 to 30, is a
living, acknowledged example, Afghanistan and Iraq another. Nothing
defines trauma for Afghanis and Iraqis more than war, internal and inter‐
national, for over a quarter of a century, and their most lasting response,
if war is to be transcended, will be a working constitution. Here stands
the contribution of Kahn at its best: 21st century constitution‐making
conceived as a response to the failures of the 20th century, and a new
prism—the love, religion, law triangle—to go beyond comparing the trite
and the insignificant, or the incomparable, or the hard to compare.
This chapter follows a similar quest. Rather than looking at these
three perforce unique constitutions simply through black‐letter law, I
shall try to look beyond the arrangements of the respective
constitutional texts for the emerging patterns of constitution‐making.
Before that, a brief word off the Kantian bifurcation in its leg
which is not totally unrelated to the argument of this chapter—that
there is a core common thematic constitutional horizon across the
planet. That leg is the subject of a separate “work in progress.” As Kahn
3
also says, “after Einstein, we are all Kantians,” and no person has

once a year under the auspices of the Yale Law School. SELA is animated by Professor
Owen Fiss. I read here Depoliticization instead of Depoliticalization.
2. We find Kahn bleak on the intersection of psychology and law (Law and Love: The
Trials of King Lear, New Haven, 2000) and international law (“Universal Jurisdiction and the
Rule of Law,” in John Borneman ed., The Case of Ariel Sharon Case and the Fate of
Universal Jurisdiction, Princeton 2004, 131–145); more positive on domestic law, The Reign
of Law: Marbury v. Madison and the Construction of America, New Haven 1997; Legitimacy
and History: Self-Government in American Constitutional Theory, New Haven 1992.
3. Kahn, “Sacred Violence,” 3.
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written a more meaningful treatise on war, constitutional treatises and
international law than Immanuel Kant. On the occasion the bicentenary
of Kant’s death, the Goethe‐Institut has been particularly inspired in its
depiction of the 2004 Zeitgeist through the poster which puts, on the
one side, the 300+ wars that have befallen mankind since 1804, on the
4
other the text of his Treatise for a Perpetual Peace. That dimension
belongs to a separate work, in progress, on Kant’s TPP, but it cannot be
totally shorn from our present reflection, so much steeped in war those
societies working out these constitutional texts, and so menacing to
both domestic and international peace if they fail their promise. Should
Iraq, Afghanistan and the EU roll their constitutions back, and the
political trend seems to indicate that they have, much of the promise of
peace will fall by the wayside.
In Europe, the new constitutional order was designed by Jean
Monnet to prevent a repeat of World Wars I and II, both classic wars. A
collapse of the Afghani and Iraqi theatres of violence in the so‐called “war
on terrorism,” a sui generis development increasingly dubbed as the third
or fourth world war, will have incalculable consequences first for the
5
peoples of Iraq and Afghanistan, but also for the rest of the planet.
So while that part of the Kantian bifurcation would appear at first
glance to stand outside the pale of the present study, constitution as
antidote to war suffuses it throughout: already the inside‐outside image
of constitutions is breaking at the seams. Traditionally, constitutions are
eminently sovereign texts, made by people to rule themselves by them‐
selves. This is no longer the case. The fiction of a self‐organized Iraqi
constitution, or of a self‐organized Afghani constitution, might be
naturally peddled by the Iraqi and Afghani governments, few believe
their constitutional input and output isn’t international. As for the Euro‐
pean Union, even a fiction encompassing the 15 Member‐States, or
indeed the additional ten delegations from the enlarged continent who
attended the Constitutional Convention, makes the effort by nature a
particularly non‐national one. More importantly, the international drive

4. All the major wars are listed on a poster published on the anniversary of Kant’s
double centenary’s death in 2004 by the Goethe-Institut. Kant’s famous treatise, Zum Ewigen
Frieden. appeared first in 1795.
5. James Woolsey, CIA director during the first Clinton Administration, is to my
knowledge at the origins of the description of the post-September 11 era as “fourth world
war.” For a robust legal debate on the contours of the new “war,” see Bruce Ackerman, “The
Emergency Constitution,” 113 Yale. L.J. 1029 (2004) and the forum devoted to the responses
of David Cole, “The priority of morality: The Emergency Constitution’s Blind Spot,” 113 Yale
L.J. 1753 (2004), and of Laurence Tribe and Patrick Gudridge, “The Anti-Emergency
Constitution,” 113 Yale L.J. 1801 (2004), together with the rejoinder of Ackerman, “This is Not
a War,” 113 Yale L.J. 1871 (2004).
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of E.U. constitutionalism is now formally enshrined in the European
Union’s “proximity policy.”
Proximity is not only about Turkey, the immediate next‐door giant
of the EU. The most intriguing, perhaps the most interesting article in
the European Constitution in terms of emerging patterns—read here
challenges—of the 21st century appears in Part I, Title VIII of the text,
Title VIII, The Union and its Neighbours
Article I‐57:
The Union and its Neighbours
1. The Union shall develop a special relationship with
neighbouring States, aiming to establish an area of prosperity
and good neighbourliness, founded on the values of the Union
and characterised by close and peaceful relations based on
6
cooperation.
Much has been built on this seemingly innocuous article, on
different levels. On the political plane, a full and daring proximity policy
was announced and followed through, from a European perspective, by
the former head of the Commission, Professor Romano Prodi. This policy
suggests including any willing neighbouring state in the EU system,
except for the institutions. Short of voting and being represented in
7
Brussels, “everything else” could be common, European. On the aca‐
demic plane, I have tried to develop this concept as a solution to the
Arab‐Israeli problem by way of a Hegelian‐style Aufhebung resting on the
freedom of circulation and establishment through the new immense
8
territory constituted by the EU + its Mediterranean neighbourhood. The
EU as solution to the hundred‐year conflict over Palestine is one striking
illustration, following which the right to return for Palestinians would
find its application in their freedom of movement over the new “EU”
territory that includes Israel. For Israel, the fear of a destabilizing influx
would be tempered by its opening up to a European space where part of
its security would be naturally one shared with the EU.
6. EU Constitution, final draft as agreed in Dublin, June 2004 (Text widely available on
the internet, hereinafter EU Constitution).
7. Romano Prodi, “L’Europe et la Méditerranée: venons en aux faits,” Louvain-laneuve, 26 Novembre 2002 ; Romano Prodi, “L’Europa più grande: una politica di vicinato
come chiave di stabilità,” ECSA conference, Bruxelles, 5-6 Décembre 2002, COM (203) 104,
Bruxelles 11 Mars 2003. Mallat, “Des relations privilégiées entre l’Union et les pays voisins,”
ECSA 2002, 5 December 2002, forthcoming as EU Commission publication.
8. See Mallat, “George Weidenfeld’s bright idea,” The Daily Star, 16 July 2003; “L’UE
entre déficit démocratique et Méditerranée en feu,” L’Orient-Le Jour, 21 June 2004.
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This is a long shot, a generation at least away. Still, if emerging
patterns for the 21st century are to be sought, one can see how the EU has
now internalized, in the revolutionary text of Art.I‐57, that pattern of
constitutional internationalization. While it sounds excessive to think of
it in such grandiloquent terms as the chance of a peaceful Mediterranean,
more specifically a solution to the Arab‐Israeli conflict much in the
manner that Europe has “solved” the Northern Ireland problem, one is
staring in Art.57 the promise of a century, not just of a few years. And if
the Good Friday Agreement marks a real turning point in Irish history
conceived in its four‐centuries long pattern of violence, it is undoubtedly
the result of European integration. For it can hardly be conceived outside
the framework of the concept of regionalization—and the hankering for a
realization of subsidiarity across Europe and within its regions, the well‐
9
established as well as the contentious ones.
II. SIMPLIFIERS: PERSISTENT MONTESQUIEUIAN ISSUES
So much for constitutionalism’s international drive. Let us take a step
back, and indulge in a few simplifiers. By simplifiers I mean those trusted
mileposts which are the basics of constitutional making, and which any
drafter needs to contemplate in accordance with a received vision which
is essentially an eighteenth century legacy of political
science/constitutionalism, more specifically a Montesquieuian one. This
is the concept of separation of powers, or the checks and balances in
American lore, coupled with the concept of federalism to accommodate
regional disparities. Such vertical and horizontal division of powers is the
10
stuff of any constitution‐making, arguably since Plato and Aristotle, and
goes along a number of classical questions from both sides of society.
Seen from the top, how solid and impermeable are the boundaries
between powers in the state? This, reduced to its simplest expression,
raises the need to make a choice between a presidential and legislative
constitution, and a choice between a federal system and a centralized
one. What are the powers of federated states, and if there are no
federated states, how is power devolved and exercised by regional
entities? Seen from the bottom, what voting power does the citizen have,
as individual and as member of a collectivity? What recourse does the
individual have in case of infringement on his or her rights as enshrined
in the text?

9. For some of the extensive treatments in this vein of Northern Ireland and Palestine,
see e.g. the works of Gideon Gotlieb and Donald Horowitz.
10. Central reference to Plato’s Republic ix, Aristotle’s Politics, chapter 1, Cicero’s De
Republica, chapters 1 and 2.
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Now even simplifiers can make life complicated when comparisons
are exercised in dual terms, let alone when three nascent constitutions
are being compared. National systems of law, the first year law student
learns quickly, are self‐sufficient. In a fiction which is essential to
understanding its realm, law operates outside history as well as outside
geography. Legal history might explain much, but it works in a way
irrelevant to the substance, or content, provided by a given law.
Comparative law is an additional luxury: use of comparative law may be
edifying, enlightening or enriching, even persuasive; it is never decisive.
11
Yes, there are increasing exceptions in global law. But legal history, as
well as comparative law, remain luxuries. The law stands for what it
disposes hic et nunc, not for how it came about, or what country it com‐
pares with beyond the realm of the jurisdiction in which it holds sway.
It therefore makes sense, from the vantage point of simplifiers, at
the overall architectonics of our three constitutions, with each as a self‐
contained arrangement.
Afghanistan. Starting with the simplest, the Constitution of “the
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan,” as defined in Article 1. Simplest because
it has now been adopted (24 January 2004); the other two remain
transient, either getting superseded by repeated amendments as in Iraq,
or frozen, as for the EU after the rejection of the agreed text by a majority
of the French and Dutch citizens. Simplest because it is an essentially
presidential constitution, with a person—Hamid Karzai—in mind draw‐
ing the constitution and implementing it. Simplest because there is no
federalism in the text. Simplest because, despite the international
convulsions in the modern history of Afghanistan, the non‐Afghani input,
unlike for Iraq and the EU, is limited. Simplest, finally, because there does
12
not seem to have been too much work behind it. By contrast, the
emergence of the Iranian Constitution in 1979 has left constitutional
13
scholars a formidable trail of constituents’ minutes.
11. Progress in comparative law within the US Supreme Court can be read in Stanford
v. Parker, 266 F.3d 442 (6th Cir. 2001) cert. denied 71 USLW 3236 (S.Ct. 2002), decided on
October 7, 2002 (execution of juvenile offenders) and in Atkins v. Virginia, No. 00-8452,
decided on 20 June 2002. (execution of mentally retarded defenders). The trend is
adumbrated and developed in Harold Koh, “Paying ‘Decent Respect’ to World Opinion on the
Death Penalty,” 35 UC David L R 1085–1131, at 1104. Judith Resnik, “Law’s Migration:
American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and Federalism's Multiple Ports of Entry,” 115
Yale L.J. 1564 (2006).
12. The little available can be found in a report by the Secretariat of the Constitutional
Commission of Afghanistan, ‘The Constitution-making Process,’ 10 March 2003. Henceforth
reference to “Afghani Constitution,” text available as pdf in English, Pashtu and Dari on the
internet, e.g. on http://www.loc.gov/law/guide/afghanistan.html.
13. They can be found in two series of official documents, of three and four volumes
respectively, entitled Surat-e mashruh-e muzakarat-e shura-ye majles-e barrasi-ye niha’i-ye
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Composed of a preamble and one hundred and sixty articles, and
divided into twelve neat chapters, the Afghani Constitution was written in
14
Pashtu and Dari, two of the several languages recognized by Article 16.
Following a familiar and didactic terrain, the Constitution presents the
main attributes of the State of Afghanistan in the Preamble and first
chapter—flag, languages, religion, economic traits and state responsibility
for citizens’ welfare, education, place in the international order—followed
by the citizens’ fundamental rights (chapter 2). The organs of the state
cover chapters 3 to 8: presidency, government, national assembly, Loya
Jirga, judiciary, administrative divisions. “Special dispositions” are
enshrined in the last four chapters, including the state of emergency and
the amendment process. Most significant in terms of separation of powers
is the establishment of Afghanistan as a centralized presidential republic,
where the head of the executive is elected directly by popular suffrage if he
or she gets over 50 percent of the vote. The two candidates with the
15
highest vote in the first turn, as in France, fight it out in a second turn. “No
16
one can be elected as president for more than two terms.”
The president is extremely powerful under the Constitution, as he
heads the Cabinet—there is no Prime Minister. The list of presidential
prerogatives is long and wide‐ranging, to which should be added the
prerogatives of a cabinet which cannot be brought down by Parliament by
a vote of confidence, with the exception of individual ministers. The
president is even entitled to name some of the members of the Upper
House (the Elders’ House). Parliament under the Constitution is composed
of two houses, to which should be added the Loya Jirga, originally a
congregation of tribal leaders in which the Constitution vests some
17
historical mantle of sovereignty. In reality, the Loya Jirga consists of all
the parliamentarians, to which are added provincial and district council
heads, and the members of government. The Loya Jirga is supposed to deal
with the supreme interests of the country, but it is again the president who
is entitled to convene it. Presumably, it can in some cases meet of its own

qanun-e asasi-ye jumhuri-ye islami-ye iran (Tehran 1985-89) and Surat-e mashruh-e
muzakarat-e shura-ye baznegari-ye qanun-e asasi-ye jumhuri-ye islami-ye iran (Tehran
1990).
14. Afghani Constitution, Art.16: “Pashtu and Dari (which is a variation of Persian) are
the official languages of the state.”
15. Afghani Constitution, Art.61.
16. Afghani Constitution, Art. 62.
17. Afghani Constitution, Art.110, Loya Jirga as historical “manifestation of the people of
Afghanistan,” see the classic work of the late Louis Dupree (d. 1989), Afghanistan, Princeton
1980.

47

Duke Law CICLOPs | Chibli Mallat

Vol. 1

accord, since it is also entitled to pass judgment on the president in case he
18
dramatically fails his duties, such as committing crimes against humanity.
Loya Jirga and “crimes against humanity,” a phrase which appears in
several articles of the Afghan constitution, provides the comparative
lawyer with the most original concepts in the text. The bottom line is about
centralized presidential power, where the battle will be fought for the
foreseeable future, for Afghanistan as well as for Iraq, and, to an extent
which we need to dwell also upon, in the European Union. The place of the
president as chief executive rallying the country is the more important
locus of constitutional attention since the Afghani and Iraqi experience,
despite sharing common “international” inputs, underline the difficult of
agreeing on the place of the head of the executive branch under a
Montesquieuian scheme of things. In Afghanistan, as the text stands, the
president trumps the rest of the Constitutional arrangements, be they
central or federal. This may be unwise, especially since the incumbent
owes his position to “being the smallest common denominator” picked by
the UN.19 The battle for executive power will continue to define
constitution‐making in the 21st century, as it has from time immemorial.
This is a certainty. Whether it is wise is a different matter.
Iraq. In Iraq, the battle for the presidency has taken another shape,
despite a similar international input, including the same UN envoy. It
played itself out differently, and the idiosyncrasies of history got the upper
20
hand on planning.
Unfortunate Iraqis, trying to find some peace after thirty five years
of solid dictatorship, including the longest Middle East war in 20th
century history, and two or three invasions, that is their invasion of
others, and others invading them, plus a twelve year sanctions regime
followed by occupation: in the midst of which mayhem they put together
21
a “wonderful new Constitution.” It is true that the Iraqis, who forge
18. Afghani Constitution, Arts. 110 to 115.
19. As explained by the UN mediator Lakhdar Brahimi, who supported Hamid Karzai’s
nomination on the basis that his name appeared on all the lists requested from the various
leaders and lawlords of Afghanistan.
20. For some of these highly unusual circumstances, Mallat, “Malgré tout, une leçon de
démocratie à Bagdad,” L'Orient-le Jour, 2 June 2004.
21. The description of the Constitution as “wonderful” is owed to the editors of the New
York Times who propped up the comment I submitted into excessive enthusiasm, “East
Meets West, at Least on Paper,” New York Times, 11 March 2004. Here I discuss what
became know in English as the Transitional Administrative Law, TAL (Qanun idarat al-dawlat,
literally the law for the governance of the country, agreed on March 1, 2004 by the Iraqi
Governing Council, and published by the Coalition Provisional Authority on 8 March as “Law
of Administration for the State of Iraq for the transitional period.”) The TAL, which preceded
the “final” Constitution of 2005, exhibits similar trends. The “final” Constitution of 2005
mentions that it needs to be completed, and so its finality is relative even on its own accord.
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ahead with a Constitution against the odds, deserve a burst of
enthusiastic kudos. But one should perhaps remain reserved on such
elusive matters for fear of ridicule—getting “mugged by reality” is a
fashionable term.
In the midst of so much violence, how did they do it in Iraq? They,
here, are a hapless though talented duo: Iraqi‐”international” (chiefly
American). One must realize what constitution‐writing means in Iraq 2004,
and it means a lot of English, not only because a U.N. Security Resolution
had consecrated a governor of Iraq who is solely American‐English
speaking, and so wields the ultimate signature upon any text Iraqis may
want to turn into law, but more fundamentally because the legal and
judicial body politic of Iraq is simply inexistent. It is, unfortunately, as
tragic as it sounds: so destructive of any judicial independence has the rule
of the former Iraqi dictator been that Iraqi jurists who remained in Iraq
simply lost confidence in their job and themselves. Not that there are no
talents, dedication or competence: chapters of judicial and legal resistance
in the Iraqi dictatorship are yet to be written. Polyglottism (especially
Western. . .) was a mark of treason for dark, fascist Arabism in the heyday
22
of the long Baathist night. The systematic destruction of Iraqi legal
culture, its lawyers, judges and law schools, meant that constitution
drafting was left to those coming from the outside. There simply aren’t so
many people capable of writing up a constitution in English words which
are also Arabic, and occasionally, Kurdish.
So hail to the two drafters, and their advisors. Friendship being
involved here on both the drafting side and the advising side, all shall
remain nameless. The result is what matters for the purpose of the
present chapter, and that result is a longish text, with a didactic effort (62
articles in nine parts). The Transitional Administrative Law self‐erased
when the elections planned for January 2005 resulted in a Parliament
which was tasked with writing the ultimate text and putting it to the vote.
Meanwhile, some constitutional landmarks have been posted for Iraq.
While buffeted by barbaric violence on a scale which knows few such
precedents on the planet, the process moved decisively forward in
textual terms.
Three matters draw the TAL reader’s attention: the first is the place
reserved for women, who were to constitute a quarter of Parliament. The
second is the open reference to federalism. The third is the care given to

22. Conversation with the late Hani Fukaiki, May 2002, in Kurdish Iraq, who, as a former
active member of the Baath leadership, explained to me how knowledge of a Western
language was suspicious and frowned upon as a sure mark of “treason.”
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the protection of the individual’s right. All three remained in the 2005
Constitution.
If Iraq wished to remain at the forefront of Middle East (ME)
democracy—a position which it will continue to pretend to, despite it
being rocked by violence, both in terms of the freedoms it carries, and the
fact that those in power owe it neither to dynasty, nor to the ME‐
dominant self‐extension of presidential mandate—then Iraqi society
needs to protect those two achievements, women representation and
federalism. This will not be easy. As for the judicial protection of the
person’s basic rights, it will come only after Iraqi society overcomes the
violence that plagues it, and finds a way to stand on its two feet without
foreign armies dictating the terms of social peace.
Much of this commentary is arguably hypothetical, but the morass
of Iraqi politics should not mask the forest for the trees. In Iraq, consti‐
tutionalism has forged ahead in the most delicate of all arrangements,
that is the attempt for a constitution to be inclusive of two dominant and
competing national identities—Kurdish and Arab—and two dominant
and competing religious sects, Shi’i and Sunni Islam. Even under the most
elaborate constitutional schemes, which Donald Horowitz has dissected
in many different approaches over three decades of scholarly attention to
23
“discrete and insular minorities” across the world, one would find it
difficult to draw a model near enough accommodating the Iraqi socio‐
historical set‐up. Nor have the Iraqi constituents succeeded yet in
convincing their people, and the world at large, that they are out of the
woods of overwhelming sectarianism in the individual politician’s
political expression.
The European Union. The Constitution finally agreed upon by the
European Council (of heads of states) meeting in Dublin in June 2004
stands outside any recognizable model in the field: This for obvious
reasons owing to the history of European integration. But it also stands
out for technical reasons obtaining from its fissiparous genesis: the
Constitution makes no sense for the reader outside the accumulation of
texts since the six European communities came together on the so‐
called common market in Rome in 1957. This accumulation of treaties,
and of legislative, judicial and administrative acts, is known as “acquis
communautaire.”
In any appreciation of constitution‐making, it would not be
appropriate to mark solely progress. There also are setbacks. One
certain failure in the EU text concerns its style. However hard the
constituents tried to make the text of the Constitution palatable to the
23. See e.g. Horowitz, The Deadly Ethnic Riot, Berkeley 2001.

50

Constitutions for the 21st Century

2009

educated but non‐specialist reader, this effort was a failure. Even
Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, the head of the Convention which drafted the
text, discourages the reader from dealing with Part III of the text, which
24
is the longest and most detailed. The Economist rightly ran a cover
page when the European constitutional project was disclosed
25
suggesting to “bin it.” Could it have been otherwise?
It is true that one distinguished former Minister of Justice in France
did write in 2002 a model constitution which had the advantage of being
short and more palatable, including actually most of the provisions which
26
found their way to the text. It was possible to do better. But there is no
point in trying to rewrite history, and there are already a number of
reader‐friendly editions and short commentaries, of which the
introductions of Giscard and a Que SaisJe by Professor Christian Philip
27
stand their ground in terms of clarity and comprehensiveness. One
problem is the type of “consolidator Treaty” which integrates previous
texts as so many layers, and the mechanisms in the Convention which, for
sake of including the largest number of proposals, fails to devote a
stylistic effort which could have brought together the text in the US‐
concise manner of 1787. It is true also that the US constitution is a unique
text in the excellence of its constitutional style, hardly matched
elsewhere on the planet.
The EU Constitution consists of four parts, and a number of
protocols of which two are important. Starting with the end, a brief
Fourth Part deals with amendments and transitional measures. A Third
Part consolidates all previous treaties and is therefore the longest and
most verbose. A Second Part integrates the bill of rights known as “the
European Union Charter for Fundamental Rights,” which had been
approved in Nice four years earlier. The First Part is the most novel one,
on which I shall mostly dwell to discern meaningful trends in 21st Cen‐
tury constitution making.
Let me suggest, for the sake of argument, an extreme critical line
that flows from the universally acknowledged “democratic deficit” in
Europe. Managing the 27–nation‐strong E.U. by 2009 does create in and
24. Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, “Introduction à la lecture du projet de constitution pour
l’Europe,” La Constitution pour l'Europe, Paris 2003, 75: “Je ne pense pas qu’il y ait lieu pour
vous, lecteur, d’entreprendre la lecture en continu de cette troisième partie.” (Hereinafter,
Giscard, ‘Introduction’.)
25. The Economist, 19 June 2003.
26. Robert Badinter, Une Constitution Européenne, Paris 2002.
27. Giscard, “Introduction,” Christian Philip, La Constitution Européenne, Paris 2004
(Hereinafter Philip, La Constitution Européenne) The literature on the draft treaty known as
the European Constitution is extensive. Most interesting are the minutes of the debates
during the Convention, especially specialists’ reports, available on the EU convention site.
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by itself problems which have been dealt with in the EU constitution as it
could best: the creation of enhanced cooperation, which allows a group of
EU countries to go forward with integration without being hampered by
slow or reluctant member states. The Euro system is the most successful
application of that principle, which does not include Britain and Sweden.
Already the EU operates on a system of géométrie variable, and this is
fine as long as it does not burst at the seams. Even bursting at the seams
has already been envisaged, and happily dealt with, when Austria found
itself in the throes of a government dominated by racist extremism. From
that emerged a “freezing out” procedure, which has worked well to
temper extremism within Austria, without the EU exploding altogether
under the shock. Of course, should one country turn so undemocratic as
to threaten not only being frozen out of the EU, but also engaging in
military hostilities against it, the issue would become grave to say the
least; but even a major country or two turning in this nasty way at the
same time would not unravel the system, and that scenario might even
be a privileged way to consolidate it. More immediate is the risk that new
countries bring in their weak democratic system of deliberation, as is the
case of Rumania or the Republics of former Yugoslavia. But the
remarkable democratic strides of Turkey to bring its legal system, both in
terms of its books and, more importantly, in the application of its laws, up
to EU standards, are testimony to the immense leverage at the disposal of
the EU for smaller countries. Indeed the annual reports that the
Commission prepares on Turkish alignment with EU legal and economic
standards may be one of the most innovative tools for the spread of
democracy, human rights and the rule of law across the world since the
28
collapse of the Soviet system.
No, the problem of EU democratic deficit does not lie in its
expansion, and one can argue the exact opposite, namely that the world
EU‐fashion, and more specifically the Middle East EU‐fashion, is a unique
29
opportunity allowed by the emergence of a unified Europe. No, the
problem of the EU democratic deficit has been building up since the
Treaty of Rome, and that problem is constitutional, more specifically one
of separation of powers. In eighteen months of deliberation, the E.U.
Constitutional Convention simply failed to address it successfully.
This problem is eminently Montesquieuian, and results from the
vesting of legislative and executive powers in a strange EU mixture of a
triangle Council‐Commission‐Parliament, in which the two first institu‐

28. Commission reports on Turkey since 1999, available on the EU Commission’s site.
29. Original reflection in Robert Fossaert, chapter entitled “Le Monde façon Europe,” in
his Le Monde au 21 ème siècle: une Théorie des Systèmes Mondiaux, Paris 1991.
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tions are dominant. Those who are elected “Europeanly,” that is the E.U.
MPs, represent at best a fifth wheel in the carriage, as the French motto
has it. You can take most of the EU Parliament away, the maximum lost is
a faint forum for deliberation, and an even fainter one in terms of
legislation. While the legislative process has been time and again
redrawn at the margins in order to enhance its powers, any person famil‐
iar with the institutional working of the EU knows that Parliament is a
place for occasional protest, possibly elaborate and meandering
“comitology,” not a power that anyone seriously takes into account.
Now the Council, being composed of governments who are
representative of their people, is indispensable. It is indispensable
because it does represent the people within the Member States, and
brings into the federal European model the voice of the constituent
peoples. The Council is also indispensable because even if it does not
contribute a federal voice, one can hardly imagine how laws enacted by
the Union could be binding within each country, in that ever wider field
of European competence, if implementation were not carried by the
Council’s governments at home.
How about the Commission? The Commission has real power. This
is the problem, since the Commission has no popular legitimacy, and its
members are appointed by the Council to play a European role. To make
matters worse, the Constitution has managed to establish a number of
new high positions, including a would‐be president for the Council who
fights, over terms of preeminence, with the president of the Commission,
much as the High Representative for the Common Foreign Policy and
Security has already fought it out with the Commissioner in charge of
foreign affairs; this is a sorry sight indeed. The result, inevitably, is more
muddle, and with poor legitimacy at that for the new bicephalous
institutions. None of these positions will be filled by direct popular vote.
No, the only serious step to bring democracy to Europe would have
been to scrap the Commission and to give Parliament a real legislative
role. One would still remain in the throes of the federal problem, but the
democratic deficit would have been tackled head on, in a way that would
have made it finally meaningful to vote for a European MP. It is now alas
mostly a waste of time, and the electors are far savvier than the
institutional cooks of Europe give them credit for. They simply do not
bother to vote for Parliament, nor do they show the slightest interest in
what it does.
To underline further the democratic deficit in the EU version of
separation of powers, an “error” in the text is telling: no doubt attentive
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to the subdued role of Parliament, the constituents entrusted EU MPs,
30
as the text goes, with “electing” the president of the Commission.
This is further detailed under Article I‐27, on the President of the
European Commission:
1. Taking into account the elections to the European Parliament,
and after having held the appropriate consultations, the
European Council, deciding by qualified majority, shall propose
to the European Parliament a candidate for the President of the
Commission. This candidate shall be elected by the European
Parliament by a majority of its members. If he or she does not
obtain the required majority, the European Council, acting by a
qualified majority, shall within one month propose a new can‐
didate who shall be elected by the European Parliament,
31
following the same procedure.
A strange concept for an election indeed, in which there is no
contest. Behind the awkward wording stands a battle for legitimacy on
the European level for the head of the executive, be s/he the president of
the Council or the president of the Commission. “Which president?” is a
good question. One can imagine the confusion about the presidency,
much in the way the confusion over who is Mr. Foreign Policy today, the
Commissioner in charge, or the Council’s High Representative. Or indeed
the president of the Commission. Maybe the ruse of the constituents was
deliberate, and some comments suggest that an ideal situation, which
was purposefully left open by the Convention, forced the bicephalous
anomaly of two presidents, a president of the Council and a president of
the Commission, so that they end up being one and the same by the
32
inevitable process of their redundancy. Nothing bars such a possibility
in the text. The problem remains. Both positions result from a choice
exercised by the Council, not by an election between competing
candidates.
So back to basics of the democratic deficit: the Constituents were
unable to see boldly enough into the strange system of separation of
powers they were perpetuating since the Treaty of Rome. They tinkered
with it, by establishing a president of the Council who would conceivably
stay in his or her position five years, instead of the current rotation of six

30. EU Constitution, “Article I-20: The European Parliament: 1. The European
Parliament … shall elect the President of the Commission.” Emphasis added.
31. Emphasis added.
32. Philip, La Constitution Européenne, 92–93.

54

Constitutions for the 21st Century

2009

months which was made impossible by the enlargement. They also
tinkered with the presidency of the Commission by suggesting that the
person in charge would be elected by Parliament, whereas the
candidate—only one—is nominated by the Council.
This leaves little democratic legitimacy in the choice of both
executive and legislative powers in Europe, if indeed we mean by
legitimacy the direct election of their EU leaders by the people of Europe.
Both the presidents of the Council and of the Commission are nominated
by the Council. In the case of the Council’s president, the parliamentary
representatives of European voters have no say. In the case of the
Commission’s president, parliamentary function is at best perfunctory,
despite the constitutional language intimating his “election” by Parlia‐
ment. And to top it all, Parliament does not legislate.
III. ACID TESTS AND EMERGING PATTERNS
In this search for emerging patterns in 21st century constitutionalism, I
would like to introduce another concept which has been of assistance in
33
writing on family and gender issues: acid test. Acid is a metaphor which
conjures up for different people and different cultures so many different
images. One image, at least in my western‐life generation, is that of a
powerful mind distorter which clouds one’s miserable life with a worldly
vision induced by hallucinogenic drugs. For Iraqis emerging from 35
years of dictatorship, acid is a far more material reality as the most
harrowing method of torture used by the former regime—said to be a
specialty of the elder Hussein son—which consists in lowering the victim
on a pulley into a basin of acid, first the toes, and drawing back the pulley
up and down repeatedly. One shudders at the image, and we should leave
it at that. What the small Oxford English Dictionary says about “acid tests”
is that they are “severe and conclusive.” In an Iraqi context, one has no
doubt they are conclusive. In all cases, acid tests are certainly severe, the
more severe as they include faith‐based, and for all intents and purposes,
“irrational” convictions imbued with religions that have competed with
each other at least since God became word.
Let me pursue comparatively three such acid tests which I have
found to be at the heart of 21st century constitutionalism, forming is a
number of legal‐constitutional fields which bring people literally up in
arms: religion, federalism, two areas that did not constitute such a
contentious arena of constitutionalism in the 20th century, and to which
is added the perennial issue of who is to be master: the presidency.

33. Mallat, “The Search For Equality in Middle Eastern Family Law,” al-Abhath
(American University of Beirut), 48-49, 2000-2001, 7–63.
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Religion. Maybe the most trying of all acid tests is the place of
religion in the constitution.
The “law and religion complex” operates as acid test not merely in
an Eastern, Muslim context. It was, and continues to be, a central point of
disagreement in European constitution making. For those who have
followed that particular aspect of the debate, suffice to see the
discrepancy between the German and French texts in the translation of
the Preamble to the Charter of Fundamental Rights in Nice in 2000, a
discrepancy which is, in constitution‐writing, unprecedented. While the
French text acknowledges the “spiritual” tradition in Europe, the German
version renders it “religious.”
The European constituents eventually succeeded in preventing that
acid test from blocking the whole process. Thanks to the Irish ironically,
they finally produced a version which leaned towards the French
disposition. Much to the dislike and vocal protests of the Vatican, they
declared the cultural heritage of the peoples of Europe in common, skip‐
ping the mention of Christianity, religion and spirituality altogether.
Now how does one deal with such a difficult test, the religion of the
land in a constitution? Of tons of ink spilled on matters constitutional,
one would venture this is the issue of unique portent in the United States
as well as in Europe and the Mideast, bringing religious affiliation in the
domestic context from born‐again Bible belts to international “clashes of
civilisations” defined religiously. The concern is not about to abate.
To make some progress in the shape of religion in 21st century
constitutionalism, a literary detour into the quasi‐universal law of indivi‐
dual psychology, much in the vein of Sigmund Freud’s Oedipus Complex,
may help: it is acknowledged that adolescence generally, if not a later age,
raises a form of religious libido in each and every individual on earth. Of
that experience two literary expressions are particularly telling. The first
is by Bertolt Brecht, whose alluring though not likeable character, Mr. K.,
was once asked about whether there was a God:
Einer fragte Herrn K. ob es einen Gott gäbe. Herr K. sagte: “Ich
rate dir, nachzudenken, ob dein Verhalten je nach der Antwort
auf diese Frage sich ändern wuerde. Würde es sich nicht
ändern, dann können wir die Frage fallenlassen. Würde es sich
ändern, dann kann ich dir wenigstens nich soweit behilflich
sein, dass ich dir sage, du hast dich schon entschieden: Du
34
brauchst einen Gott.
34. “Die Frage, ob einen Gott gibt (on the question whether there is a God),” in Bertolt
Brecht, Kalendergeschichte, Geschichte vom Herrn Keuner, Brecht Werke, V, Suhrkamp
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That adolescent part of the argument fits well with a rigid view of
separation between church and state, and can be comforted with all
kinds of citations, including from the most canonic sources, to wit the
words of Christ to the effect of keeping to Caesar what is Caesar’s, or the
lapidary injunction in the Qur’an about “no compulsion in religion.” As
one makes his peace with God or religion on this basis, acknowledging in
the process that there is more to it than Brechtian need or Qur’anic
rejection of state force to deal with one’s professed faith, another citation
sticks in mind, that of the Levantine poet admonishing his children about
the penumbra of dignity that religion brings to the believers, “wa la
tata’assabu abadan lidinin, fa kullu ta’assubin yushqi wa yurdi/ likullin
35
dinuhu wa likulli dinin masunu karamatin ta’ba alta’addi.”
This is more subtle than Brecht, because of the consideration of
one’s religion as shield, and not as sword, to borrow a distinction from
36
English contract law. The positive use of religion to shape the state is
one thing, the defence of religion against aggression and other such
humiliations is another. In our respective constitutions, this is generally
the position adopted by the constituents: the state, or group of states in
the EU, is not so much neutral about religion, which is the classical
position of a rigid doctrine of separation between state and religion, as it
acknowledges a heritage which in the case of Europe includes churches
receiving constitutional recognition—and eventually tax relief and sub‐
37
sidies; and in the case of Iraq and Afghanistan, a role for Islam which is
38
not militant. Islam is to be perceived as shield, and not as sword.
The formulation in both the Iraqi and Afghani constitutions is
alluring. In the first case, “No amendment to this Law may be made to
39
affect Islam.” Article 7 of the Iraqi TAL is equally protective:

1997, original written ca 1929–30, 218 (“One asked Mr. K. whether there was a God. Mr. K.
answered: ‘I advise you to reflect first on whether your behaviour would change depending on
the answer to that question. If it doesn’t change, then we can leave the question behind. If it
does, then I can at least tell you that you have already decided: you need a God.’”)
35. Chibli Mallat (“Poet of the Cedars,” d.1961), Diwan (collected Poems), Beirut, 1952,
vol. 2, 521: “Never follow a religion fanatically, all fanaticism brings misery and death/ to each
his religion, and to each religion a penumbra of dignity that dislikes being attacked (and in a
variation ta’ba al-tahaddi, that dislikes being challenged).”
36. Lord Denning, in Central London Property Trust Ltd. v. High Trees House Ltd.
[1947] K.B. 130.
37. Article I-52 of the EU constitutional project: “Status of churches and nonconfessional organizations. 1. The Union respects and does not prejudice the status under
national law of churches and religious associations or communities in the Member States.”
38. Expressed in Art. 17, Afghani Constitution as the duty of the state to “organise and
improve mosques, madrasas and religious centres.”
39. Afghani Constitution, Art.3.
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Islam is the official religion of the State and is to be considered
a source of legislation. No law that contradicts the universally
agreed tenets of Islam, the principles of democracy, or the
rights cited in Chapter Two of this Law [i.e. the bill of rights]
may be enacted during the transitional period. This Law
respects the Islamic identity of the majority of the Iraqi people
and guarantees the full religious rights of all individuals to
freedom of religious belief and practice.
In Afghanistan, the more specific formulation of compatibility
between Islam and law is similar: “No law can be contrary to the sacred
religion of Islam and the values of this Constitution.” In comparative
Middle Eastern constitutionalism, where the acid test has generally taken
the form of Islamic law being considered “the” in opposition to “a” source
for the Constitution, this novel formulation upholds a conception of
religion as shield in ways that shift the terrain of the debate onto areas
which may relieve the test from some of its acid severity.
This is not the end of the matter, however, as the law and religion
complex in modern constitutionalism must be perceived increasingly,
in 21st century constitutionalism, on a far more elusive register: namely
the absence of religion—as religious affiliation—in the constitution.
The problem is no longer whether Islam is “state” religion or not, but
how collectivities which identify themselves on the basis of religious
affiliation can stand ignored by the constitutional set‐up. I had several
occasions over the past years to discuss this vexing issue in modern
constitutionalism, so I will not pursue it further here, except to note
that even the EU, secular as it may pretend to be, was unable to escape
40
some form of recognition for established churches.
Federalism. Directly related to the issue of collective identification
to a given religious denomination is the problem of sectarianism, or
communitarianism as Indian constitutionalists call it. This is an issue
which conjures up an eminently federal mirror.
Federalism acts as an additional acid test in 21st century
constitutionalism, albeit in a muffled way: of the three constitutions, only
the Iraqi TAL mentions the word, and it may well be the most
courageous. In Afghanistan, one will also not find the word federal in the
Constitution, but there is mention of peoples, tribes and “men” in various

40. Above n. 38. See also my “Du fait religieux dans les institutions,” in Mallat ed.,
L’Union Européenne et le Moyen-Orient: Etat des Lieux, Beirut 2004, 83-95.
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articles. Valéry Giscard d’Estaing explains in his Preface how the word
“communitarian” came to replace the word “federal” in Article I.1 of the
42
Constitution, bringing an end to the heated debate between European
federalists and European sovereignists among the constituents. A more
“federalist” form of government than the European one it is hard to
conceive, and the refusal for the constituents to get drawn by the word
indicates areas of “irrationality” getting into the public discourse in ways
typical of acid tests, as English and French national forms of the Anti
Federalist get pitted against mostly German and more recent Spanish
adhesion to the concept as a perfectly acceptable one constitutionally.
Even a perfunctory approach of EU, Iraqi and Afghani constitution‐
making shows that all these issues are very much alive. Indeed the “F”
word is as much of a hot potato in Europe as it is in Afghanistan or Iraq,
and federalism could indeed represent a line of approach which brings
together the inchoate world of 21st century constitutionalism: buckets of
43
ink have also been spilled over European federalism, and those of
political inspiration are not the most interesting. It might have proved
expedient for the constituents to have finally avoided the word in their
would‐be founding text, for they knew they were all practicing federalism
like Molière’s character speaking in prose without knowing it.
In Iraq, the battle for the inclusion of the word is far from over: I have
often opined to Iraqi colleagues that constant resort to sui generis
categories may not be useful (in this case the use of the concept of wilayat
under Ottoman fashion to avoid using the Arabic fidirali). The advocacy has
even found its way to Security Council Resolution 1546, which included the
word in part upon my insistence with the Iraqi foreign minister. This has a
story, and the jury is out on whether it is preferable to practice federalism à
la Molière, or whether some more courage would not be amiss for the
44
enrichment of the debate and its integrity.
Presidency. Lest we lose our bearings, constitutions are about who
is to be master. Put in less crude terms, 21st century constitutionalism

41. Afghani Constitution, Introduction paragraph 5, “aqvam wa mardum,” Art. 6, “aqvam
va qaba’el.”
42. Giscard, Introduction, 34: “Aussi, dans le texte que j’ai préparé pour le Praesidium,
ai-je substitué l’expression ‘sur le mode fédéral’ la formule ‘sur le mode communautaire.’”
43. Most heated was the celebrated debate in 2001–2002 between German foreign
minister Joschka Fischer (EU as federation), president Jacques Chirac and his foreign
minister Dominique de Villepin (EU as assembly or confederation of nations), and former
president of the EU Commission Jacques Delors (EU as people’s federation sui generis).
44. On my intervention with Iraqi foreign minister Hoshyar Zibari for the inclusion of
federalism in Security Council Resolution 1546 (8 June 2004), see the account in “2004, le
Moyen-Orient en quête de non-violence: Un parcours personnel,” published in Mallat,
Presidential papers, Beirut 2005.
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does not escape the battle about leadership and its democratic
credentials since the dawn of history. Here appears the most muddled
pattern in the present comparative exercise: in Afghanistan, the
tailoring of the constitutional text to fit a particular person is simply
wrong, and the sacrifice of real checks and balances to presidential
power, one can alas confidently predict, is a recipe for trouble to come.
In Iraq, matters are still in a situation of flux, owing to the duality of
President‐Prime Minister in the Transitional Administrative Law (and
in the 2005 “final” Constitution), but also to the real test of federalism
as it is wont to develop—or get smothered by authoritarianism and/or
chaos, both equally capable of marking the death of constitutionalism in
the country for another generation. In the EU, the gross emptying of the
concept of election with regard to the choice of the president of the
Commission is indicative of a major problem yet to be solved.
So what does this tell us about that long‐standing acid test, the
headship of executive power?
The president as leader voted in directly by the people underlies
the central problem of constitutional theory, which is couched, perhaps
even papered over since Montesquieu, as a natural result of a doctrine
of separation of powers. The Montesquieuian scheme has arguably
always been in crisis, and its difficult birth remains upon us, as
45
troubling in the 21st century as it was in the second half of the 18th.
Separation of powers, in that description, is a way to say that society
cannot vote in its parliament under universal suffrage, and vote in its
president also in universal suffrage, without having to explain why
there should be two bodies so elected. The solution was a functional
one, based on the idea that the first legislates, and the second executes.
Power becomes therefore segmented functionally, but such
segmentation is a human construct which divides up power in a
disturbing and incoherent manner: for what does it mean issuing a law,
as opposed to executing it?
Federal arrangements are more convincing, because they point to
a horizontal way in the division of powers which is based on a tangible
division of territory and land. Horizontal devolution of power is more
coherent than the functional division of powers between a parliament
that enacts laws, a president/PM which applies them, and the judiciary
which arbitrates conflicts arising from that application. Federalism as a

45. This is developed in Mallat, “Droit comparé au 18ème siècle: Influences françaises
sur la common law,” Revue Historique de Droit Français et Etranger, 3/1994, 383-400
(arguing that Montesquieu and Lord Mansfield understood separation of powers in a manner
profoundly different from the way it became operational).
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successful constitutional arrangement, a comparative reading of the
three constitutions suggests, has far more credentials than the
domestic functional division of powers extant in 21st century
constitutionalism. While the Montesquieuian scheme lags behind, there
is no decidedly convincing route out of the conundrum, which is
illustrated in the three questions by the absence of a convincing
mechanism that resolves it.
EPILOGUE
The federal order; Religion’s proactive challenge to constitutionalism;
the confusion in the tripartite separation of powers underlying the role
of the presidency and its legitimacy; these are three problem areas
which define the shape of things constitutional in the 21st century.
Beyond the natural disparity in the respective traditions and conditions
of emergence of the three constitutions, it may be helpful to end on the
special form of internationalism which seems to mark 21st century
constitutionalism.
One needs to reflect, in a planet that no longer recognizes the
domain of internal affairs as a self‐contained one, on the mechanisms
which may ensure that domestic problems do not spill over regionally
and internationally. Even more positively, the question of constitutions
as model can no longer be avoided: the world after Europe, in the
fashion adumbrated by the so‐called proximity policy of Art.I‐57 is a
case in point, but there is little doubt that success in Afghanistan
and/or in Iraq will make constitutional standards affect an immense
area, reaching into India through Pakistan and Kashmir, and across the
Middle East and North, including Palestine‐Israel.
There is no harm putting the matter into the first leg of the
Kantian bifurcation that the chapter opened onto, with the contrasting
vantage points drawn from Kant’s Treatise on Perpetual Peace: its
failure on the ground since 1795, and its continuous success in the
battle of ideas in ways that compel us to rediscover the Treatise again
and again at key junctures in human history—the French‐Atlantic
Revolution, which saw its birth, the failed attempts in the Congress of
Vienna to go beyond the Westphalian paradigm of sovereign nation‐
states, through the collapse of the Wilson vision in Versailles, and the
shortcomings of the UN in the wake of World War II.
The constitutions just examined constitute, through their birth
and potential projections beyond their borders, an attempt to include
Kant’s cosmopolitan law into their frame. This is halting and timid, but
the pattern is there for the discerning, whether in terms of federalism
for Iraq, a unique novelty in the Middle East (and Europe), crimes of
61
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war as a constitutional category in Afghanistan, or transnational
projections of the EU, both federal and international.
I would like to conclude on yet another horizon, which conjures
up, in converging ways two millennia apart, Aristotle and Paul Kahn. At
its simplest, the issue is one of “man”—less so woman, and this in itself
is telling—”as a political animal”: “The entire effort of the international
human rights movement is rooted in this vision of well‐being. No one,
on this view, should die or suffer for politics.” One could read this in the
most exciting acknowledgement of the Preamble to the interim Iraqi
constitution: the people of Iraq, it says, “reject violence and coercion in
all their forms, and particularly when used as instruments of govern‐
ance.” One can also hear it plainly in a more relative, but potentially more
“applicable” utterance interspersed, in a manner which seems novel in
constitution‐writing, in the repeated references throughout the Afghani
text to the scourge of “crimes against humanity.” In both Iraq and
Afghanistan, societies which have been bled white through three decades
of continuing horror, are showing the way to others, even to Europe,
where the constituents remain behind in terms of the crucial task of
46
preventing crimes against humanity from remaining unpunished.
This points to the meta‐conclusion of our emerging patterns,
which is the next horizon of constitutionalism. How can human beings
structure their domestic and international world to make politics
redundant? Depoliticisation, I would like to conclude, is the ultimate
horizon of comparative constitutionalism, that moment in history when
it matters little what politics and politicians say, because they have
become by‐and‐large irrelevant to the happiness of the citizen. But this
is better left to constitution‐making in the 22nd century.

46. Mallat, “Des relations privilégiées,” supra n. 8, section discussing transnational
justice.

62

Richard M. Buxbaum, Comparative Law as a Bridge Between the Nation-State and the Global Economy: An Essay for
Herbert Bernstein, 1 Duke L. CICLOPs 63 (2009)

Comparative Law as a Bridge Between the
Nation-State and the Global Economy
An Essay for Herbert Bernstein*
Richard M. Buxbaum**

I. INTRODUCTION: COMPARATIVE LAW IN A TRANSNATIONAL ECONOMY
What should, what might be the role of comparative law as the regionali‐
zation and globalization of many segments of formerly national
economies proceed? I hope to propound and weave together three
1
strands of my approach to that question. The first has to do with the fact
that while organized economic life increasingly is transnational, much
law bearing on the economy still is national law. I say “much law” but the
second strand, not surprisingly, has to do with the recognition that much
national law, as indeed it has begun to do, must move up one step. This
second strand—and second step—concerns the increasing federalization
or regionalization of previously national law, as well as the inevitable and
perhaps even legitimate lag of that process behind the regionalization
and, at least in its financial aspects, the globalization of organized eco‐
nomic life. The third strand bears on the characterization of that part of
the law—be it national, regional, or even global—that focuses on the
economy; that is, it bears on the slippery notion of “economic law”, an ill‐
defined concept straddling private law and public law. For reasons that
arise from that exploration, I also propose a mission for comparative law
that I label the “coordination” mission, which in my view promises a

* Fourth Annual Herbert L. Bernstein Memorial Lecture in Comparative Law, Duke University School of Law, Sept. 27, 2005.
** Jackson H. Ralston Professor of International Law, Boalt Hall, University of California
Berkeley School of Law. Note from Author: An expanded and slightly footnoted version of the
Fourth Herbert Bernstein Memorial Lecture given at Duke on September 27, 2005. With some
exceptions, this version has not been updated to take account of more recent developments.
I thank Ralf Michaels for his inestimable help in this conversion, even if I did not always follow
his advice.
1. Right away I violate one of Herbert Bernstein’s central injunctions: “Innumerable
comparatists have felt the urge to marvel over…our discipline. My plea…is: Resist [the urge].
What we need much more than such soul-searching is hard–nosed comparative work on
clearly defined specific institutions or subject-matter areas.” Book Review, 40 Am. J. Comp.
L. 261 (1992). On the other hand, even he yielded to the temptation once, if only in the form
of a review essay: Herbert Bernstein, “Rechtsstile und Rechtshonoratioren,” 34 RabelsZ 443
(1970).
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more fruitful role for comparative law in this contemporaneous context
than do earlier missions as understood by the first generations of mod‐
ern comparative‐law scholars.
Given both Herbert Bernstein’s and my experiences, the legal re‐
gimes I am comparing are, not surprisingly, the US and European
Community/Union regimes. That, however, only becomes relevant as we
move to the second‐mentioned strand, that of the possible federalization
or regionalization of national law, since it is there that the differences be‐
tween the two “federal” (in quotation marks) hierarchies—those of the
United States and those of the European Union—become relevant. Let
me foreshadow the significance of this difference to the not‐yet‐defined
coordination mission of comparative law: what is important here is that
the horizontal coordination of national law within the EC is more impor‐
tant as a mission than is the shrinking need for a similar coordination
mission among the states of the American Union.
II. PRIVATE LAW AND ECONOMIC LAW IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
All of this suggests that my presentation will be more about the European
than the American scene. Therefore, let me begin with some brief com‐
2
ments about the situation in the European Community (EC), because
there one can see the third strand more clearly; namely, how the strug‐
gles over the definition of “economic law” matter more there than how
they matter—though they do—in the United States. Specifically, the rela‐
tively recent European focus on “private law” (as distinguished from
“public law”) arose and has flourished because the heavily top‐down
harmonization of laws considered essential to the establishment of a
genuine Internal Common Market had to move into other spheres than
governmental regulation of business—and that of course problematized
the distinction between the two sub‐disciplines of law, as the very con‐
cept of “economic law,” straddling them, suggests.
A. The Focus on European Private Law
The origins and motivations of the current focus on a European core of
private law are mixed and hard to disentangle. Whether the relatively
new energy pulsing on the private‐law side stems from a defensive strat‐
egy against the unsystematic incursions of EC directives and regulations
into the national legal regimes, whether it stems from the related effort of
the European Court of Justice to provide a modicum of systematic order

2. I refer to “European Community” rather than “European Union” because my focus on
economic law suggests the traditional pre-Maastricht division of powers rather than those
new federal powers added by the additional pillars associated with the “European Union.”
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to its interpretative jurisprudence, or whether it stems from the re‐
sponses of legal scholarship to the various Decisions and Action Plans of
3
the organs of the EC, beginning with the 1989 Decision of the European
Parliament to support research into the harmonization of the member
states’ private law and culminating for now in the Commission’s Action
4
Program of 2004: whatever its origins, the result is clear. The decades‐
long monopoly of public‐law scholarship in the European Community is
over. European Private Law has been on the agenda for over a decade
now, and has developed a dynamic of its own that transcends the various
reasons for its original appearance.
The mission of the proponents of this expansion or incursion also has
varied and evolved. At one end of the spectrum lie efforts to integrate those
new federal regulations that adhere to the classic codes like barnacles
5
without being integrated into them. The notorious Products Liability Di‐
6
rective is the classic example. At the other end lie the ambitious efforts to
develop, if not an entire European Civil Code, at least major elements of
one. The so‐called Lando Principles of European Contract Law is an often‐
7
cited example of this ambition. A different mission is that of developing
principles of adjudication that permit a greater integration of varying na‐
tional code provisions through interpretative techniques, an approach

3. Good examples of this literature include An Academic Green Paper on European
Contract Law (Stefan Grundmann & Jules Stuyck eds., 2002) and The Harmonisation of
European Contract Law: Implications for European Private Laws, Business and Legal Practice (Stefan Vogenauer & Stephen Weatherill eds., 2006).
4. Commission, “European contract law and the revision of the acquis: the way forward,” COM (2004) 651 final, October 11, 2004; Communication of July 11, 2001, COM
(2001) final, OJ C255 of Sep 13, 2001; Action Plan of [Feb. 2] 2003, COM (2003) final, OJ C
63, of 15 March 2003.
5. This criticism is a major theme of Karl Riesenhuber, System und Prinzipien des Europäischen Vertragsrechts (2003).
6. Supra n. 2. The various directives pertaining to consumer protection, in particular
the Unfair Contract Terms Directive (No. 93/13 EEC, in OJ 1993 L95/29), also have given rise
to system-breach criticism–in this case further conflated with disagreement over the values of
“weaker-party” protection. As to the former see, e.g., Geraint Howells & Thomas Wilhelmsson, EC Consumer Law Aldershot 1997, 19ff, esp. 22; to the latter, Peter Hommelhoff,
Verbraucherschutz im System des deutschen und europaischen Privatrecht (Heidelberg
1996) is instructive.
7. The Principles of European Contract Law (Ole Lando & John Beale, eds., Dordrecht
1995). An important if contested additional program is that launched through the Commission’s Action Plan of 2003 for a “Common Frame of Reference” in the field of contract law
that would identify the commonalities of national systemic and linguistic usage as an aid to
courts, legislators, and the private bar. See most recently the Commission’s Communication
of October 11, 2004, “European Contract Law and the Revision of the Acquis: The Way Forward,” COM (2004) 651 final; and the sympathetic explanation of this project in “Uniform
Terminology for European Contract Law (Gianmaria Ajani & Martin Ebers, eds., Karlsruhe
2005).
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found already in 1991 in the Symposium of the Hamburg Max‐Planck‐
8
Institute on “Alternatives to Legislative Unification of Law.”
B. The Challenge from Economic Law
For some time in the 1990s, the effort to position this unification of pri‐
vate law in a contemporary version of the usus modernus pandectarum,
an effort associated above all with Reinhard Zimmermann and the
Zeitschrift für europäisches Privatrecht he co‐founded, claimed much at‐
9
tention. It was always challenged, however, by another and older
movement that insists on the centrality of economic law as the legiti‐
mate and perhaps (though this may be only my view) limiting basis of
any unification of private law the European Community should strive
for. This focus, which hews more closely to the still largely economic
functions and legitimation of the EC, even in this day of the new pillars
of defense, security, environment, justice, etc., is not a narrow one.
Rather, it is what its proponents in the 1970s titled it: a challenge to the
10
very concept of private law. And this tension, the challenge modern
11
economic law poses for private law, is my subject today.
Like Herbert Bernstein, it is a European subject; but, also like him, it
illuminates the historic tension between the (apparently) resolutely un‐
systematic Anglo‐American conception of law and the (apparently)
resolutely systematic conception of law associated with the Civilian legal
12
families. This tension is apparent in the very label “economic law.” It is
unfamiliar to the US academy, and the very notion that it is a challenge to
private law perplexes us, if only because the label “private law” itself is
13
not a significant feature of US legal discourse. No teacher of Corporation
Law, for example, would worry whether it was a private‐law subject and
therefore consider omitting treatment of civil litigation under Rule 10b5;
and definitely we would not be concerned about the contours of such an
8. “Alternativen zur legislatorischen Rechtsvereinheitlichung,” 55 RabelsZ 215 (1992).
9. He describes this approach in Reinhard Zimmermann, Roman Law, Contemporary
Law, European Law: The Civilian Tradition Today (Oxford 2001).
10. Heinz-Dieter Assmann, Gert Brüggemeier, Dieter Hart & Christian Joerges, Wirtschaftsrecht als Kritik des Privatrechts (1980).
11. As it was for a previous Bernstein Lecture: Christian Joerges, “The Challenges of
Europeanization in the Realm of Private Law: A Plea for a New Legal Discipline,” 14 Duke J.
of Comp. & Int’l L. 149 (2004).
12. A digression: In my first year of teaching in 1961, the Italian scholar, Rodolfo de
Nova, was a visitor at Berkeley. He told me of having met Chief Justice Charles Evans
Hughes in the mid-1920s, while a young visiting scholar at Yale. In response to Hughes’ gracious question of what he was doing, de Nova told him he was studying the US legal system.
Hughes responded in turn and apparently without irony: “My goodness; I didn’t realize we had
a system.”
13. For the “public-private law” distinction, see n. 40 below.
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amorphous and pervasive notion as “economic law” in the context of de‐
ciding where to place its components in our curricular divisions. If
anything, we have the opposite problem: the dominance of the economic
analysis of law across the curriculum is so advanced that, like Voltaire’s
14
Monsieur Jordain, we all speak economic law without knowing it.
Given this situation, namely, that legislating and ruling about mat‐
ters concerning the economy are a far larger part of the legislative and
judicial tasks of the past century than they were during the laissezfaire
15
era, and given the further fact that the competencies delegated to the
federal level of the European Union are precisely these economic mat‐
ters, it seems to me that the role of Comparative Law in moving any legal
agenda along deserves a new look. The notion that economic law is a
challenge to private law has a largely European or Civilian flavor about it.
But the notion that economic law is a challenge to traditional under‐
standings about the competencies of units of a federal system is as much
an American notion as it is a European one. After all, it was Justice, then
Professor, Felix Frankfurter who said of the Dormant Commerce Clause
that so far as the states were concerned, in the absence of federal action
16
laissezfaire was the only permissible regulator.
III. THE VERTICAL DIVISION OF POWERS
This brings me to the second strand of this presentation; namely, to a
comparative (i.e., EC‐US) look at the classic division of powers. Any ar‐
gument that national law needs to remain relevant at a time when the
transnational economy in facilitative terms increasingly demands, and
in regulatory or redistributive terms increasingly should be required, to
accept a transnational legal order has to begin there. Why national law
nonetheless should remain relevant, however, will be the final element
of this discussion.
A. Coordination—the Third Function of Comparative Law
The term I have elsewhere used to highlight this function of compara‐
17
tive law is that of “coordination.” It joins, and supplements, the two

14. Another digression: The “it” in that sentence bears two meanings. Many of us, myself included, often speak of economic law in this analytical sense without knowing what we
are talking about.
15. Its proportional importance during the age of mercantilism is another matter.
16. Felix Frankfurter, The Commerce Clause Under Marshall, Taney and Waite (Chapel
Hill 1937) 65f.
17. Richard M. Buxbaum, “Die Rechtsvergleichung zwischen nationalem Staat und internationaler Wirtschaft,” 60 RabelsZ 201 (1996). The similarity of that title with the present
one is no coincidence, even though the present paper expands the inquiry into dimensions
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traditional functions of comparative law as these have been accepted in
academic discourse for now almost two centuries; namely, the instru‐
mental function of identifying “other” law that might be considered, via
18
appropriate adaptation, for one’s own legal order and the visionary or
legal‐cultural function of showing the path towards a universal legal
order. The historian of comparative law might associate Mittermaier
19
20
21
with the former, Wigmore and Kohler with the latter function.
Coordination implies a horizontal function; specifically, that of the
adaptation of a state’s laws to those of another formally equal state. It
suggests a cooperation of equals within a system that is either hierar‐
chical in the sense of federal‐state structures or networked as a web of
formally equal sovereigns in a structure without a more or less authori‐
tative center. In comparative terms, this issue of coordination of course
is much more salient for the European Community/Union than for the
United States. Despite the 10 th Amendment and the sputtering states’
rights discourse, the legal orders of our states exist at the sufferance of
the national legal order as authoritatively interpreted, in constitutional
terms, by our Supreme Court. “Puppy federalism” is Edward Rubin’s
22
term for this arrangement, and an apt term it is, given the powerful
preemptive role of the Supremacy Clause, especially in economic law.
What little horizontally developed uniformity our states have seemed
to achieve voluntarily through this coordination function was only vol‐
untary in the sense that they acceded to the requirements of the market
in preference to what otherwise would surely have been imposed as
national law; the Uniform Laws headed by the Uniform Commercial
Code and the Model Laws headed by the Model Business Corporation

not considered more than a decade ago.
18. These transplantation problems of course are a favorite subject of comparatists, but
they are not for today.
19. The Kritische Zeitschrift fuer Rechtswissenschaft und Gesetzgebung des Auslandes, which Mittermaier co-founded in 1829, in its title [Critical Journal for Legal Science and
Foreign Legislation] and in his foreword to the first issue, “Ueber den Zweck dieser Zeitschrift”
[Concerning the Purpose of this Journal], id. at 1, suggests his–and this–“practical” approach.
A recent appreciation of this approach is that of Heinz Mohnhaupt, “Rechtsvergleichung in
Mittermaiers ‘Zeitschrift fuer Rechtswissenschaft und Gesetzgebung des Auslandes,” in Juristische Zeitschriften (Michael Stolleis, ed., Frankfurt 1999) 282.
20. On Wigmore’s similar aims, see Annelise Riles, “Encountering Amateurism,” in Rethinking the Masters of Comparative Law (Annelise Riles, ed., Oxford 2001) 94.
21. Josef Kohler, who wrote on almost everything, is noted for his aim at universality
and the evolution of a world law through the study of comparative law. See, e.g., his Das
Recht als Kulturerscheinung (Würzburg 1885). For an appreciation see, e.g., Günter Spendel,
Josef Kohler. Bild eines Universaljuristen (Heidelberg 1983).
22. Edward L. Rubin, “Puppy Federalism and the Blessings of America”, 574 Annals of
Am. Acad. Of Pol. & Soc. Sci. 37 (2001).
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Act illustrate the point. To put it another way: what some states en‐
acted as obstacles to the inevitable and inevitably legitimate corporate
form of economic activity may not have been removable via the Privi‐
leges and Immunities Clause but were rendered irrelevant by way of
24
the Commerce Clause. The European Community is not yet at that
stage, and its Supremacy Clause has not yet been lowered to room
height. The concept of limited delegated powers still is taken relatively
seriously, and one of the principal reasons for that constraint bears di‐
rectly on the coordination concept I am proposing as a function of
25
comparative law. That reason is the so‐called “democratic deficit,” the
fact that the one body directly elected by the peoples of the member
states, the European Parliament, to this day is not yet a parliament in
the classic sense. Despite the increase in its role of co‐legislator, the leg‐
islative initiative of the EC remains with the Commission, an organ
whose members are appointed by the executive branches of the na‐
tional governments represented in the EC’s Council of Ministers.
In this framework of significantly attenuated lines of democratic
legitimation via the aggregate of national electorates, in which at least
two tiers of government lie between any given national polity and the
EU’s principal legislative bodies, unification or harmonization of law
from the top down suffers two potentially negative consequences. In
comparative terms, only one of these also weighs on top‐down unifica‐
tion via national legislation in the US, and even that one weighs more
heavily on the European law‐making mission than it does on ours. Let
me describe these so that these abstract concepts gain some context.
B. The Remaining Relevance of National Law
The first consequence, the one common to both regions in kind if not in
degree, concerns the benefits of experimentation and flexibility. The
26
near consensus on the benefits of regulatory competition, or at least
on using the states as laboratories, is applied today to challenge much
national or centralized legislation. In the United States, that is more of
an academic than a practical argument, in part for the reasons just
23. The uniformity dictated by the quasi-constitutionalized Internal Affairs Doctrine in
corporation law, leading to the squatter sovereignty of Delaware, is a variant on this theme.
24. See Richard M. Buxbaum and Klaus J. Hopt, Legal Harmonization and the Business
Enterprise (Berlin 1988) 36ff.
25. Works on this subject are legion; for a recent entrant providing the variations on this
theme, see Transnational Governance and Constitutionalism (Christian Joerges, IngerJohanne Sand & Gunther Teubner, eds., Oxford 2004).
26. For a respectful critical view of its role for legal scholarship, see Eva-Maria Kiesinger, Wettbewerb der Privatrechtsordnung im Europäischen Binnenmarkt (Tübingen
2002).
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mentioned. The essential uniformity of US economic law, based on the
essential unity of the US economy, has narrowed the field of application
27
in which that desideratum has much purchase; and, to repeat Frank‐
furter’s axiom, that competition in any event can only be a race for the
bottom in a non‐pejorative sense, that is, it can only be a race to provide
market‐supporting facilitative law.
The European Union situation does vary in degree if not in kind
from that obtaining in the United States. The EC member states’ laws,
reflecting its member states’ less complete economic unity, evidence a
higher degree of differentiation. Regulatory variation—not only regula‐
tory competition—will have more bite there, and, given the less
rigorous application of the EU version of the Dormant Commerce
Clause, be less controllable. In this situation, the attraction of top‐down
unification, demanded now both by the market and the more regula‐
28
tion‐oriented member states, will be harder to resist. As a result, a
somewhat peculiar situation will arise, indeed already has arisen. Mar‐
ket pressures push for positive central legislation, but that is a less
desirable solution than the solution the proponents of regulatory com‐
petition envisage. Even for those, like myself, who are less convinced of
the unalloyed benefits of this beneficent version of the race for the bot‐
tom, there is a concern with some of the more practical consequences
of top‐down unification in the European context. The legislative proc‐
ess is clumsier than in the United States, the formal structure of
directives with their need for national adoption and concretization
paradoxically leaves significant room for resistance at the national
level, and the flexibility needed for adaptation to changed circum‐
29
stances is less than optimal.
The second consequence of top‐down unification or harmoniza‐
tion, the already mentioned democratic deficit, is unique to the EU, and
may be the more significant. The coordination of lawmaking among
sovereign states of equal formal status, and with an identical need to
adapt to the realities of an economic system that more and more tran‐

27. Justice Brandeis’ famous comment in dissent in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285
US 262 (1932) is less regnant today. Consider the battles California had to fight to gain some
autonomy over regulation of automobile emission standards.
28. Whether the battle over control of the Delaware phenomenon of mobile corporations, provoked by the European Court of Justice’s use of the Treaty’s Establishment Clause
in the Centros, Überseering, and Inspire Art cases is an invigoration of a type of Dormant
Commerce Clause jurisprudence or only the beginning of a new round of centralized regulation permitting only a limited range of variation, or of both, is not yet determinable. See
Richard M. Buxbaum, “Private International Law and Regulatory Competition in Comparative
Perspective,” RabelsZ (forthcoming 2009).
29. Buxbaum & Hopt, supra n. 24 at 242f.
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scends their particular boundaries, offers a better chance of eliminating
this politically volatile deficit than does top‐down harmonization. It
also provides a further benefit; namely, the power inherent in such a
coordinated state network to control the race to the bottom faced by
states standing in isolated and non‐communicative competition with
one another. While that sounds like a cartel of states, and thus anti‐
thetical to the very notion of regulatory competition, it is, in terms of
30
accommodating a “decent” level of regulation and perhaps of redis‐
tributive policies, a virtuous cartel.
This can profitably be compared with the current effort of the po‐
litical organs of the EC to achieve a similar goal by combining the
principle of subsidiarity with the principle of minimum common stan‐
dards. Absent minimum standards, the so‐called Cassis de Dijon
31
principle, mandating full faith and credit to the laws of the home state
of a legal person whose behavior is sought to be controlled, leads to the
market‐driven facilitative law we associate with this race to the bottom.
To control this drift, the concept of minimum common standards is su‐
perimposed on the subsidiarity concept, much as the new mandatory
minimum standards of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act are superimposed on
state corporation law in certain sensitive fields. Here, too, however,
some of the concerns just discussed remain relevant. While minimum
common standards are a coarser mesh than fully centralized law‐
making, they, by definition, cannot avoid ossification and inflexibility
over time, and of course they also still suffer some of the problems of
the described democratic deficit.
To end this introduction to the coordination mission, one addi‐
tional insight, blindingly obvious, nonetheless is worth making. Market
pressure for bottom‐up harmonization essentially is little more than
pressure for uniform measures facilitative of transactions. To the ex‐
tent policy disputes exist as to the outer boundaries of facilitation, the
“market” solution taken in isolation only represents the net power of
the winners of those debates; that is, usually, the private sector provid‐
ers of the goods, services, and investments at issue, and among them
the net power of the more organized participants (for example, banks
30. I put this in quotes to avoid having to define it.
31. Rewe-Zentral v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein [Cassis de Dijon], [1979]
ECR 649. The application of this mutual-recognition principle, mitigated by the mentioned
possibility of uniform minimum standards, was made a keystone of Community legislative
policy through The White Paper Completing the Internal Market, Com. (85) 310 (June 1985)
and has found significant application in the free-movement-of-capital and financial-services
sectors. See the brief overview in George A. Bermann, Roger J. Goebel, William J. Davey &
Eleanor M. Fox, Cases and Materials on European Union Law (2d ed. St. Paul 2002) at 1175
f., 1186 f., 1194 f.
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over merchants). Plenty of examples come to mind: the battle over
shrinkwrap licenses in the failed UCC effort to create an Article 2A; the
internecine battles over priorities in creditors’ remedies; the battle
over labor codetermination; the battles–and they are constant–over
appropriate capital market legislation. Market failure, in this context, is
a political standoff between the proponents of discordant policies;
market success represents the lack of politically significant policy ob‐
jections to facilitative norms.
IV. THE COORDINATION OF ECONOMIC LAWS
A. The Challenges of Economic Law for Comparative Law
Before this coordination mission, with its asserted benefits, can be mean‐
ingfully applied, its necessary attributes need to be specified, a
requirement that returns us to the particular concept of economic law
and its mix of facilitative and regulatory elements. Three assumptions
about the addressees of economic law introduce this brief discussion.
First, in the present era, the transnational economy is built upon the pri‐
vately (not state) owned business firm, a firm that is hierarchically
organized and plans its activities even if they have to exist within a more
or less unplanned economy. Second, in the short run, trade and invest‐
ment is largely, though of course not totally, concentrated at the next
level above the national economy, the regional economy of blocs, rather
than immediately at the fully global level. Third, regional legal regimes,
preeminent in the EC, of course, with widely different levels of the verti‐
cal division of powers will exist but only partially shadow the level of
regional economic integration.
Following on these assumptions, the central elements of economic
law (and thus of its coordination) can be better understood. Two ele‐
ments stand out. First, despite the tendency to think of the harmonization
of private law, the essential core of comparative law will move more than
32
previously towards public law. That is in part, of course, due to the sim‐
ple definitional assumption that economic law is more than private law.
It also, however, is due to the fact that any single state’s effort to legislate
about cross‐border economic matters in which other states also have a
legislative interest needs to consider that legislation’s prescriptive reach
across its borders, which by definition means to step beyond the private‐
law realm since that incursion may meet other policy bases than those

32. For a full review of the current state of that definitional problem and its contexts, see
Nils Jansen & Ralf Michaels, “Private Law Beyond the State: Comparative Perceptions and
Historical Observations,” 71 RabelsZ 345 (2007).
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supporting the home state’s laws. And as regional legal regimes follow in
the path of regional or global economic regimes, these regional law‐
making bodies will have to engage even more fully in these coordination
efforts. Since they have no higher hierarchy to speak of, they are con‐
demned to follow this path to “doing” comparative law if they are to
engage in the process at all. Here even more than on the purely inter‐
state level, issues of policy analyses and of the appropriate reach of pre‐
scriptive jurisdiction will be essential.
Second, the significance of economic and other social‐science ele‐
ments underlying or influencing law‐making in any given state
increases as the substantive differences between different economic or
other policy judgments of other states increase. This impels compara‐
tive law practice to be deepened and contextualized through what one
might call comparative social science practice. Put another way, the
cryptotypes that Rodolfo Sacco has explored so fruitfully in his study of
Legal Formants concern not only the hidden forms that support legal
doctrines but also the hidden forms that support the social‐science or
33
policy judgments underlying those doctrines. The uncovering of these
cryptotypes thus is inescapably a function, a social‐science function, of
comparative law. Its importance cannot be underestimated. At the do‐
mestic level, the various ideological, political, and economic conflicts
that underlie all law‐making can be left more or less unarticulated, em‐
bedded as they are in the historically contingent path of the particular
polity. At the inter‐state level, however, they need to be articulated—to
be translated and made transparent—if transnational facilitation and
regulation of economic activity and economic actors are to be success‐
fully coordinated. A small example from the extensive debate about the
contestable convergence of national capital market laws comes to
mind: assumptions about the coming victory of the US model of this
34
type of regulation —informational transparency and adequacy in lieu
of substantive regulation—rest on more or less articulated assump‐
tions about the depth and liquidity of the American capital markets; i.e.,

33. Rodolfo Sacco, “Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law,” 39
Am. J. Comp. L. 1, 343 (1991). For earlier insights into that issue, both connected with the
institute with which Herbert Bernstein was long connected, see Andreas Heldrich, “Sozialwissenschaftliche Aspekte der Rechtsvergleichung,” 34 RabelsZ 427 (1970); and, early in his
career, Ulrich Drobnig, “Rechtsvergleichung und Rechtssociologie,” 18 RabelsZ 295 (1953),
esp. at 304.
34. An aggressive version of this argument is that of Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 Georgetown L. J. 439 (2001), reprinted in
Convergence and Persistence in Corporate Governance (Jeffrey Gordon and Mark Roe, eds.,
Cambridge 2004).
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35

on cryptotypes. Without clarity about the power of these cryptotypes
in determining the doctrines and laws, no convergence or transplanta‐
tion effort would make much sense.
B. Don’t Talk About ItDo It
So the question is fairly posed: can the process of comparative law
provide this network of states with the benefits of politically legitimate
and economically responsible law‐making that can meet an increas‐
ingly globalized system of economic actors—on its own terms, so to
speak—while escaping these two pitfalls of lack of adaptability and lack
of democratic accountability? With this question I return to Herbert
Bernstein’s injunction: don’t talk so much about what comparative law
is; start doing it. My case study, a foolhardy term for the following few
remarks, of whether “doing it” is possible is a project that has been un‐
der way for over a decade now, the Trento ‘Common Core’ Project of
36
European Private Law. This project is based, in turn, on the approach
the late Rudolf Schlesinger took when in the 1950s he developed the
subject of comparative law in terms of its practical utility for the legal
37
profession, judiciary, and legislature; in other words, following the in‐
38
strumental mission of the subject. Both began at the bottom, with
close study of the law on the books and the law in action in specific
fields; Schlesinger’s on contract law, the Trento Project on private law
tout court. The former’s approach was perhaps too microscopic; in any
event, given its limited resources it essentially exhausted itself with a
definitive, if too narrow, study of the formation of contracts. The Trento
Project has had the resources to support a larger ambition, as its title,
“The Common Core of European Private Law,” suggests.
The most recent substantive study produced by the Project, Eva‐
Maria Kieninger’s thorough report on European national law governing
39
non‐possessory security interests in moveables, provides my example.

35. For recent scholarship recognizing these issues in the field of corporate and capitalmarkets law, see John Coffee, “Racing Towards the Top?: The Impact of Cross-Listings and
Stock Market Competition on International Corporate Governance,” 102 Colum. L. Rev. 1757
(2002) and Ronald Gilson, “Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or
Function?,” 49 Am. J. Comp. L. 329 (2001).
36. For a description see Mauro Bussani & Ugo Mattei, Making European Law: Essays
on the “Common Core” Project (Trento 2000).
37. Formation of Contracts: A Study of the Common Core of Legal Systems (Rudolf B.
Schlesinger, gen. ed., Dobbs Ferry 1968).
38. In this he followed his bent towards the practical-analytical; but his larger mission, a
reflection of his personal history, was an idealistic one closer aligned to the ”universal-law”
mission, if never ostentatiously trumpeted as such.
39. Security Rights in Moveable Property in European Private Law (E.-M. Kieninger, ed.,
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First of all, it is a classic example of the awkwardness of fitting eco‐
40
nomic law into the standard private‐public dichotomy. Creditor‐
debtor law, including this sub‐set, is a subject that only exists inside
two very powerful bookends of classical public law—between the con‐
41
sumer protection bookend and the insolvency bookend. In that sense,
it reveals exactly the challenge and the potential success in seeing com‐
parative law work as a work of coordination; after all, for policy
reasons stemming from different national views of these bookends, the
actual doctrines almost inevitably differ—will have to differ—no mat‐
ter how strongly market forces seek maximum facilitative framing of
these credit devices in the applicable law. Consider only the listing of
the issues Kieninger identifies as representing continuing substantially
divergent positions: the publicity requirement for the creation of non‐
possessory proprietary rights; the derogation by contract of mandatory
rules of property law such as the retention of title approach to the secu‐
rity interest in newly manufactured goods; lease forfeiture in the event
of the lessee’s insolvency; the assignability of security interests and the
related issue of the notification of the debtor or the public; the validity
of floating charges that cover all, even after‐acquired property, of the
debtor; above all, perhaps, the variously mandatory or less‐than‐
with the assistance of M. Graziadei, Cambridge 2004). Note that this subject is categorized
as private law in traditional terms, thus implicitly questioning my offhand characterizations in
the immediately preceding text.
40. This is—finally—the place at which to look at the contestable private/public law
distinction in comparative terms. Early assumptions about its dichotomous nature and its
variously located roots in Roman, Westphalian or 19th century soil have been discredited; see
in lieu of other citations the thorough study of Martin Bullinger, Öffentliches Recht und Privatrecht (Stuttgart 1968). Putting aside its remaining power as a means of cartelizing the
internal distribution of teaching and research chairs, it survived into the 20th century in one
shorthand form: public law is that whose substantive expression either includes the state as a
party or the role of state’s institutions in any law’s enforcement, i.e., constitutional and administrative law in the former case, civil procedure and bankruptcy law in the latter. In the United
States, the only possible dichotomous classification would have to be an indirect one: if the
substantive law is enforceable privately (i.e., through contractually authorized arbitration), it is
private law; if not, it is public.
But that shorthand classification no longer works, for the same reason that the Civilian
distinction no longer works. In the first two-thirds of the last century, the state’s increasing
engagement in providing social goods and curbing private power “publicized” much formerly
private law and diminished the value of the Civilian distinction. In the last third, the state’s
increasing disengagement from both the provision of social goods and the regulation of economic life diminished the value of the American version of the distinction (almost all “public
law” is arbitrable today).
41. “Classical” in the American sense–consumer protection once was non-arbitrable. It
was not classical in the Civilian sense, since consumer protection did not fit within the formal
definition of public law (see the preceding footnote). But consumer protection is, in both systems, a policy limit on the freedom of contract; and in that sense it will display national
variation as national policy responses to the issue vary.
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mandatory rules of private international law when the goods in ques‐
tion cross borders; and more.
Transparent communication of individual states’ doctrines and un‐
derlying policies among themselves, as equals, is what the coordination
mission of comparative law is about. Its advantages over top‐down har‐
monization lie, first of all, in the inherent flexibility of the preferred
approach. An example taken from the Kieninger volume: Finnish law ap‐
parently permits the secured creditor to obtain only 50% of the value of
the property covered by a floating (or “enterprise”) charge in the case of
the debtor’s insolvency—a rule that itself is a good example of how the
typical conflict between institutional lenders and trade creditors arguing
over the body of the commercial debtor produces ad‐hoc legislative com‐
promises. Putting aside the actual fact that the EC Council of Ministers
did not wish to force a reconciliation of numerous such differences by
forcing a common compromise down the throats of recalcitrant Member
42
States, the choice between a top‐down solution and a coordinated inter‐
state one seems to me to lie with the latter. A directive or regulation “cur‐
ing” (again in quotes) one or even a series of random variations simply
lays one patchwork over another, compared with the preservation of
domestic‐level systemic and political harmony that results when any
given country is persuaded by this exercise in comparative law to coor‐
dinate its laws with its fellows through smoothing out its own lumps and
bumps. Those bumps may be simply the contingent result of historical
accident; they may be the remnants of local political bargains now ren‐
dered obsolete by changing circumstances, including of course the
development of the common internal market itself; or they may be
needed even today in the context of today’s political bargains. In the last
case only, a separate calculation may have to be made whether the local
aberration indeed distorts internal‐market conditions to an extent justi‐
fying federal intervention; but in all other cases, coordinating local
responses within this network frame seems to me a far sounder way to
expend scholarly and policy‐making energy than to move immediately
towards imposed unification. Unification may in the end be the preferred
solution, but not on an a priori basis.
This may, of course, strike some as simply “bargaining in the
shadow of the ruler,” much as we have semi‐coerced market‐driven har‐
monization or unification in what otherwise seems like open and
43
voluntary bottom‐up harmonization. That objection, however, is not at

42. Kieninger, at 22ff.
43. The semi-coercive role of the pseudo-constitutional conflicts norm that the law of the
state of incorporation governs the internal affairs of the corporation is a homely domestic ex-
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all relevant if coordination of law in a system without a hierarch is at is‐
sue, and only marginally relevant if the hierarch is not yet omnipotent, as
in the EC, rather than all‐powerful as in the US. And the objection does
not touch at all on the two pitfall points I have raised, those of flexibility
and democratic legitimation, which the state‐based coordination ap‐
proach largely avoids. Within the context of the world we live in, a multi‐
storied economy living in a number of one‐story state houses, a new look
at the missions of comparative law is appropriate. Mine, I hope, is one
such look that may open some new approaches to our work.
The coordination mission of comparative law I have suggested is
specifically relevant to economic law and I do not know whether it can be
readily applied to those fields of the law that the economic world of Sys‐
tem graciously permits the Lebenswelt, the world of non‐instrumental
44
actors like families and friends, to govern. The private‐law norms of
that life‐world also have their overarching policy frame, even if it derives
more from what once was unabashedly called “organic life.” What is clear
is that the private‐law norms of the world of the instrumental actors
never have been only that. To the extent the Trento Project belies its self‐
professed “private law” core, to that extent it will be a success and re‐
main, for now, my prime example of the comparative advantage of the
coordination mission of comparative law.
V. CONCLUSION
I suspect that Herbert Bernstein would have been happier had my exam‐
ples come from that Lebenswelt; after all, family law was one of his
favorite subjects, and the theme of the Habilitation he abandoned in or‐
der to come to the new world. But it was not his only interest, as his
45
doctoral dissertation on workers’ compensation and his study of the ef‐
fects of East German nationalization decrees on the extraterritorial life of
46
those nationalized companies demonstrate. Indeed, even his family‐law
project was not without its public‐law overlay, since it analyzed the im‐
pact of constitutional equal‐protection and non‐discrimination doctrines
on traditional private international law treatment of foreign marriages
47
and local divorces. Herbert Bernstein was a widely read, broadly inter‐

ample, as already suggested.
44. This distinction, derived from the phenomenological literature, is fruitfully used in our
context in Jürgen Habermas, “Law as Medium and Law as Institution,” in Dilemmas of Law in
the Welfare State (Gunther Teubner ed., Berlin 1985) at 203.
45. Herbert Bernstein, Schadensausgleich bei Arbeitsunfällen (Karlsruhe 1963).
46. Herbert Bernstein, Corporate Identity in International Business: The Zeiss Controversy, 20 Am. J. Comp. L. 299 (1972).
47. Herbert Bernstein, “Ein Kollisionsrecht für die Verfassung,” 19 Neue Juristische Wo-
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ested, humane and engaged person, and given that range I hope this trib‐
ute would have been acceptable to him, a dear colleague and friend.

chenschrift 2273 (1965). Left incomplete, it was aptly characterized as a “drumroll without
symphony” in the review essay of Franz Gamillscheg, “Gleichberechtigung der Frau und Reform des Internationalen Eherechts, 33 RabelsZ 654 (1969), at 701f.
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Foreword*
Political Parties in China’s Judiciary
Jonathan K. Ocko**

To have Zhu Suli, Dean of Peking University Law School, deliver the Fifth
Annual Herbert Bernstein Memorial Lecture in International and Com‐
parative Law on November 2, 2006, was especially apt. His address not
only commemorated Professor Bernstein, it also commemorated the
twentieth anniversary of Professor Bernstein’s first foray into Chinese
law at the 1986 Law and Contemporary Problems Conference on “The
Emerging Framework of Chinese Civil Law.”1 Moreover, Zhu’s lecture
touched on one of the central issues raised at that conference; namely,
the extent to which German and other foreign models had influence on
and were of value to China. At the conference, and in a later essay, the
late Tong Rou, a law professor at People’s University Law School and one
of the drafters of the General Principles of Civil Law, acknowledged that he
and his colleagues had not created the civil law anew. However, stressing
the singularly Chinese nature of the document and its reflection of the
particular Chinese experience, he emphatically resisted analyses, Bern‐
stein’s among them, that he perceived as over‐emphasizing foreign influ‐
ence. To understand the distinctive national character of the law, argued
Tong, one had to consider “broadly the social structure, all political eco‐
nomic phenomena, and the entire legal system.”2 In his lecture, Zhu Suli
echoes Tong Rou’s concerns. Zhu welcomes comparative analysis of Chi‐
nese contemporary law, but he sees it as having value and cogency only
in so far as the comparatist first grasps the realities of China and remem‐
bers that no comparative framework is intellectually neutral.

* Fifth Annual Herbert L. Bernstein Memorial Lecture in Comparative Law, Duke University School of Law, Nov. 2, 2006. Reprinted with permission from The Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law: Foreword to Zhu Suli, Political Parties In China's Judiciary, 17
DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW 527 (2007).
** Adjunct Professor of Chinese Legal History, Duke University School of Law; Professor
and Head, Department of History, North Carolina State University.
1. The Emerging Framework of Chinese Civil Law, 52 Law & Contemp. Prob. (Jonathan K. Ocko sp. ed., Spring-Summer 1989). Herbert Bernstein, The PRC’s General Principles From A German Perspective, 52 Law & Contemp. Prob. 117 (Spring-Summer 1989).
2. Jonathan K. Ocko, Preface, The Emerging Framework of Chinese Civil Law, 52 Law
& Contemp. Prob. 1, 12 (Spring-Summer 1989).
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Zhu Suli’s scholarly writings are substantial and wide‐ranging, con‐
tributing to the literature on rule of law, law and public policy, legal sociol‐
ogy, law and society, and legal education. Though largely in Chinese, they
are indirectly accessible in English through an analytical summary of his
work by Hong Kong University law professor Albert Chen3 and a review of
his recent monograph, Sending Law to the Countryside: Research on China’s
Basic Level Judicial System4 by New York University law professor Frank
Upham.5 Accordingly, rather than reprise still another account of Zhu’s
work, I will restrict my comments to several brief observations.
First, Zhu Suli is not simply one of Peking University (Beida) Law
School’s more distinguished alumni; he is also one of its proudest and
most loyal alums. Zhu’s decanal remarks to incoming and graduating
Beida law students demonstrate his deep, emotional attachment to Beida
Law School and his passionate feelings about the role that it and its stu‐
dents can and should play in China’s evolving legal system.6 Yet he tem‐
pers his prideful affection for both his school and his students with
reminders that this well‐known brand stands for nothing by itself. Beida
law students must give it meaning and substance by being individually
accomplished and committed to the social responsibility for the greater
good that they undertake as a concomitant of their legal education.
Second, Dean Zhu is above all else a pragmatist. For him, “there is no
absolute knowledge… Law is for solving practical problems.”7 As Zhu
3. Albert H.Y. Chen, Socio-legal Thought and Legal Modernization in Contemporary
China: A Case Study of the Jurisprudence of Zhu Suli, in Law, Legal Culture And Politics in
The Twenty First Century 227-49 (Günther Doeker-Mach & Klaus A. Ziegert, eds., 2004).
4. Zhu Suli, Songfa Xiaxiang: Zhongguo Jiceng Sifa Zhidu Yanjiu [Sending Law To The
Countryside: Research On China’s Basic Level Judicial System] (2000).
5. Frank K. Upham, Who Will Find the Defendant if He Stays with His Sheep? Justice
in Rural China, 114 Yale L. J. 1675 (2005) (reviewing Zhu Suli, Sending Law To The Countryside: Research On China’s Basic Level Judicial System (2000)).
6. See, e.g., Zhu Suli, Nide shi you chuxide haizi, zai beijing daxue faxueyuan biye dianlishangde zhici [You are Children with a Future, Remarks at the 2005 Graduation Ceremony of Peking University Law School] (June 29, 2005) (transcript available at
http://lawthinker.com/show.asp?id=2775); Su Li, Diyige mengxiang chengzhen, Su Li 2005
nian beida faxueyuan xinxuesheng zhici [The First Dream Becomes Fact, Su Li’s Fall 2005
Remarks to Peking University Law School’s New Students] (Sept. 14, 2005) (transcript available at http://law-thinker.com/show.asp?id=2855); Zhu Suli, Xuanze Beida, Su Li 2006 nian
beida faxueyuan xinsheng ruxue zhici [Picking Beida, Su Li’s Remarks at the Matriculation of
Peking University Law School’s 2006 Entering Class] (September 2006) (transcript available
at http://article.chinalawinfo.com/article/user/article_display.asp?ArticleID
=34429); Ni ruoruandi xiangqilai zhege xiaoyuan Political Parties In China (zai beida faxueyuan 2006 jie xuesheng biye dianlishangde zhici, 2006/6/23) [Your Tender Thoughts of this
Campus, Graduating Remarks at the June 23, 2006 Commencement Ceremony for Peking
University Law School] (June 23, 2006) (transcript available at http://law-thinker.com/
show.asp?id=3277).
7. Chen, supra note 3, at 231 (quoting Zhu Suli). Zhu Suli frequently uses the pen
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makes clear in Sending Law to the Countryside, foremost among these
problems is the absence of law and legal services in rural China.8 How, he
asks in a recent essay on a celebrated rural judge, can China be a rule of
law country when the sixty percent of its population that lives in the
countryside is largely without law, that is, without affordable legal serv‐
ices and dedicated adjudicators?9 Thus, he calls for China’s legal educa‐
tion to be less theoretical and more practical; for there to be more former
judges and litigators among its law professors; and for legal academics to
worry less about developing ideal models and more about what is ap‐
propriate and what works. Unlike his Beida colleague, He Weifang, Zhu
sees no inherent problem in using former military officials as judges in
courts of first instance.10 Certainly, at the intermediate and higher courts,
there should be an emphasis on professionalization and specialization.
But at the basic level rural court, where disputants are looking for sub‐
stantive justice and are more likely to agree to mediation than urban
residents, proceduralism can be an impediment. Zhu sees enormous
value in drawing judges from practically experienced government cadres,
especially if they themselves have rural backgrounds, can explain matters
simply and in local dialect, deploy discretion adeptly and fairly, and draw
their authority from personal qualities rather than from the trappings of
the courtroom and judicial garb. He worries not about there being too
many such judges, but rather about who will replace them when the
current ones retire. The task, then, for legal academics, concludes Zhu, is
to encourage their students to bring law to the countryside; to conduct
detailed local studies that identify what works and what does not and
which rural judges are effective and why; to distill the implicit logic of
rural adjudicators; to express it in generalizable academic language, sys‐
tematize the knowledge, and suggest creative ways to deploy diverse
forms of law that suit the needs of a nation experiencing wildly uneven
development.

name Su Li.
8. In an article on legal education, Zhu cites a finding that twenty percent of China’s
counties lack even a single lawyer. Su Li, Dangdai Zhongguo faxue jiaoyude tiaozhan yu jiyu
[The Challenge and Opportunity in China’s Contemporary Legal Education], 2006 FAXUE,
no. 2, at 9 (2006).
9. Zhu Suli, Zhongguo nongcun dui fazhide xuqiu yu sifa zhidude huiying—cong Jin
Guilan faguan qieru [China’s Villages Need for Rule of Law and the Judicial System’s Response—The Example of Judge Jin Guilan] (2006), available at http://article. chinalawinfo.com/article/user/article_display.asp?ArticleID=32785.
10. See generally Zhu Suli, Annual Herbert L. Bernstein Memorial Lecture in International and Comparative Law: Political Parties in China’s Judiciary, 17 Duke J. Comp. & Int’l L.
533 (2007).
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Third, as the above suggests, Zhu Suli is a contrarian who relishes
playing the role of intellectual “bad boy” and provocateur. (Perhaps this
inclination explains why he is so attracted to the work of Judge Richard
Posner, who is much easier to peg ideologically than Zhu, but who, Zhu
notes, is an anti‐Marxist libertarian, whose analytical approach has much
in common with Marxists’ historical materialism11). Of Chinese and West‐
ern commentators who complain about the Communist Party’s influence
on and interference in the judicial system, Zhu asks: in terms of China’s
modern history, what did you expect? China’s modern political parties
antedated the modern state. Indeed, the Communists (like their erstwhile
competitor for political power, the Guomindang, Zhu boldly notes) estab‐
lished a party‐state in which the party was explicitly privileged over the
state. Moreover, while certainly problematic, the Party’s influence is not
utterly reprehensible and sometimes produces the desired substantively
just result even as its interference violates procedural justice. Yet Zhu is
no apologist for the Party and openly defends the valuable social role of
the public intellectuals who criticize its missteps and overreaching.12
Zhu’s most contrarian stance is his critique of legal academics’ emphasis
on rule of law, especially on a purely modern model of rule of law. It is
not that Zhu is opposed to rule of law. Rather, he objects to its being
treated as a decontextualized panacea, and he objects to legal profession‐
als cutting themselves off from ordinary people by not listening to them
and by speaking in overly specialized language.13 Zhu’s paradoxical
couching of some of this critique in Western high theory has led Frank
Upham to characterize Sending Law to the Countryside as “important,”
but also as “irritating and fun.”14 Zhu’s own stature as a widely read pub‐
lic intellectual indicates that Upham’s characterization can arguably be
applied to most of Zhu’s prolific writing.
Fourth, Zhu Suli is a scholar who reads voraciously, broadly, and in‐
tegratively—his latest book, a study of law and literature, draws widely
from Chinese literature as well as from Chinese and Western scholarship
on the subject15—but one who is, like Clifford Geertz,16 also finely attuned
11. Su Li, Falu Yu Wenxue: Yi Zhongguo Chuantong Xiju Wei Cailiao [Law And Literature: Using Materials From Chinese Traditional Plays] 14 (2006).
12. Xiao Qiang, Zhu Suli on Public Intellectuals, China Digital Times, Jan. 15, 2005,
http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2005/01/zhu_suli_on_pub.php.
13. Zhu Suli, Fazhi yu gonggong zhengce meizhou pinglun’ kaimushide pinglun [Comment at the Opening Ceremony of the Weekly Discussion on Rule of Law and Public Policy]
(Apr. 2, 2007) (transcript available at http://article.chinalawinfo.com/article/user/article
_display.asp?ArticleID37854).
14. Upham, supra note 5, at 1677.
15. Su Li, Falu Yu Wenxue, supra note 11.
16. Clifford Geertz, Law as Local Knowledge, in Local Knowledge (3d ed. 2000).

82

2009

Foreword—Political Parties In China

to the problems of commensurability and comparison as well as to the
purpose of comparison. Is its purpose to denote one system as the per‐
fect universal model, others as aspiring but still imperfect emulators, and
others as inherently incompatible with the model? Or is it to use the per‐
spective of one system to cast new light on the processes of another, to
use one to understand the strengths and weaknesses of the other? Or,
finally, is it to prepare for the task (impossible in Zhu’s view) of grafting
one legal system onto another?17 In his provocative, pragmatic, penetrat‐
ing essay that follows, Dean Zhu attempts to answer the question: what is
the proper frame of reference for a comparative legal analysis of contem‐
porary Chinese law?

17. Zhu Suli, Zheli meiyou budongchan—faluyizhi wentide lilun shuli [Here There is No
Real Property—Theoretical Parsing of the Problem of Legal Transplantation], (2007) available at http://article.chinalawinfo.com/article/user/article_display.asp?ArticleID=38679. Presented in the southwest corner of Western China’s Qinghai province, a predominantly Tibetan
area, this essay argued that a legal concept, such as real property, cannot be transplanted in
vacuum. To have meaning and be effective, it requires the transplantation of the entire
framework and infrastructure whence it came.
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Political Parties in China’s Judiciary*
Zhu Suli**

I. THE ISSUE AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE
The Spring 2005 issue of the Yale Law Journal published a lengthy re‐
view by New York University Law School Professor Frank K. Upham1 of
my book, Sending Law to the Countryside. Professor Upham’s central
criticisms are two: first, my “uncritical acceptance of a linear version of
modernization theory,”2 a criticism that I will not address in this essay;
and second, my “greatest flaw,” “the absence of politics and political
power.” My work, he says, “is reticent to the point of timidity when it
comes to politics,” “[a]side from the smallp politics,”3 by which he ap‐
pears to mean the internal conflicts and interpersonal quarrels of the
workplace. I emphasize these words to show that Professor Upham in‐
tends to make his point absolutely clear and forestall any possible mis‐
understanding of the word by readers. Moreover, his choice of the word
“timidity” implicates the author’s academic honesty in the political
dominance of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
Contrary to Professor Upham’s characterization, my book actually
repeatedly reveals the influence on the judiciary of politics, especially
the CCP’s policies, including local Party organizations’ multifarious in‐
terference in cases. This coverage is most evident in Part I of the book,

* The Fifth Annual Herbert L. Bernstein Memorial Lecture in Comparative Law. Reprinted
with permission from The Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law: Zhu Suli, Political
Parties in China's Judiciary, 17 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW 533 (2007).
** Professor of Law, Dean of Peking University Law School. L.L.B. (Peking University,
1982); L.L.M. (McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific, 1987); M.A. (Arizona State
University, 1989); and Ph.D. (Arizona State University, 1992). The Chinese version of this
paper was presented at the “Constitutionalism and the Judicial Power in China” conference,
organized by the Sciences Po and the Centre d’Études et de Recherches Internationales
(CERI) and held on December 12-13, 2005, Paris, France. I am grateful for the valuable
comments and suggestion of participants of the conference and Jonathan Ocko, Adjunct Professor of Chinese Legal History, Duke University School of Law; Professor and Head, Department of History, North Carolina State University.
1. Frank K. Upham, Who Will Find the Defendant if He Stays with His Sheep? Justice
in Rural China, 114 Yale L. J. 1675 (2005) (reviewing Zhu Suli, Sending Law To The Countryside: Research On China’s Basic Level Judicial System (2000)).
2. Id. at 1700.
3. Id. at 1698, 1703 (emphasis added).
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which analyzes the influence of politics over judiciary from macro,
middle, and micro levels. Chapter I projects the sending of the law to
the countryside as an extension of the power of the nation‐state to the
basic level of society and points out that the judicial system in contem‐
porary China assumes a political role. Chapter II discusses how the po‐
litical control over judicial affairs is possible through the judicial
administration within the courts and the judicial system. Chapter III fo‐
cuses on the adjudication committee (shenpan weiyuanhui), a judicial
organization within each court designed to deal—at least according to
statutory law—with hard and important cases, and analyzes the multi‐
ple function of this micro institution within courts. Other chapters also
have abundant analysis of politics and political power.4 Thus, while I
may not meet Prof. Upham’s expectations about how much discussion
there should be of politics and political power, his judgment that there
is none at all is without foundation.
Certainly, such analyses may not be enough and should be extended
by other research. However, I want to emphasize that I wrote the book in
Chinese for a Chinese audience and never intended it to satisfy the politi‐
cal and ideological tastes of any foreign readers; Professor Upham’s frus‐
tration or dissatisfaction is therefore understandable.
Nevertheless, Professor Upham’s review attracted my attention
and needs to be countered, not because he has any new insights or
makes any contribution to the study of law in China, but rather because
his errors in methodology are typical of some Western observers of
China and are influential in China. Such errors reveal not only the deep
ideological bias that is central to the “moral authority” of the Western
notion of the autonomy of law and “rule of law” (a shaky authority that
has evaporated after 9/11), but also a theoretical mistake that is com‐
mon in comparative or implicitly comparative studies of China. In other
words, it is the impact of these and similar errors on recent legal stud‐
ies in China over the recent decades that has prompted me to write this
response. Moreover, precisely because Upham’s errors are characteris‐
tic of the shortcomings in analyses of Chinese law, this essay is not sim‐
ply a response to Upham’s book review, but also a paper of its own
independent significance.
II. IS A DISTINCTION NECESSARY?
Professor Upham’s criticism of my work as failing to address politics and
political power is internally illogical and contradictory because his re‐

4. Zhu Suli, Sending Law To The Countryside: Research On China’s Basic Level Judicial System chs. 7, 10, 14 (2000).
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view also acknowledges, at least implicitly, that I did analyze the influ‐
ence of various social actors, including the Party and government, upon
the operation of basic courts. So, what then is Professor Upham’s com‐
plaint? A careful reading suggests that what troubles Professor Upham is
my failure to devote a chapter or chapters to a relatively systematic
analysis of the CCP’s interference in the operation of basic level courts. As
I already noted, this charge is untrue. However, even if the criticism were
valid, we need to note that it is based on three implicit presuppositions:
first, that there is a unique political influence that comes purely from the
CCP; second, that it is possible to create a standard model of a judiciary
free from political influence or meddling; and third, that it is possible and
necessary for researchers to examine and measure independently such
influence. All three presuppositions are unrealistic.
In my own view, and in the view (explicit and implicit) of many
Chinese and foreign scholars, the CCP’s influence and control is ubiqui‐
tous; it penetrates every aspect of society. Despite the many political
differences between the CCP and its former arch‐rival, the Nationalist
Party (known as the Guomindang or GMD) and despite the fact that the
CCP never used the GMD’s often deployed concept of the “party‐state,”
in practice, the CCP inherited the political tradition, initiated by Sun
Yat‐sen5 and pursued by the GMD, comprised of a “party construction of
the state,” “party rule of the state,” and “party above the state.” Indeed,
eventually, the CCP’s influence over society and the machinery of the
state would far exceed that achieved by the GMD.
The evidence is abundant. First, during the GMD’s rule of mainland
China (1927–1949), political control of entire regions remained in the
hands of provincial strongmen or warlords, and the GMD’s unification
of China was more symbolic than real.6 Second, the same was true of
political parties. Whether or not the GMD wanted to recognize it at the
time, even during the GMD’s rule, the CCP occupied a considerable
amount of territory, enjoyed the support of a large number of the peo‐
ple, and controlled independent armed military forces. There were, as
well, some other smaller political parties. Third, in the Nationalist gov‐
ernment, even within the GMD itself, there was a group of relatively in‐
dependent and socially influential scholars and technocrats. Fourth,
because of the GMD’s weakness, to a certain extent the traditional
model of social control being exercised by a combination of imperial

5. Sun Yat-sen was the first President of the Republic of China, and founder and
leader of the Gmd. Sun Zhongshan, Sun Zhongshan Quanji [Complete Works Of Sun Yatsen], vol. 8, at 267–68, vol. 9, at 103-04 (1986).
6. 2 Deng Xiaoping Xuanji [Selected Readings Of Deng Xiaoping] 299 (2d ed. 1994).
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(central) and gentry (local elite) power persisted, with the central gov‐
ernment having rather weak influence in rural China.7 In conclusion,
the GMD built only a superstructure and did not, because it could not,
implement its will and policies down to the lowest levels of society.8 In‐
deed, this inability to achieve its goal of social transformation is what
led to the GMD’s loss of the mainland in 1949.
In the judiciary, too, the GMD fruitlessly sought to establish total
control. From its earliest years, even before it had established national
political control, the GMD insisted on “partyization of the judiciary”
(sifa danghua). Subsequently, it continued to adopt systematic meas‐
ures in this regard,9 and there is evidence to show that in some cases,
the GMD exercised strong direct control.10 However, this insistence on
partyization demonstrated that the GMD’s control and influence over
the judiciary was not complete. Because of this reality, it would be pos‐
sible, though still very difficult, to distinguish GMD influence from other
political or governmental influence.
In the years immediately following the CCP’s assumption of power
in 1949, such a distinction became impossible—not because the CCP’s
influence weakened but rather because it was too strong. First the Peo‐
ple’s Republic of China (PRC) became a modern, nationalist state with a
high degree of political, economic and cultural unity. Only Taiwan was
under the control of the Nationalist government, and there were no re‐
gional strongmen. Second, although there were other legal, democratic
parties, they all existed under the leadership of the CCP. Even after the
space for these democratic parties’ political activities expanded follow‐
ing the reform and “opening up” in 1978, the 1982 constitution pro‐
7. Fei Xiaotong, Huangquan He Shenquan [Imperial Power And Gentry Power] (1988).
8. Some historical researchers testify that conflicts between GMD local branches and
local governments always ended with the victory of local governments during the GMD’s rule.
Cf. Wang Xianzhi, Kangzhan shiqi guomindang zuzhi jianshe yu zuzhi fazhan de jige wenti
[Issues on GMD’s Organizational Construction and Development During the Anti-Japanese
War], 1990 Jindaishi Yanjiu, no. 2, at 230-50 (1990); Zhongshen & Tang Sengshu, Shilun
Nanjing guomin zhengfu xunzheng qianqi (1928-1937) de difang dangzheng jiufeng [The Local Party-Government Conflicts in Early Tutelary Period (1928–1937) of Nanjing National
Government], 1999 Shixue Yuekan, no. 2, at 53-58(1999).
9. The earliest recorded statement available referring to partyization was made by Xuqian in 1926; Ju Zheng, a founding member of GMD and later Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court of National Government, elaborated it in 1934. According to Ju Zheng, partyization has
three criteria: all judicial personnel must be GMD’s members; GMD policies must be applied
in adjudications; and all the judges must accept the Three People’s Principles (the political
ideology of GMD). Ju Zheng, Sifa danghua wenti [On Partyization of the Judiciary], 1934
Dongfang Zazhi, no. 10 (1934).
10. Cf. Wo Suo Zhidao De Hanjian Zhou Fuhai [Traitor Zhou Fuhai, As I Know] (Wen
Fei ed., 2005); Wo Suo Zhidao De Hanjian Chen Gongbo [Traitor Chen Gongbo, As I Know]
(Wen Fei ed., 2005).
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vides that the system is still one of cooperation and consultation by
multiple parties under the leadership of the CCP.11 Through various
formal (for example, the Chinese Political Consultative Congress) and
informal irregular meetings with non‐party figures and institutions, the
CCP gathers and selectively adopts the political advice of other political
parties. Some leaders of these democratic parties are also CCP mem‐
bers.12 Third, the vast majority of social elites, whether in government,
universities, commerce, or social organizations, are party members.
Other elites who are not party members accept the political leadership
of CCP and most of them are staunch communists.13 Finally, within the
CCP are some “radicals,” whose political views might be considered dis‐
sident by Westerners. In this sense, though the Party consistently pro‐
claims itself to be the vanguard of the proletariat and the working class,
and describes its highest ideal and ultimate aim to be the realization of
communism,14 even before the declaration of “the three representa‐
tives,”15 the Party also emphasizes that it was the vanguard of the entire
Chinese people and that it sought to represent the interests of the
greatest number of people.16 In this sense, the CCP is another “national‐
ist” party. Its political program, despite having suffered mistakes of the
right and the left (including the serious mistake of the Cultural Revolu‐
tion), is widely accepted by the people.
Owing to the CCP’s political program and tight organizational
structure, its influence is ubiquitous at every level and in every aspect
of contemporary Chinese society; it determines the direction of society
and government. Though there may be differences and conflicts within
the party‐state, there is no external influence on the government other
than the Party: there is no such thing as government policy independ‐

11. Xian Fa [Constitution] pmbl., para. 10 (1982) (P.R.C.).
12. As far as I know, the former or current leaders of such political parties as Democratic League, China National Democratic Consultation Association, Zi Gong Party, and Taiwan Democratic Self-government League were or are CCP members.
13. Two examples are the late and only non-CCP Vice Presidents of PRC: Song Qinqlin, wife of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, applied and was approved for membership in the CCP right before her death; and Rong Yiren, China’s leading “red capitalist,” was identified in a New China
News Agency obituary as a “solider for communism.”
14. 16TH CCP Nat’l Conf., Constitution Of The Communist Party Of China general
princs. (2002) [hereinafter CCP Const.].
15. It is emphasized that CCP represents the fundamental interests of the overwhelming
majority of the Chinese people, represents the development trend of China’s advanced productive forces, and represents the orientation of China’s advanced culture. It is widely considered an important change of CCP in terms of its organizational constitution and political
ideology.
16. Cf. 7th CCP Nat’l Conf., Constitution Of The Communist Party Of China (1945); 8th
CCP Nat’l Conf., Constitution Of The Communist Party Of China (1956).
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ent from the CCP; there is nothing else truly influential, not even the
military policy imagined by Western scholars. In this view, as a matter
of fact, the CCP is not only the strength at the core of every undertaking
in China, it is also the mechanism for the mobilization, integration, and
political representation of all social forces and classes of PRC. In con‐
temporary China, nearly every political force has either been integrated
into the CCP, or, as in the case of former and present capitalists,
counter‐revolutionaries, bad elements, and rightists during the Cultural
Revolution (1966–1976), denied political expression. However, in the
more than two decades since China began its reform and “opening up”
in 1978, and especially following the inclusion of the concept of the “the
three representatives” in the party’s and PRC’s constitutions, the CCP
has pursued becoming a governing party that represents the basic in‐
terests of the greatest number of people and that has daily strengthened
its ability as a governing party.17
Therefore, distinguishing the status of party and government offi‐
cials is truly not that important. At every administrative level in the
PRC, the head of the administrative unit is not only a party member, but
the number two leader (for example, the deputy party secretary) of the
party organization at that level, while among the deputy leaders of an
administrative unit (for example, Vice Mayor of a city), only one person
is generally not a party member. Party and governmental officials are
interchangeable: for example, most governors eventually assume a po‐
sition as provincial Party secretary, and many provincial Party secretar‐
ies have previously served as governors or other officials. This is the
pattern from the center down to the lowest level. Indeed, historically,
few officials who have specialized in or worked only in Party affairs and
never in the government enter the highest, core policy‐making posi‐
tions of the Party organization.
This pattern holds true across all the branches of government and
administration regardless of the breadth of their responsibilities. For
example, at all levels of government, from the municipal to the national,
the chairs of the People’s Congresses and People’s Political Consultative
Conferences, as well as the chiefs of all but a few government agencies,
are the party secretaries of the leading party group18 in those units.19
The institutions charged with administering justice (the People’s
Courts and People’s Procuratorates) are certainly no exception. Since

17. Xian Fa art. 1 (1982).
18. A leading party group is a CCP organization set in a state organ, people’s organization, and other non-party organization.
19. Currently, probably the foreign ministry is the only exception.
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1949, all the Presidents of the People’s Supreme Court and the Chief
Procurator of the Supreme Procuratorate, except Shen Junru, the first
President of People’s Supreme Court, have been CCP members and sec‐
retaries of the leading Party group of the organization. Although there
is commonly a non‐CCP‐member Vice President or Deputy Procurator,
they are all carefully selected by the CCP organizational branch and
trusted by the CCP; in some particularly important policy decisions,
these non‐Party officials may be invited to participate in an expanded
meeting of the leading party group of their institution.
Given such a structure, it is not only hard to distinguish among so‐
cial, administrative, or Party interference in the judicial system and its
operation, it is also unnecessary to make this distinction. To insist on
the distinction is to apply a standard Western model of a judiciary, in‐
apposite for China. It fits China into a procrustean bed, akin to “cutting
one’s feet to fit shoes” or “marking a boat to see where one has dropped
a knife in a river.” This sort of “research” is not only meaningless; it also
blurs and confuses the real problems to be dealt with in the Chinese ju‐
dicial system and can, moreover, lead to mistaken solutions. In my
view, what is truly important is for us to discover, examine, and study
concretely the shortcomings and merits of influence on and interfer‐
ence in the legal system (whatever its sources), and to determine how
to adjust and improve the performance of China’s judiciary, as well as
make it just, efficient, and effective.
It should be pointed out that because of the Party’s ubiquitous in‐
stitutional presence and because of the nature of the social revolution
in China, the Party’s organizations and leaders (through administrative
and other agencies) have directly and indirectly influenced, interfered
in, and even at times manipulated the judicial process. However, we
cannot, indeed, we should not, simply look at this as unfair interference.
To be sure, the Party’s mistaken interference in the judicial system and
its policy errors have led to some disastrous consequences. Yet even
during the most extreme moments, such as the Cultural Revolution
(1966–1976), there were CCP organizations and officials, who, within
the scope of their ability and influence, prevented and reduced the un‐
fairness or radicalism in some cases, including instances in the judicial
sphere. Although today it is quite popular to attribute all the problems
of the PRC to the CCP or the revolution led by the CCP, it is hard to
imagine that the current state of Chinese society and the judicial system
would necessarily be better off without the modern revolution and
economic development led by the CCP. This is counterfactual, and I will
not develop the argument here; I am willing to let history be the final
judge. However, if one thinks the revolution led by the CCP was inevita‐
91

Duke Law CICLOPs | Zhu Suli

Vol. 1

ble and on balance improved China, then one has to accept the CCP and
its modeling of China’s modern judiciary. Though we can argue about
whether the costs are worth it, there are no benefits without costs.
Today, although the CCP has adopted “relying on law to rule the
country” (yifa zhiguo) and judicial independence is inscribed in the
Constitution, party organizations and individuals persist in influencing
and interfering with the judiciary. However, although these interferers
are sometimes leading cadres who “wave the flag” of the local Party or‐
ganization, it does not mean that this individual’s interference repre‐
sents the Party’s or that particular party organization’s interference. To
the contrary, some of them are violating CCP principles, policies, and
disciplinary rules. A county Party chief may interfere with a county
court’s handling of a case; if he or she acts out of personal interest, it is
illegal; if the action is driven by “local interest,” it is at a minimum un‐
fair and inappropriate. The Court or Procuratorate has a basis in law
and Party disciplinary rules to reject such interference, and both insti‐
tutions have certainly resisted this sort of meddling, though not always
successfully.20 Moreover, sometimes the party’s apparent interference
is merely issuing an opinion (pishi) as a response to a “hot” social issue.
Even in the absence of this opinion, the relevant court, acting solely on
the basis of the law, would have reached a similar result. In a sense, the
Party’s issuing of an opinion is simply a necessary political or public re‐
lations gesture by the CCP, acting in its role as the governing party that
is serving the people. It is a necessary political strategy that shows re‐
sponsiveness to outcries from the people. Such gestures certainly do
not fit the model of separation of powers and are often criticized by
many legal scholars who, based on their knowledge of Western judicial
practices, think that the CCP should keep quiet about a case awaiting
trial. Yet maybe the gesture is necessary for the majority of Chinese
people who are not interested in foreign comparisons, and want merely
justice and social solidarity. From a legal perspective, I find the Party’s
interference unjustified and am sometimes disposed to join in the criti‐
cism. However, from a political perspective and from an objective or
neutral position, I do not see why the legal perspective is necessarily
more moral and more reasonable than the political perspective, and
why the judicial position should always be privileged over the political
position. Perhaps, my position is tendentious and conflicts with my self‐
interest as a legal professional. However, in my view, the Party’s inter‐
ference may reasonably be seen as a performance of its political func‐
tions of social integration and representation.

20. See Zhu, supra note 4, at 129-31, where I analyze such cases.
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Another difficulty in making a distinction is that an administrative
agency’s interference may be arising directly or indirectly from a CCP
decision or policy determination. For example, in order to attract for‐
eign investment, a local Party organization, the local government, or
government agencies may instruct (zhishi) the local court to “take care
of” (zhaogu) a foreign investor in a particular case. Such actions do not
comport with a pure model of judicial autonomy, but at the same time,
the local Standing Committee of People’s Congress or other government
agencies may enact a local statute of general applicability that requires
local courts to implement the CCP policy of encouraging economic de‐
velopment. Regardless of the form it takes, this sort of interference
cannot be said to come from the government rather than the Party be‐
cause it is, in fact, reflecting the political judgments and decisions of the
Party center or its local branches. When we turn to the real world to
look closely at how such influence is exercised, we find an even more
complicated situation. In general, one can say that the final decision
making power lies in the CCP. However, at the level of everyday experi‐
ence, whether interference comes from the Party, the government, the
People’s Congress, or the media, or individuals within them all depends
upon the position and actual influence of the interfering party, upon the
institutions he or she thinks is the most effective instrument for inter‐
vening, and upon the actual channels he or she uses to affect the court’s
judgment. It is not always a CCP organization that is the most influential
in such matters. Like other people, the Chinese are very practical. They
will try anything and everything they think might be effective at exert‐
ing influence on the courts. Distinctions among the Party, government,
People’s Congress, or the mass media are not made. Nor are distinc‐
tions between lawful and unlawful methods, such as personal connec‐
tions with and even bribery of judges.
Even within the judiciary (Courts and Procuratorates), there are
various legal, semi‐legal, and illegal interferences, both legal and adminis‐
trative in nature. Sometimes, it is hard to determine whether the influ‐
ence is Party or non‐Party, institutional or personal, or legal or
administrative. A Supreme People’s Court’s decision, even a judicial in‐
terpretation from its adjudication committee, the most professional or‐
gan within the Court, may still be a response to a policy decision by the
Central Committee of the CCP. For example, in December 2003, Supreme
Court President Xiao Yang announced that the Court had issued a “lead‐
ing opinion” (zhidao yijian) following intensive study by the Court’s Party
branch of a statement from Hu Jintao, General Secretary of the CCP.21 In

21. Liaowang Xinwen Zhoukan, Oct. 13, 2003, at 20.
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this case, it was not simply a matter of restating a CCP Central Committee
policy. Rather, the decision addressed a real, pervasive internal problem
of the court system. Moreover, a higher court judge or judges’ unfair re‐
versal of a lower level decision may be a product of undue social influ‐
ences on those higher court judges disguised with CCP rhetoric. Finally,
even if the Party interferes in a particular case, for example, through the
increasingly less common practice of utilizing the Party secretary of the
politics and law committee (zhengfa wei), the instructions, though writ‐
ten, are general rather than specific. Like any other texts, they need in‐
terpretation. Is such interference an interference, and in what sense?
Actually, judges who try such cases may use such an instruction to hide
their personal judgment, even their partiality.
Accordingly, I conclude, first, that the influence of the CCP upon
the judiciary is general and diffuse; it comes not only from party institu‐
tions and party leaders, but also through many other avenues.
Second, although the CCP has its own ideology and exercises sig‐
nificant influence on the judiciary, taken as a whole, this ideology is not
necessarily incompatible with the general view of justice shared by or‐
dinary people. The organizational principles of the CCP are in conflict
with the operation of professional logic in the legal/judicial system, but
in concert with China’s social development, the legal/judicial profes‐
sion in China is institutionalizing itself. Third, as a concrete, operating
political party within society, the CCP is not essentialist; every sort of
person, interest group, and political force may try to use the mecha‐
nism of the Party to influence or interfere in the operation of the judici‐
ary. Their actions have both a positive and negative effect on the
formation and development of the judicial system. Fourth, on the level
of everyday life, not only is it difficult to identify the pure party inter‐
ference, it is also important to note that such interference has a
strongly pragmatic and opportunistic character. Therefore, I would ar‐
gue that separating Party interference from other interference cannot
further our understanding of the operation of the basic level legal sys‐
tem. Moreover, other than exacerbating an ideological and essentialist
understanding of the CCP and China, such distinctions have no intellec‐
tual significance.
III. WHAT IS THE FRAME OF REFERENCE?
Even it were possible to identify a purely Party influence, such research
is untenable because of the problem of an implied frame of reference.
Indeed, there are many flaws in the PRC’s judiciary, and they are
probably attributable to the CCP’s ideology. However, I prefer to trace
them to the unprecedented social transformation of China during the
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last one hundred years. One of my aims in writing Sending Law to the
Countryside was to try to identify and find solutions for these flaws.
Perhaps, because my effort was insufficient, my analysis not trenchant,
my vision too narrow, indeed blind in places, my work has its short‐
comings. Nevertheless, it is hard to construct, indeed even to imagine, a
standard frame of reference, whether experiential or ideal, for the po‐
litical‐judicial relationship that could be used to objectively measure
the CCP’s influence and interference at the basic level of the judiciary
and then evaluate the pros and cons of such influence.
All modern countries have political parties, which despite the com‐
monly recognized principle of judicial independence, influence or inter‐
fere in judicial matters in various ways. The extent of the phenomenon
may be less than in China, but it is nonetheless fairly common. Actually,
without the active participation and influence of political parties, it is
hard to imagine the existence or perpetuation of an institutional judicial
independence. My language may seem a bit cynical, but it describes a his‐
torical and contemporary reality. Was it not out of loyalty to the Federal‐
ist Party and determined resistance to the Republic‐Democratic Party
that Chief Justice Marshall created the system of judicial review, which
serves as the core of American judicial independence?22
Some may dismiss my example as characteristic of the early stage
of judicial independence. However, even in many Western countries
today, judicial independence depends on and indeed is guaranteed to a
great extent by party politics. Without party politics there would be no
judicial independence in these countries. For example, in the United
States, the two political parties exert influence on the courts and judi‐
cial process through the system in which the Senate advises and con‐
sents to the President’s nomination of federal judges. Also, as the
example of the Warren Court shows, some American judges voluntarily
make their judgments in accord with their party’s ideology. In addition,
some states have institutions of election and recall.23 To different de‐
grees, all these institutions and practices are influenced by party poli‐
tics. Personally, I regard these political parties’ influence on the judicial
system as generally acceptable and lawful. Moreover, I recognize that
neither in degree nor character can they be equated to the political in‐

22. Oliver Wendell Holmes, John Marshall, in The Essential Holmes: Selections From
The Letters, Speeches, Judicial Opinions, And Other Writings Of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.
206-09 (Richard A. Posner ed., 1992). I discuss the background of Marbury v. Madison in
Zhiddu ruhe xingchengde? [How was the System Formed?], 1998 Bijiaofa Yanjiu [Res. In
Comp. L.], no. 1 (1998).
23. Henry J. Abraham, The Judicial Process: An Introductory Analysis of the Courts of
the United States, England, and France 37-42 (7th ed. 1998).
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fluence or interference to which Chinese judges are subject. However,
the acceptance by Upham and me, as well as by many others of the ine‐
luctability of parties’ political interference does not mean that we can
deny that it is indeed political influence.
“Many” does not mean everyone or on all issues. In America, there
have been instances of what Judge Robert Bork and other scholars re‐
gard as egregious interference—for example, the struggle in 1987 be‐
tween Republicans and Democrats over President Reagan’s nomination
of Bork to the Supreme Court. At least Judge Bork regarded it as inap‐
propriate interference, or in his words, a “political seduction of the
law.”24 Is this an overstatement prompted by Judge Bork’s anger? Let us
imagine an alternative outcome in which a Republican‐dominated Sen‐
ate confirmed Bork. In the eyes of adamant Bork opponents Senator
Ted Kennedy and Senator Joseph Biden (who in the Democratic‐
controlled Senate was chair of the Judiciary Committee), would that re‐
sult not also have been political? Actually, the controversy over Judge
Bork’s nomination reveals only the tip of the iceberg of the influence of
disciplined American party politics over judicial affairs. It was an ex‐
ceptional case, but less controversy in a confirmation case does not
mean the absence of politics and political influence; politically non‐
controversial is not politically neutral or politics‐free.25 The nomination
and confirmation of federal judges in the United States is becoming
more and more political.
Politics and political interference are evident not only in the proc‐
ess of nominating and confirming judges, but also in some concrete
cases. The interference comes not only from politicians in their role as
party leaders, but also through the willing cooperation of politicians
serving as judges. Sometimes, such efforts may be out of bounds. The
most famous or infamous instance is Chief Justice John Marshall’s han‐
dling of Marbury v. Madison.26 In that case, there was no party leader

24. Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law
(1990).
25. A recent empirical study found that “the more important the court, the greater the difficulty of having the person confirmed. Although the confirmation rates have fallen and the
length of the confirmation process has lengthened dramatically, the ex-post facto measures
of judicial quality of circuit court nominees…or judicial independence have been decreasing
over time.…The most troubling results strongly indicate that circuit court judges who turn out
to be the most successful judges…faced the most difficult confirmation battles . . .” The study
speculates that “[p]ossibly, senators of the party in opposition to the President really care only
about preventing the best judges from being on the circuit court because they will have the
most impact.” John R. Lott, Jr., The Judicial Confirmation Process: The Difficulty with Being
Smart, 2 J. of Empirical Legal Stud., 407, 443-47 (2005).
26. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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demanding that he handle the case in a certain way, but his aggressive
personality and firm party ideology motivated him to make perhaps the
greatest decision in the American constitutional system. In the last fifty
years, the Berger and Rehnquist courts have, to a certain degree, been
much the same: more political than juridical.27 The most recent instance
is the controversial case of Bush v. Gore.28
Please note that in no way am I saying that American political par‐
ties’ influence on the operation of courts is the same as the CCP’s influ‐
ence upon basic courts in China. The two are very different. The United
States has a two‐party system, while in China, the “[Communist] party is
the leader of all”;29 in the United States, political influence on the judici‐
ary probably comes mainly from judges’ self‐conscious loyalty to party
ideology and platforms, while in China the influence is a function of the
party’s demands on and disciplinary control over judges; and in the
United States, with lifetime tenure and high salaries as protection, some
judges will not hesitate to “rebel against” their party,30 while in China,
judges, who are civil servants, can find comfort only in the supportive
writings of a few scholars. Thus, I recognize that in terms of parties’ po‐
litical interference in the judicial system, the differences between China
and the United States are ones both of degree and character.
Moreover, I want to point out that nothing I have said implies that
in the course of transforming its judiciary, China should not study the
United States and other Western countries. To the contrary, the PRC is
in the midst of studying these examples, and out of a concern for the
need to address China’s problems, I approve and support this effort.
However, the position I have taken above has nothing to do with
the frame of reference issue with which I want to engage. The question
remains: what is the proper frame of reference for measuring and
evaluating the relationship between party politics and the judiciary.
The American? The British? The German? The French? Or should I con‐
struct a standard model based on the judicial practice of all of the na‐
tions in the world? But why should they be basis for the standard, and
is that standard appropriate for China? From where does such a com‐
27. Lucas A. Powe Jr., The Warren Court And American Politics (2000); Earl M. Maltz,
The Chief Justiceship of Warren Burger, 1969-1986 (2000); Tinsley E. Yarbrough, The
Rehnquist Court and the Constitution (2001); Rehnquist Justice: Understanding the Court
Dynamic (Earl M. Maltz Ed., 2003).
28. Cf. Richard A. Posner, Breaking the Deadlock: The 2000 Election, The Constitution,
and the Courts (2001); The Vote: Bush, Gore, and the Supreme Court (Cass R. Sunstein &
Richard A. Epstein Eds., 2001).
29. 2 Mao Zedong, Mao Zedong Zhuzuo Xuandu [Selected Readings Of Mao Zedong’s
Works] 852 (1986).
30. Cf. Laurence H. Tribe, Constitutional Choices (1985).
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parative law model or statistical standard derive its normative force?
From where does its justness come? If, as Speaker of the U.S. House of
Representatives Tip O’Neil said, “all politics are local,” why should local
judicial politics adopt a universal standard? We cannot get to this form
of universal standards unless I adopt a linear version of modernization
theory, which I steadfastly reject, but Professor Upham believes I sup‐
port.
Should I dismiss all the empirical evidence and directly develop an
ideal model frame of reference by which to examine the relations be‐
tween the judiciary and political parties? This is, of course, possible and
really not that hard. Or, should I derive such a model relationship from
the separation of powers (with its Western origins and cultural color‐
ing) or other similar concepts? I believe I can do it quite well if practice
is not considered. But then, unless we are essentialists who not only be‐
lieve that there is one true, correct, universal, and transcendent defini‐
tion of the relationship between political parties and the judiciary, but
also believe that we have perfect access to that definition, we still can‐
not prove that this ideal or deduced model for political party‐judicial
relations is indeed legitimate. Perhaps it is possible to broaden or
loosen the standard a bit, consider the national context where a judici‐
ary is located, and construct a “comparatively reasonable” relationship
between political parties and the judiciary. But methodologically, this
would still be an artificial construct which would certainly deviate from
the American standard implicit in Upham’s critique, comparative law’s
ideal model, or the essentialist standard, because one would have to re‐
turn to the contextualized, consequentialist, functionalist model by
which I abide in my book. One must come back to China’s social context,
where the judiciary operates, and evaluate the relationship between
party politics, the government, and the judiciary in considering the sys‐
tematic consequences of such a judiciary in the Chinese society. Even if
all this is possible, it is hard to avoid innumerable controversies over
the reasonableness of the construct. For example, I consider that in
Sending Law to the Countryside, I constructed a reasonable analytical
structure and frame of reference for evaluating the relationship be‐
tween the Party and the judiciary, and provided a focused discussion of
a series of related issues. However, Professor Upham finds in it an ab‐
sence “of politics and political power.” Through numerous, useless pub‐
lications, we could debate forever the reasonableness of the
framework, but we will get nowhere.
I say useless because not all debates end in agreement or intellec‐
tual enlightenment, and even if we can reach an agreement over the
frame of reference, does this frame have any practical uses? Whether
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we deduce it from the general, abstract it from empirical materials, or
make a standard directly out of American or some other national expe‐
rience, in the end, it mainly provides us with just another frame of ref‐
erence for criticizing contemporary Chinese judicial practice, making us
think that we have truth and justice in our hands. But it does not help
us either to understand China’s reality or to transform that reality. In‐
deed, we may be worse off than we started. This sort of frame of refer‐
ence is doomed to fail because from the beginning, the current
relationship between political parties and the judiciary is neither de‐
rived from a concept or ideology, nor modeled on a foreign standard.
The current state of China’s judicial practice is a product of China’s
modern historical and social development, a social reality constructed
from various social variables.
IV. THE PARTY AS AN INSTITUTIONAL ALTERNATIVE
My response cannot stop here. Otherwise, readers may think it is not a
strong response, but rather at most a defensive pleading for my meth‐
odology that, even if successful, merely dodges Upham’s arrow. It might
enhance the misimpression about the relationship between the CCP
and the judiciary within China and the implied universal, normative
character of American‐type judicial politics.
More importantly, such a brief response leaves unexplored topics
that are inherently deserving of further consideration and it is there‐
fore unfair to Chinese contemporary history, the CCP, and the Chinese
judiciary to stop here. So, in this section, I want to engage in a thought
experiment and argue for the contextual reasonableness of the relation‐
ship between the CCP and the judiciary and for its necessity in China’s
social transformation. If my argument is sound, it will further demon‐
strate the problems with Professor Upham’s criticism of my book, not
only in his methodology, but also in his value judgments. Further, such
a social science analysis of the relationship between Party and the judi‐
ciary may provide a new frame of reference for understanding and
evaluating the issue of the relationship between the CCP and the PRC’s
judiciary. Even if my effort fails, it will advance the academic research
on China’s judicial system.
The relationship between the party‐state and the judiciary in
China evolved over the course of China’s modernization. Since 1840,
China’s most important task has been to transform itself successfully—
economically from an agricultural society to an industrial and commer‐
cial society; politically from a community unified by culture to a mod‐
ern nation‐state unified by politics; and culturally from a rural society
dominated by Confucian humanities to an urban one led by the social
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sciences.31 In terms of key variables such as time, population, and geo‐
graphic size, this was an unprecedented historical transformation.
Without a vigorous, core political power, it is unimaginable that this
change could have occurred in such a short time and in the face of a
fiercely competitive international society. The early history of the Re‐
public of China is clear evidence. Only when the GMD and CCP appeared
as national, revolutionary parties and twice cooperated, did Chinese
society begin its first steps toward unification, and only in the Second
World War, with the assistance from Soviet Union and the United
States, did China win its first war against foreign invasion since 1840.
It should be noted that the GMD and CCP are profoundly different,
but looked at from another angle, whatever their differences, both are
different from contemporary Western political parties. Both the GMD
and CCP were aware that the task and historical burden of the nation
was the economic, political, cultural, and social transformation of China.
To achieve this goal in the wake of imperial China’s collapse and in the
face of an intensely competitive world, they had to use every possible
means to mobilize and integrate all political forces in the service of na‐
tional unity, independence, and freedom, which are preconditions to
social and economic development. What I have described is the process
of jianguo, which is commonly translated as “state‐building.” I prefer to
translate it as the constitution (or re‐constitution) of the nation‐state. It
is in this historical context of constituting the nation‐state that the CCP
and GMD came into being. In contrast, the political parties in the West
were established and operated within already‐constituted nations.
They were political organizations that served as vehicles for common
interests within these constituted nations, and generally speaking, did
not confront the historical problems and tasks that faced the Chinese
political parties, nor did they have the long‐term political goals of the
Chinese parties.
Because of this historical task, both the CCP and GMD were revolu‐
tionary parties, rather than merely political parties holding power.
They had to engage in armed struggle to gain the power, and then, even
after they gained political power, they had to continue to play the role
of a revolutionary party, leading society in the completion of social
revolution, land reform, and industrialization. All of these historical
tasks dictated that both parties be elitist: they had not only to be able to
propose national reform, but also to mobilize and lead the masses to

31. Zhu Suli, Daolu Tongxiang Chengshi—Zhuanxing Zhongguo De Fazhi Of [All Roads
Lead To Cities—Rule Of Law In A Transforming China] Intro. (2004) [Hereinafter Suli, All
Roads Lead To Cities].
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accomplish the transformation in order to construct or constitute a
modern nation‐state, precisely the original meaning of constitution.
However, this task could not be accomplished by the political elites
without the collective effort of the nation. Thus, both parties had to be
capable of integrating all kinds of other social forces, representing dif‐
ferent interests, and in this sense, they became the parties of the
masses.32 As a consequence of this historical context, the CCP and GMD
developed not only strong political ideologies, but also strict party dis‐
cipline and tight internal organizations to insure effective implementa‐
tion of party policy. Their party structures emphasize “democratic
centralism,” “organized democracy,” and “disciplined freedom,” which
all seem to be antinomies or oxymorons, but are actual practices within
the parties. Party members who violate Party discipline will be sanc‐
tioned or even expelled.33
Therefore, such parties are not only an important motivating and
leading force for social change; they have also been a critical institu‐
tional alternative in modern Chinese society. Before they take power,
they are organizational mechanisms and social mobilizers.
The party organization, party leaders, and even ordinary party
members are thus alternatives to the conventional bureaucracy and bu‐
reaucrats. Given the absence of the professionals and bureaucrats
China needed to order its society, after taking power, besides continu‐
ing their function of social mobilization and organization, the parties, to
a certain extent, could not but assume the role of the bureaucracy, and
in the course of that process, their members became the bureaucrats
that modern China needed. The so‐called party‐state, or rule by the
party, that the GMD first proposed and emphasized 34 is therefore not
only natural, but also inevitable. The CCP always opposed the GMD’s
idea of “party‐state,” but in reality, such a pattern characterized the CCP
both before,35 and certainly also after its victory in 1949. Indeed, the
CCP’s party‐state was even more pronounced than the GMD’s. Thus, ei‐

32. Cf. CCP Const., supra note 15, general princ. ; Const. Of The Guomindang preface
[hereinafter Gmd Const.].
33. CCP Const., supra note 15, general princs. Gmd Const., supra note 32, arts. 3, 4, 5,
ch. 12.
34. In 1928, the Standing Committee of the GMD stated that the Party was the Supreme
Tutelar of the nation. In 1931, the Nationalist Government invited selected representatives of
rural society, labor, business, and the education sector to convene and draw up a Tutelary
Period Provisional Constitution of the Republic of China, Article 30 of which specifies that
during the Tutelary Period, GMD will represent the National Conference to direct and supervise the National Government. Xu Juhua, Jiang Jieshi Chenbai Lu [A Record Of Jiang Jieshi’s
Success And Failure] ch. 12.
35. 1 Xiaoping, supra note 6, at 12.
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ther the GMD or the CCP has been the most important part of the con‐
stitutional and governmental structure of modern China and the core
force of that modernization.
The Party’s objective is social transformation. Accordingly, it can‐
not base itself directly on democracy—the people, after all have a ten‐
dency to be conservative and short‐sighted—but must insist on the
central role of the Party’s elites and leadership group in guiding the
revolution and social transformation. But at the same time, in order to
lead the masses, the Party cannot abandon them. In order to be repre‐
sentative, both the GMD and CCP had to maintain a certain degree of
internal democracy (whether it was called “democratic centralism” or
“democracy with organization”). Parties become a quasi‐constitutional
structure in another sense as they serve as an alternative for or a nec‐
essary stage on the road toward constitutionalism:36 Within the party,
party discipline and guiding principles perform the function of law and
statutes. In his analysis of the party‐state of China during the twentieth
century, Harvard professor William C. Kirby pointed out that the goal of
a party‐state is not to lead the government, but to reform the Chinese
people and recast them into citizens of new nation‐state. The party‐
state, he noted, is a political entity pursuing social and economic devel‐
opment; its aim is complete mobilization of all China’s people and total
industrialization.37
This historical task cannot be fulfilled within a short period, so the
party‐state structure may last quite long since the taking over of power
does not equal constitutionalism, nor accomplishment of the self‐
imposed historical task. Parties want to accomplish their ideals through
the coercive state and governmental powers under their control. How‐
ever, when in power, the requirement of effective and stable govern‐
ance will force parties to gradually adjust their policies; to enact laws;
to establish conventional institutions, such as the National Congress or
National People’s Congress; to recruit qualified civil servants and set up
bureaucracy; and to establish a judiciary and improve its function. It is
a long process of transformation from a revolutionary party to a gov‐
erning party; a process of transformation from a pioneer and elitist
party to a popular party. Because these processes of reformation of the

36. Sun Yat-sen proposed three stages to China’s constitutionalism: the period of military government, the period of political tutelage, and the period of constitutional government.
See Sun Yat-sen, Guomin zhengfu jianguo dagang [A Constitutional Program of the National
Government], in Zhongshen, supra note 5, at 126–29.
37. William C. Kirby, Renshi 20 Shiji zhongguo [Understanding China of Twentieth Century], 2001 21st Century, no. 10, 114-24 (2001), available at http://www.usc.cuhk.edu.hk/
wk_wzdetails.asp?id=1523.
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Party and institutionalization of modern nation‐state take time, they
are still ongoing in the PRC.
Thus, it is understandable why in contemporary China, complete
judicial independence is impossible and why the relatively low degree
of party interference in the judiciary in the developed countries of the
West is not likely to be systematized in China. Actually, in contempo‐
rary China, the entire modern state apparatus, including the judiciary,
consists of inventions created by the governing political parties on the
basis of their political ideals, policies, and organizational structures.
The specific forms, such as the GMD’s “partyization of the judiciary,” or
the CCP’s “sending law to the countryside” and political and judicial
committee (zhengfawei) may be accidental, but the comprehensive
leadership, influence, and control of the parties was inevitable and per‐
vasive. Thus, we have the phenomenon that I have described above: in
contemporary China, it is well nigh impossible to distinguish what is
and what is not the CCP’s influence and interference, for in fact the judi‐
ciary is the CCP’s creation.
Although GMD and CCP had some commonalities, there were also
significant differences between them, most notably the different social
forces that they integrated and represented. From the 1920s onward,
the GMD inherited most of the technocrats from the late Qing dynasty,
as well as the vast majority of professionals and mid‐ to upper‐level in‐
tellectuals, for, as the party in power, the GMD provided them with
room for their knowledge and skill. Moreover, another major constitu‐
ent force of the GMD was the group of military officers who had gradu‐
ated from the Huangpu Military College and who served as another
institutional alternative to the bureaucracy.
By contrast, despite consistently seeking a united front during its
military struggles, the CCP had no way to attract the broad participa‐
tion of such groups, not only because it had no space to deploy their
skills, but also because for these elites, the CCP was a much riskier
choice, especially in its military struggle for national power. Moreover,
unlike the GMD, the CCP also did not have a captive military college to
train its officers, who instead got their experience and skills on the bat‐
tlefield. During wartime, most military officers of the CCP were trained
in the battlefield. Thus, the CCP was less capable than the GMD of utiliz‐
ing modern or Paramodern institutions and professionals.
The CCP membership came mainly from peasants and other mid
and lower social classes. Because of the peasants’ mode of production,
they tended to be less modern, less disciplined, and less likely to be
long‐term thinkers. Thus, in order for the CCP to rely on this mass base
to make a successful revolution, it had to develop stronger party orga‐
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nization and leadership, stricter discipline, and a more radical ideol‐
ogy.38 There is substantial research to show that during the time that
the GMD held power on the mainland, the actual political power and
influence of its party organization and party members was substan‐
tially weaker than similarly situated CCP party organizations and cad‐
res. For example, the GMD’s propaganda and organization ministers
were much less influential than the CCP’s. Such evidence is abundant.39
The differences between the CCP and GMD lie in the social conditions
from which they were constructed; the ideological differences may not
have been as important as many people think.
The CCP’s stronger party organization and ideology compensated
for its lack of a bureaucratic system for modern government, but they
also impeded the creation and development of such a bureaucracy. Of
course, the CCP felt no urgent need for a bureaucracy, and long after it
took power in 1949, it remained a revolutionary party in character.
There was no quick transformation into a governing party; there was
no effective formation of a decent bureaucracy with technocrats, civil
servants, and professionals, such as judges and lawyers. In all aspects of
governance, the CCP played a decisive and dominant role. Political loy‐
alty and ideological purity became the important criteria for selecting
government employees, including those in the judiciary.40
Not until the 1980s did the CCP began to emphasize knowledge
and human talent, seeking to create a reformed cohort of cadres who
were more knowledgeable, professional, specialized, and younger. This
trend was fostered by the steady, rapid development of higher educa‐
tion and a dramatic increase in university graduates. The 1993 Provi‐
sional Civil Service Act,41 which replaced recruitment through political
channels with selection by open, competitive exams,42 symbolizes this

38. Cf. 1 Mao Zedong, On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party, in Selected Works of
Mao Zedong, vol. 1, Peking, Foreign Language Press, 1975.
39. See supra note 8.
40. Cf. Dong Biwu, Dong Biwu Faxue Wenji [Legal Works Of Dong Biwu] (2001).
41. Guojia gongwuyuan zanxing tiaoli [Provisional Civil Service Act] (promulgated by the
State Council, Aug. 14, 1993, effective Oct. 1, 1993), available at http://www.china.org.
cn/chinese/MATERIAL/385908.htm. On January 1, 2006, the Provisional Act was superceded
by the Civil Servant Law (Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gongwuyuan Fa). For the Chinese
version, see the website of the National People’s Congress, http://www.npc.gov.cn/
zgrdw/common/zw.jsp?label=WXZLK&id=337350&pdmc=110106. For an English language
version, see http://www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDI_EN/Laws/GeneralLawsandRegulations/Basic
Laws/t20060620_50863.jsp.
42. For a discussion of this Act, which is compared to the Pendleton Act that created the
United States Civil Service, see King K Tsao & John Abbott Worthley, Chinese Public Administration: Change with Continuity during Political and Economic Development, 55 Pub.
Admin. Rev., Mar.–Apr., 1995, at 169–74.
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fundamental change. Similarly, the 1990s appearance of criticism of the
practice of discharged military officers serving as judges 43 was not acci‐
dental. Though it was initiated in academic circles, it found an echo in
the court system itself, indicating the rise and increasing influence in
the judiciary of the first generation of post‐Cultural Revolution trained
legal professionals (most of whom were around forty years old). They
constituted a challenge for the established institutional structure in the
judiciary and led a series of judicial reforms.44
In the mid‐1980s, the CCP proposed separating party and gov‐
ernment, but progress has been neither fast nor significant.45 It seems
to me that a prominent (though not the only) problem is that parallel
duplicative systems address the same matter—the Party and the gov‐
ernment have separate but corresponding organizations and personnel.
Moreover, the logic of the Party organization impedes its becoming the
logic of an organization with specialized functions.46 High transaction
costs sharply reduce work efficiency. Also, because of the Party’s hold
on power, opportunists can use their position to use ideological lan‐
guage to expand their influence and serve their self‐interest. Thus, the
Party has consistently promoted strengthening and improving party
leadership,47 as well as establishing a new relationship between the
Party and the judiciary.48 China still faces an enormous task of reform,
and its performance is still subjected to withering criticism from West‐

43. He Weifang, Fuzhuan junren jin fayuan [Discharged Military Officers Come to the
Courts], Nanfang Zhoumo, Jan. 2, 1998.
44. Renmin fayue wunian gaige gangyao [A Five-Year Program for the Reform of People’s Courts], 1999 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Gongbao, no. 6
(1999).
45. Deng Xiaoping raised this idea in June 1986. 3 Xiaoping, supra note 6, at 164. In
September of that year, he further pointed out that the separation of Party and state should
be the top priority political reform. Id. at 179. Then, in October 1987, the 13th meeting of the
CCP Party Congress adopted Party General Secretary Zhao Ziyang’s report, Yanzhe you
zhongguo tesede shuihuizhuyi daolu qianjin [Advancing Along the Road of Socialism with
Chinese Characteristics], thereby formally listing party-state separation as the key to and the
primary task in reforming the political system.
46. Su Li, Fayuan de shenpan zhineng yu xingzheng guanli [The Adjudicative Function
of Courts and Administrative Management], 1999 Zhongwai Faxue [Chinese Foreign Jurisprudence], no. 5 (1999). Su Li is a pen name used by Zhu Suli.
47. Dang he guojia lingdao zhidu gaige [Reforming the System of Party and State
Leadership], August 18, 1980, in 2 Xiaoping, supra note 6.
48. For some of the most recent attempts, see Shenzhen jiangcheng dangzheng fenli
zheng’gai xianfeng [Shenzhen at the Forefront of the Political Reform Separating Party from
Government], Gongshang Shibao, Jan. 14, 2003. According to the article, this was the largest
political reform since the Party took power in 1949. Its key component was the separation of
the Party from the administrative and legislative systems, leading toward a Shenzhen municipal government with a Western-style separation of powers, in which the municipal government and the courts were in a mutual balance of power.
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ern governments and scholars, much of which is driven by their own
ideology. I admit that some criticism is justified and deserves the CCP’s
attention. However, historically, functionally, and consequentially,
China under the CCP’s leadership and governance has achieved great
success. Most notably, the CCP created a unique, innovative path to
modernization in a country with a large peasant economy and no mod‐
ern constitution or political institutions. Today, China’s political system
may not entirely meet our expectations, but the practical question is
whether abolishing the current system of CCP leadership would make
China better off and develop faster in the future, or, to put it as a coun‐
terfactual, without the CCP, could China have accomplished what it has
accomplished. I think not. In the last thirty years, to an extent, the CCP
actually has transformed itself and successfully led China’s reform and
social modernization.
This statement holds true for the judiciary. Although the recent
judicial reforms have, to some degree, been in response to pressures
accompanying economic transformation, the real organizational and
motivating force has been the CCP, including its leaders and intellectu‐
als. Reform has been implemented as a consequence of Party principles
and policies and through the exertion of party organization discipline
within the judiciary. I do not think every reform measure is good or de‐
sirable, but on balance their benefits outweigh their defects.49 For ex‐
ample, although the CCP’s control seriously compromises the
independence of the judicial system, especially the independence of
judges, in the absence of alternative institutions that are not yet fully in
place during this time of social transformation, to some extent Party
control has limited the corruption, laxness, and partiality of the judici‐
ary. This last point, I should note, is the subject of considerable contro‐
versy among lawyers and legal scholars. I, personally, respect others’
criticism, but conclusions about China’s judicial system cannot be
reached simply through debates; they will come as the result of empiri‐
cal research, which requires time. I do not want to rush to judgment
and am willing to be critiqued and rebutted, but if we are to research
China’s modernization, especially the relationship between the Party,
the state, and the judicial system, then we must look at the question
with an open mind and take into account the historical and social con‐
text of these institutions. Evaluations and judgments based solely on
Western experience or ideology or out of the strategic considerations of
Western politicians have no academic value or possible practical appli‐
cability. From the perspective of democratic theory and evolutionary

49. Suli, All Roads Lead To Cities, supra note 31.
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economics, valid institutional development and innovation arises from
competition. The vicissitudes along the road of social development are
not predetermined. The same is true for the evolving relationship be‐
tween the party‐state and the judicial system. It is therefore critical for
us to examine this relationship as scholars and not as ideologues.
V. A NEW MODEL FOR THE STUDIES OF CHINA’S JUDICIAL SYSTEM
Once we understand the role that the CCP has played in modern China
in social mobilization and representation, in nation building, and in the
creation of institutions, then we must maintain a degree of moderate
academic vigilance against the apparently successful Western experi‐
ence with the judiciary and rule of law. Vigilance is not hostility. Rather,
simply because of current Western institutions’ ostensible success, we
should not take them as a decontextualized standard when they are in
fact embedded in and abstracted from particular historical and theo‐
retical contexts. And then, once China fails to comport with this stan‐
dard, it becomes an object for politicized academic criticism and
reform. Such an approach is fairly common among both Western and
Chinese scholars. I am not accusing them of intentionally using ideology
as a critical standard. Many of them work hard to understand China and
wish it well. However, their social experience imperceptibly impedes
them from placing themselves in the position of the Chinese and con‐
sidering China’s current situation from a value‐neutral perspective. In‐
evitably, our life experience impedes and defines the scope of our
imagination.
Beyond their social environment and history, what has also influ‐
enced Western scholars, and through them some Chinese scholars as
well, is Western scholarship on the relationship between the party‐
state and the judiciary in the former Soviet Union and communist coun‐
tries in Eastern Europe. This scholarship and its underlying theoretical
framework may have prevented them from realizing the uniqueness of
China’s experience. In the Soviet Union and formerly communist East‐
ern European countries, the major function of the Communist Party
was seen to be, and indeed is, to control the bureaucracy, including the
judicial professionals who had been in place before the Communist
Party existed. This research not only enhanced the notion of an inher‐
ent separation of and conflict of interests between the Communist
Party and the bureaucracy, it also left the impression that the bureauc‐
racy always came first and that Party control followed. This conclusion
is reasonable and, considering the context of these countries, possibly
correct. For example, in the Soviet Union’s early years, many Red Army
generals, such as the famous Marshal Mikhail Nikolayevich Tuk‐
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hachevsky and the hero of World War II, Marshal Georgy Konstantino‐
vich Zhukov, were previously military officers of the Tsar. In order to
secure its leadership and control, the Communist Party sent political
commissars to ensure the implementation of the party’s lines in the
Red Army. The Party followed the same approach in many enterprises
and governmental agencies, and this practice was followed by other
Eastern European countries.
China, however, was not like this. Long before CCP took power in
China, its leaders clearly understood that China was different from the
Soviet Union. In 1936, when a presidium political commissar, Yang
Chengwu, was reappointed as the military commander, Mao Zedong
explained the difference between the Soviet Red Army and the Chinese
Red Army: in the Soviet Union, political commissars were sent to su‐
pervise military officers, most of whom were former White Army offi‐
cers, while in China all the military officers and political military
officers in the Red Army were trained by the CCP and experienced in
combat.50 Yang Chengwu later became one of the most famous generals
of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), but few knew that he had previ‐
ously served as a political commissar;
Yang was not unique in the PLA. His career path, like that of indi‐
viduals in other professions, was common.
Therefore, the model abstracted from the experiences of the for‐
mer Soviet bloc is not entirely appropriate for modern China. In mod‐
ern China, whether the GMD or the CCP, and whether before or after
one of these parties held power, to varying degrees the general pattern
was that the party preceded the government, the judiciary, and the
armed forces. Before the GMD and CCP, there was hardly a modern na‐
tion‐state, government, judiciary, and army.51 There is some truth in the
CCP propaganda, “without the CCP there is no new China.” Thus, the
time sequence of the appearance of the Party and the modern institu‐
tions of China demand a new framework or model of research.
As I have said, this paper aims partly at Chinese scholars of the
current legal system because some of them avoid any discussion of po‐
litical parties. It may be from disgust with the extreme leftist politics of
the Cultural Revolution, fear, or excessive sensitivity. However, as I
have argued in this essay, their unwillingness to deal with the CCP may
50. Yang Chengwu, Yang Chengwu Huiyilu [Memoirs Of Yang Chengwu] 334 (1987).
51. The first national conference of the GMD convened in 1924, and the first military college, Huangpu Military Academy, which became the major source of soldiers for the national
army under the GMD, opened in 1925. The national government of the GMD took power in
1927. The first national conference of the CCP convened in 1921, the Chinese Red Army was
founded in 1927, and the CCP national government took power in 1949.
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also simply reflect their practice of labeling the particular experience of
the West as a universal theoretical framework for legal systems. This
approach leads to two sorts of responses in dealing with the issue of
Party influence. One is to list examples of the glorious history of judicial
independence in foreign countries. Either they think that they will per‐
suade the Chinese people, government, and Communist Party to carry
out judicial reform or even revolution on the basis of the Western
model, or they hope that by not talking about Party influence on the ju‐
diciary, it can be made to gradually disappear. This is not an unreason‐
able strategy for pushing judicial reform, but I doubt that it can be
successful and find it naïve. It cannot be successful because the Party
and government’s influence are a historically constructed and estab‐
lished fact. Whether one likes it or not, the Party is an integral compo‐
nent around which the judicial system revolves. If one wants to reform
the legal system, then one has to face this situation directly.
Another common approach by some Chinese scholars is to oppose
the Party’s involvement and treat it as a historical mistake rather than
understand how the current system happened. They do not look for or
do not see the variables that constitute the causal relationship that ex‐
plains China’s current system. Because they insist on using an idealistic
historical point of view rather than a materialist one from which to un‐
derstand the history of the judicial system, they cannot see that the
Party was, from the outset, an external force in the system, but one that
is now fully integrated. They persist in imagining the glorious moment
in which an unsullied legal system emerged and thereafter and forever
remained innocent, flawless, and pure. This sort of hope is very impor‐
tant in establishing the courage and commitment for judicial reform,
but it is of little advantage in successfully accomplishing that reform.
Against these two approaches, I would argue that in studying con‐
temporary China, one must treat either the GMD or CCP as a constituent
element of the political and legal system or as a constitutional struc‐
ture. That implies that no matter how much it deviates from “the stan‐
dard” or the experience of Western countries, the system should be
seen as something normal and not as a freak or an anomaly produced
by mistaken theories and viewpoints. And despite the current system’s
weaknesses, problems, and even mistakes, nearly all of which are in
some way directly or indirectly connected to the Party’s influence, one
cannot ignore the Party’s positive contributions, which are often the
flip‐side of what is perceived as negative.
Without question, what was reasonable and ideal yesterday does
not necessarily remain so today. Today, in the wake of China’s reform
and development, the relationship between the Party and the judicial
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system certainly needs adjustment and reform. Whether the path to re‐
form is the 1980s approach of separating Party from state, Jiang
Zemin’s “three representatives” (sange daibiao) approach of enlarging
the party’s representativeness, or something else, they all require care‐
ful, attentive, long‐term work from those involved with the law. How‐
ever, the effect of history means that we cannot start anew. If we cannot
treat seriously China’s adjudicature of yesterday, then there is no way
to understand its adjudicature of today or to anticipate what it will be
in the future. The past is one of the variables in the current system and
will certainly influence tomorrow’s. For the sake not only of legal schol‐
arship, but also of legal practice, the Party’s role in the judiciary and in
administration of justice must be objectively understood and not
treated as an abstraction.
I am not making a value judgment about whether the Chinese
model of the Party as preceding and shaping government, judiciary, and
even the army is good or right. What I am suggesting is that we revise
the theoretical model for studying and understanding the relationship
between the Party and modern China and base it on the Chinese expe‐
rience. My aim is to make effective, practical, and, most importantly,
constructive suggestions for China’s social, political, and judicial re‐
form. Even though I am expecting to be criticized or even condemned
by people from both the left and right for what I have written in this es‐
say—in particular for my undifferentiated treatment of the CCP and
GMD and for my depiction of the CCP as a constitutional alternative in
China’s social transformation, I welcome such criticism because it may
prove that I have done something right.
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Desperately Seeking Subsidiarity
Danish Private Law in the Scandinavian,
European, and Global Context*

Joseph M. Lookofsky**
Dean Levi, colleagues, students and friends: Thank you for this great honor to
lecture at this fine law school today in memory of my dear friend and col‐
league Herbert Bernstein. This is my fifth visit here, and I have wonderful
memories.
Last January Dean Levi’s predecessor, Dean Bartlett, invited me to
come here to Duke to lecture comparatively, in Herbert’s honor, on a topic
in Danish or Scandinavian law. In response to that kind invitation, I will
speak about subsidiarity, mainly within the context of Danish, Scandina‐
vian and European private law. Thank you, Paul [Haagen], for helping me
to introduce the subsidiarity concept.*** That will save me a bit of time dur‐
ing the first part of my lecture.
Now, to help introduce the comparative context of my lecture, I ask
you to imagine a map composed of concentric circles or rings, a map which
depicts the “private law universe.” At the center of this universe, within the
* Sixth Annual Herbert L. Bernstein Memorial Lecture in Comparative Law, Duke University School of Law, Nov. 13, 2007. Previously published as DESPERATELY SEEKING
SUBSIDIARITY: DANISH PRIVATE LAW IN THE SCANDINAVIAN, EUROPEAN, AND G LOBAL CONTEXT, 19
DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW 161 (2008). Note from the editor (of the
original publication): The text which follows consists mainly of a verbatim transcription of Professor Lookofsky’s lecture. However, since his lecture at Duke was enhanced by a series of
graphic (onscreen) illustrations, the Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law editors and Professor Lookofsky have found it appropriate to edit and adjust selected passages
in the transcription, so as to retain the gist of the illustrations and thus the essence of the
original lecture.
** Joseph Lookofsky is Professor of Obligations, Commercial Law and Private International Law at the University of Copenhagen. See http://jur.ku.dk/josephlookofsky/. Professor
Lookofsky wishes to express his sincere appreciation to Professor Henning Koch (of the University of Copenhagen) and Professor Peter Møgelvang-Hansen (of the Copenhagen Business School) for their valuable comments and suggestions in connection with the preparation
of the Bernstein Memorial Lecture at Duke.
*** In his introduction to the lecture, Prof. Paul Haagen had explained: “Subsidiarity is a
principle of European Community Law first established and defined in Article 5 of the Maastricht Treaty of 1992. It is intended to ensure that decisions are taken as closely as possible
to the citizen, and that the community can only take action if and insofar as the objectives of
the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the member states. It is somewhat
similar, Professor Lookofsky has noted, to the principles set out in the Tenth Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution.”
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innermost circle of this map, lies the private law of Denmark. Just outside
this, the map’s second ring depicts private law applicable in all of Scandi‐
navia, in particular, certain private law rule‐sets known as the Scandina‐
vian “Model Laws.”
Both of these inner rings are surrounded by a third ring which repre‐
1
sents the law of the European Union, and this ring is the one in which the
concept of subsidiarity lies. Finally, we imagine the outermost “global pri‐
vate law” ring, which comprises certain private law rule‐sets adhered to
not only by European States, but also by many non‐European countries,
including (e.g.) the United States and China. Within this last ring we find
such commercially significant treaties as the Convention on the Interna‐
tional Sale of Goods (CISG) and the New York Convention on International
Commercial Arbitration.
This map serves to depict my private law universe, and it’s not so un‐
usual that I see things from my own location and perspective. After all, I’ve
been in Denmark for some thirty‐five years, and so Denmark is the center
of my universe, not only as regards private law, but also as regards life and
society in general. I realize that might be hard for an American audience to
understand, since I was born and lived here in the United States for
twenty‐seven years, but I have lived in Denmark for an even longer period
of time, and the center of my universe shifted (or at least drifted) towards
Scandinavia some time ago.
As I proceed with my lecture, I’ll ask you to keep my private law uni‐
verse in mind. I’ll use Denmark (the innermost ring) as my starting point
and then work outwards. Before I tell you about Danish private law, I’ll say
a few things about Danish society in general. I think these observations
about the societal context might make it easier to explain some of the per‐
haps unusual concepts of Danish law which I intend to mention later.
I will also make a few general points about Scandinavian law. There
are, to be sure, many similarities between Danish and Scandinavian law,
but there are also many differences. There is, in fact, no real “Scandinavian
Law,” as there are no (regional) Scandinavian rules which regulate conduct
2
throughout Scandinavia, but we do have some similar private law legisla‐
tion in Denmark, Norway and Sweden, because these statutes were origi‐
nally drafted on the basis of models which reflect a Scandinavian
1. The author notes that in a more perfect map of this “private-law universe” the third
ring would account for the fact that one of the Scandinavian States (Norway) is not a member
of the European Union.
2. A few Scandinavians once dreamed of “federalizing” Scandinavian private law. In
1947, a prominent professor at the University of Copenhagen presented his Draft for a Nordic
Civil Code. Although the idea never took hold anywhere in Scandinavia, his Draft was later
published in English. See Fr. Vinding Kruse, A Nordic Draft Code (Else Giersing trans.,
Munksgaard 1963).
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consensus. So, just as parts of the New Jersey version of the UCC closely re‐
semble the corresponding parts of New York or North Carolina law be‐
cause they were all drafted on the basis of a uniform model, we find parts
of Danish private law which resemble parts of Norwegian and Swedish
private law.
But my main focus today will be a comparison between Danish and
European law. That will be the main comparative context. I think many of
the things I say will also invite other comparisons in your own (American)
minds, but I must say that from a Danish point of view the main compara‐
tive interest these days is the relationship between Danish law as such and
European Community law (which is of course becoming part of Danish law
as well), as opposed to comparisons between Danish and American law.
But, as I’m here in the United States today, I will also make some compara‐
tive comments in that American law direction as well.
There is a trend towards what I permit myself to call the “federaliza‐
tion” of private law in Europe. The word “federalization” is in quotation
marks here in my notes, since some constitutional scholars in Europe
would debate or contest the validity of that term, at least technically speak‐
ing, but there’s no question that some key areas of private law that were
previously the exclusive province of the Danish legislator and part of Dan‐
ish sovereignty have been federalized and have become (or been replaced
by) European law common to all Member‐States of the European Union,
and Denmark is, of course, one of these States. I will be illustrating this
point as I go along and explaining with concrete examples—as many as I
have time for—and at the end of my lecture I even hope to reach some
global comparisons (the outermost ring on my map). These comparisons
will be few and brief: one is about arbitration—the New York Convention
on Arbitration, and the other one is about the International Sales Conven‐
tion, the CISG, since I hope to say a few words regarding Denmark’s special
position in relation to these two significant treaties.
Well, I don’t have to tell you what “subsidiarity” means, since Paul
[Haagen] did that for me, but you might still ask why I (or anybody)
might be desperately seeking that? Well, a lot of people are desperately
seeking something these days. Indeed, when I googled the words “des‐
3
perately seeking,” I got more than two million hits. A large number of
them, it seems, were related to the film entitled Desperately Seeking Su
san (with Susan played by Madonna, herself)—that film was, by the way,
4
one of the “top ten” films of 1985. And then there are the many others,
3. Google, http://www.google.com/ (search “desperately seeking”) (last visited Oct. 5,
2008).
4. RogerEbert.com, Movie Answer Man, http://rogerebert.suntimes.com/apps/
pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20070816/ANSWERMAN/70817006/1023 (last visited Oct. 5, 2008).
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those desperately seeking other things—everything from snoozin’ (a
good night’s sleep) to sanity.
But why seek subsidiarity? Well, if you search for the term in Google
(one of the great sources of law these days actually), you’ll see that sub‐
sidiarity had its origins in Catholic Church doctrine from the late 1800s.
So, even the Church once sought subsidiarity. And though this informa‐
5
tion (subsidiarity’s religious origin) is actually quite interesting, I won’t
take the time right now to say more about that.
Instead, I’d like to discuss what subsidiarity means in the European
Union context. As you said, Paul, the term became prominent in 1992,
around the same time that the European Community was moving towards
(developing into) the European Union. I think it’s fair to say that subsidiar‐
ity, as it was used then, was a kind of signal to the peoples of Europe who
thought (and feared) that Europe was harmonizing too quickly, becoming
one single “State.” To counter (or slow down) that trend, the European
Community, and later the Union, could “put the brakes on,” if you will, by
using the subsidiarity concept.
In Danish we “translate” (or re‐write) the term subsidiarity to
6
something we call—get ready—“nærhedsprincippet.” This is (literally)
the “closeness‐principle,” the idea that decisions should be taken as
closely as possible to the citizens. I think that (our own freely translated)
version serves to explain the ideological aspect of subsidiarity.
And then we have the more technical, “constitutional” aspect of
subsidiarity, and this is the idea that the European Union does not (or at
least should not) take action unless such (centralized/federalized/ Euro‐
pean) action is deemed to be more effective than action taken at the na‐
7
tional level. The Union should, in other words, not go beyond what is
“necessary.”
But even that, I would venture to say (and I’m not a constitutional
scholar), is also at the moment a kind of an ideological concept. It’s just a
signal; it hasn’t really “put the brakes on.” Denmark did, to be sure, send a
shockwave through the Community by voting “No” to the Union in 1992,
and for a brief period our “no” put the brakes on the entire unionization
of Europe. So it was perhaps then appropriate that the European Council
sent the signal of subsidiarity, saying: “Don’t worry Denmark; we’re not

5. Interested readers can easily obtain a wealth of information on this subject. See,
e.g., Google, http://www.google.com/ (search “subsidiarity, Catholic Church”) (last visited Oct.
5, 2008).
6. Pronounced in Danish (something) like this: nair–heds–prin–seep–it.
7. Except in the areas within its “exclusive competence,” see Europa Glossary,
http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/subsidiarity_en.htm (last visited Nov. 18, 2008), and we
can leave that exception alone, since it does not concern us here today.

114

2009

Desperately Seeking Subsidiarity

going to take over more than is absolutely necessary in terms of federal‐
izing European law.”
The more recent (draft) European Constitution—which was subse‐
quently renamed the (draft) Reform Treaty (to make it sound less “fed‐
eral,” I suppose)—includes provisions purportedly enhancing the
8
principle of subsidiarity. As expressed in the Treaty on the European Un‐
9
ion, the principle “is intended to ensure that decisions are taken as
closely as possible to the citizen and that constant checks are made as to
whether action at Community level is justified in light of the possibilities
10
available at the national, regional or local level.”
Together with this new version of the subsidiarity principle, the Re‐
form Treaty establishes an “Early Warning System,” which gives the indi‐
vidual EU Member States the chance to say: “Wait, please don’t federalize
that, if you are going in that direction.” Essentially, the warning system
permits national parliaments to “ask the Commission to review a legisla‐
11
tive proposal if they consider that it violates the principle.” Well, as I
said, I am going to be looking at this from the point of view of a “private”
lawyer, and since the term “private law” (in Danish: privatret) sounds
more European than American, I’ll try to explain it this way: Private law
is, quite simply, what I do. It’s not a strange thing. In some legal systems, I
should say, the distinction between private and public law has technical
and important significance. We have a scholar here today, Ralf Michaels,
12
who has written about that, and all I want to say is that in Denmark the
distinction is of no particular significance. It’s just a convenient division
of labor among faculty members. Some “do” private law and some public
law. People who do public law concern themselves with constitutional
law, criminal law, administrative law, whereas the people who do private
law do things like contracts, torts and property. I “do” obligations and
that includes contractual obligations, as well as delictual obligations (the

8. See Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community, Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 150, available at
http://eurlex.europa.eu/JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:306:SOM:EN:HTML [hereinafter Lisbon
Treaty].
9. See also Treaty on European Union, tit. II, art. G(B)(5), Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C
191) 1, amended by Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the
Treaties Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts, art. 5, para. 2,
Oct. 2, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 57.
10. See generally Europa Glossary, supra note 7.
11. See Europa Glossary, Together 50 Years - Subsidiarity, http://www.together
50years.eu/EN/gloss/index.htm.
12. See generally Ralf Michaels & Nils Jansen, “Private Law Beyond the State? Europeanization, Globalization, Privatization.” 54 Am. J. Comp. L. 843 (2006).
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things you call torts), and I also do private international law and com‐
parative law as they relate to contract and tort.
Now, that is a non‐American way of doing things, I think. In the
United States, and even in much of Europe, private international law, also
known as conflicts of law, is something that is done by specialists, and I
think that we have some of those specialists with us today. In Europe, in
Denmark at least, it is not uncommon for the person doing contracts to
be responsible for comparing (e.g.) Danish contract law to the contract
law of other legal systems—contracts in German law, American law
etc.—and also to address related conflict‐of‐laws matters, including the
applicable law (choice of law). So I do these things too. It’s a system (divi‐
sion of labor) which has both advantages and disadvantages, which I
won’t go into now. I just wanted to explain what I mean by private law
when I talk about it.
And now I would like to take you on an imaginary trip, a tour from the
Duke University Law School, located on Science Drive in Durham, North
Carolina, to the place I work in Copenhagen, which is on Studiestræde (that
means “Study Street,” which is quite similar to the German term).
There are, of course, various ways to get to Denmark from Duke. If
you were to go eastward, as the crows or jets fly, towards what is now
the tiny Kingdom of Denmark, you would pass by parts of the formerly
enormous Kingdom of Denmark. We ruled Greenland (which we still
“rule,” though they wouldn’t like me to say it that way; they now have
“home rule”). Denmark also ruled most of Norway and even part of Swe‐
den at one time. It was indeed an enormous kingdom, and a mighty
one—you know, the Vikings and all of that.
But, we could also approach Denmark from the south, which I think
is more interesting today, because if we came up that way, the way the
Roman Legions did, we would pass through what is now the German
Duchy of Schleswig, and we would pass the Eider River. But if we did
what the Romans did, we would actually stop at the Eider, because there
is (or at least was) a stone there saying (excuse my Latin): Eidora Romani
13
Terminus Imperii, (i.e.) “The Roman Empire Stops Here.” And that in‐
scription remains significant today, because the “Civil law” stops there,
too. And it is incorrect, although a common error, to include Scandina‐
vian law within the Civil law group of law families.
There are, to be sure, numerous similarities between Scandinavian
and Civil law; many of them came afterwards, when we stole or bor‐
rowed or imitated a lot of German principles in certain fields, including

13. See, e.g., Wikipedia, http://www.wikipedia.org/ (search "Eider River") (last visited
Oct. 5, 2008).
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private law. But the Scandinavian States never adopted the super‐
structure of the Civil law system, and that fact might help you understand
some of the things I am going to say about the Scandinavian position on
the world comparative map, and more specifically, the Danish position.
Before moving further in that direction, however, I thought that it
might be appropriate to say something about the societal context, “where
I’m coming from,” if you will, after living and working in Denmark for some
35 years. Denmark is the oldest kingdom in the world. It was originally
14
ruled by King Knud (his Danish name was later translated as “Canute”)
and the Viking tribe that he led. And the term “tribe” is still used about the
Danish people, because Denmark is such a tightly knit society, such a small
and nearly homogeneous society that it is often figuratively speaking de‐
scribed as a tribe. And I’ll give you some examples of that.
Today, we’re not only a kingdom; we’re also a modern Welfare State.
That’s Welfare with a capital “W” (welfare is not a dirty word for us).
And ours is also an extremely Democratic society (another key Dan‐
ish word). Today, as fate would have it, there is a parliamentary election
15
in Denmark. It is a very closely contested election, and it looks like we
are going to go over 85% in terms of voter turnout, which is going to
break the Danish record. And that is also the highest voter‐participation
in the world, if we exclude the countries where you must vote (by law).
So, we are going to break our own record today. And when we do
that, 98% of the people who cast their votes will be represented by poli‐
16
ticians with seats in the Danish Parliament (Folketing). It is not a win‐
ner‐take‐all system, which is not so unusual for parliamentary democra‐
cies, but it is unusual when the cutoff or borderline is as low as 2%, as it
is in Denmark, and that means that nearly everyone in Denmark is repre‐
sented in Parliament by someone who shares his or her political view,
and that fact, some of us think, may contribute to the very peaceful na‐
ture of the Danish society. If people want to “do battle” and argue about
things, they do it in the Parliament and not on the streets.
Well, what else should I say about Danish society? Other key words
on my list here include Compromise, Realism, and Pragmatism. I’ll be re‐
turning to these concepts, but I should also mention Secularity: Denmark
might well be the least religious country in the world. Don’t be fooled by
the large symbol on the Danish flag; ours is a very secular society. We don’t

14. Pronounced: Keh-nood (as in “noodle”).
15. The election in Denmark was held on the same date as this Bernstein Memorial Lecture at Duke University School of Law: 13 November 2007.
16. See Folketinget, http://www.folketinget.dk (follow “English” hyperlink) (last visited
Oct. 5, 2008).
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have politicians talking about religion during our elections, at least not in
17
the sense of wearing their religion (if they have one) on their sleeves.
We also have great Prosperity in Denmark. The Danish Kroner is
strong (we don’t have the Euro, but we have linked ourselves firmly to it).
18
And we have a concept called Flexicurity, which even the French are
thinking about imitating: security and flexibility in the job market. We
have “S & M” as well: do you know what that is? Socialized Medicine! And
we are happy about that. We don’t really call it that; we just call it the
19
Healthcare System. But everyone in Denmark is covered by it, and it
works fairly well.
Sharing, Honesty and Happiness. We are also “number one” in these
20
categories. Denmark is on top in Sharing in the sense of having the
smallest disparity between rich and poor in the world (closely followed
21
by, I think, Bangladesh, which is of course on a different scale). Den‐
mark also has lots of Honesty, in the sense that we have—according to
the people who do these surveys, I don’t know how they do them—the
22
least corruption in the world. And then there’s Happiness: how do they
measure that? Well, however they measure it, they tell us that we are the
23
happiest people in the world. Some have contested that and said: “Well,
you Danes don’t have very high expectations; that’s why.”
17. See generally Paul Zuckerman, Society Without God: What The Least Religious Nations Can Tell Us About Contentment (2008). During a press conference televised on Danish
public television on 28 February 2007, the Danish Prime Minister said: “In my opinion, we
should have less religion in the public space (det offentlige rum).” Fogh Strongly Condemns
Religious Særhensyn, Dr Nyheder, Feb. 28, 2007, http://www.dr.dk/Nyheder/Politik
/2007/02/28/113931.htm. See John Hansen & Kim Hundevadt, The Cartoon Crisis—How It
Unfolded, Udland.Jp.Dk, Mar. 11, 2008, http://jp.dk/udland/ article1292543.ece (regarding the
Danish “Cartoon Crisis,” which engendered considerable political debate in Denmark and
elsewhere, both about religion and freedom of speech).
18. See, e.g., Wikipedia, http://www.wikipedia.org/ (search “Flexicurity”) (last visited Oct.
5, 2008).
19. In Danish: Sundhedssystemmet.
20. According to various surveys easily accessible in Google. See infra notes 21–23
and accompanying text.
21. . See, e.g., Financial Security–Income Distribution, http://www4.hrsdc.gc.ca/
indicator.jsp?lang=en&indicatorid=22 (last visited Oct. 5, 2008) (describing the Gini coefficient, which measures income disparity, ranged from 22.5 for Denmark to 48 for Mexico).
22. Tied for first place with Finland and New Zealand. Infoplease, The 2006 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/
A0781359.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2008) (providing the 2007 Corruption Perceptions Index
scores). See also Christian Bjørnskov, Combating Corruption: On the Interplay Between Institutional Quality and Social Trust (unpublished and undated manuscript, on file with the
author).
23. This has been the case for several years running. See Denmark ‘Happiest’
Country in the World, CNN, July 2, 2008, http://edition.cnn.com/2008/HEALTH/07/02
/nations.happiness/; Denmark ‘Happiest Place on Earth,’ BBC News, July 28, 2006,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/5224306.stm.
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We are also “number one” in some other categories, including—this
is the downside I guess—Taxation. Of course, you need high Taxation
(and Sharing) to get the very, very small disparity between the wealthy
and the poor; we have, in fact, no “poor” in Denmark in the sense that you
(in America) understand poor. That is the result of heavy taxation, heav‐
ily progressive heavy taxation. But Danish people pay it willingly, and the
voting (in the Parliamentary election) today is not about whether we
should have less taxes, but rather about whether we should reorganize
the taxes.
Moonlighting is another negative: it seems we have the highest rate
24
of moonlighting in the civilized world. Teenage Drinking—we have a lot
of that too. And then we have problems associated with what I might la‐
bel “Tribal Initiation.” I’m not sure whether we are first in that category,
but we certainly have had a lot of publicity about it, especially as regards
“initiating” foreign newcomers as Members of the Danish Tribe, which is,
as I said, a societal system characterized by high participatory Democ‐
racy and high Sharing (redistribution of wealth). These things have been
hard for some newcomers to understand, and so it’s been hard for them
25
to become Members of the Danish Tribe.
Well, now that you know the societal background, or at least some‐
thing about it, I return to the subject of Danish private law. My first Dan‐
ish private law book was a book called “Den Borgerlige Ret.” This was in
1975, in my first course in elementary Danish contract law. This was my
first “hornbook,” if you will. I have it with me here today, and I’d like to
translate one sentence in it. It says this: “Article 1 (§ 1) of the Danish Con‐
tracts Act lays down the fundamental rule that promises and contracts
are legally binding.”
I read that a few times in 1975: “Promises—and therefore also con‐
tracts—are legally binding.” And then I began another kind of desperate
search, desperately seeking (but not finding) some key concepts I had
26
learned during my American legal education, things like “consideration,”
writing requirements and other formalities. And if you searched today (in‐

24. Also sometimes referred to as the “black economy.” The Danish Tax Department
considers “[m]oonlighting [to be] when you are offered and accept a job where neither you nor
your employer informs SKAT [the Tax Authorities] about the employment and the pay
you receive.” SKAT, Tax In Denmark, 18 (2005) available at http://www.skat.dk/
Vejledninger/Personserien/Pnr_37_eng2005.pdf.
25. Author's note: Lest I be accused of jingoism, I'll readily admit that my lecture statement on this point oversimplifies a complex set of related problems—some of them also attributable to the way some Native (born-in-Denmark) Tribal Members treat newcomers to
Danish territory.
26. E.g. Wikipedia, http://www.wikipedia.org/ (search “consideration”) (last visited Oct. 5,
2008) (defining consideration as the “value paid for a promise”).
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stead of in 1975) you might, as an American‐educated jurist, also look for
(but not find) the Law and Economics concept of “efficient breach.”
Well, I searched for some of these things in 1975, but I found none
of them. There is no consideration requirement in Danish law. Indeed,
there are, quite simply no formalities at all. No contract needs to be “sup‐
ported” by consideration, nor does any contract need to in writing.
Nor do many Danish jurists concern themselves with “efficient
breach,” not even today, and there are several reasons for this. There
happens to be an article in the American Journal of Comparative Law this
month which explains why many Civil law systems are not interested in
27
efficient breach. I won’t go into that in detail, but I will say that the core
explanation for us is that promises are not only “legally binding” in Den‐
mark; they are also morally binding, and so how could Danish lawyers go
out and encourage people to (efficiently) breach their promises? It would
not work very well. So, in our “homemade” (pre‐EC and pre‐EU) version
of Danish private law, promises are binding, period, Well, at least all rea
sonable promises are binding, because there’s another rule in the Con‐
28
tracts Act which guards against unreasonable contract terms. That too
applies to all contracts: consumer contracts, contracts between mer‐
chants, whatever. There are, to be sure, weak and strong merchants, and
the prohibition against unreasonable terms, including promises which
would be unreasonable to enforce, is applied more restrictively as be‐
tween merchants, but it’s there and it’s the same rule.
As for our “homemade” law of Torts, I’ll mention one principle now,
and I’ll follow up with a more concrete illustration later. Imagine that we
have a defective product, and that a consumer who buys that that product
is injured. The seller of the product is liable under Danish law. Why is the
seller liable? Because the Danish judges who make (judge‐made) private
law decided that he should be liable. Is that a contractual principle? No, be‐
29
cause the legislators who wrote the Danish Sales Act more than 100 years
ago were of the opinion that contractual rules were not well‐suited for
product liability cases. So even the immediate seller’s liability is based on a
tort principle, but it’s a (near) strict liability principle: you can sue the
seller with whom you have a contractual relationship—or even if you
don’t, a member of your family can sue him—and the seller will be held li‐

27. Ronald J. Scalise, Jr., Why No Efficient Breach in the Civil Law?: A Comparative
Assessment of the Doctrine of Efficient Breach of Contract, 55 Am. J. Comp. L. 721, 721
(2007).
28. See Aftalelov, 1986-96, § 36 (Den.) translated in http://www.sprog.asb.dk/
sn/Danish%20Contracts%20Act.pdf [hereinafter Aftalelov].
29. Købeloven, (1906), as subsequently amended, translated in http://www.sprog.
asb.dk/sn/Danish%20Sale%20of%20Goods%20Act.pdf.
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able unless he can prove that the producer is (without fault and therefore)
not liable. This was at least the law made by our judges. I’ll return to a more
concrete example, which illustrates how EU law has changed our law in
30
this area, in a minute.
I realize that I’m presenting a rather abrupt list of rules, but I do
want to mention another private law rule now, one that applies to both
contract and tort, and that rule says: no unreasonable compensation. Not
only are unreasonable contract terms not binding in Denmark, but even
when a binding promise is broken, the party injured is not necessarily
entitled to full‐blown “expectation protection.” There’s a regulatory
mechanism, codified by statute actually, which limits compensation (in
both contract and tort) to what a Danish judge would consider to be a
31
“reasonable” amount.
So, you see, the reasonableness‐principle pervades Danish private
law. I have one nice illustration of the fact that unreasonable contract
terms do not bind. Our daughter Sarah is living in New York now. She’s
going to be married in the Kingdom of Denmark this summer, and she
was in the process of contracting with a Danish provider of services for
her wedding. When she found the standard terms of one prospective
provider online, she sent me an e‐mail with a link to them, asking: “Dad,
can I click yes to this?” I answered her without even looking: “Don’t
worry about that,” I said, “because even if there are any unreasonable
terms in there, they’re not binding.” So she clicked yes, and that was that.
I looked at those terms later, by the way, and they were quite reason‐
able, from a Danish point of view. There was, for one thing, no arbitration
clause among them. Such a clause might not be unreasonable per se in
Denmark, but we simply don’t have any Danish merchants who include ar‐
bitration clauses in their consumer contracts, probably because the mer‐
chants would not expect them to bind. I think our general prohibition
against unreasonable contract terms reflects a more paternalistic attitude
than the corresponding, yet “milder” rule in the United States, i.e., the rule
that “unconscionable” promises are not binding. I think that “unreason‐
able” is, as it sounds, a more flexible and more intrusive term than uncon‐
scionable. I wouldn’t say that the difference is enormous, but it certainly is
a difference in spirit.
I think it’s time to move on now and say something about the sources
of Danish private law—where do all these rules that I’m talking about

30. See infra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
31. See Erstatningsansvarsloven [Liability for Damages Act], No. 885 (2005) (Den.) §
24, translated in http://uk.patientforsikringen.dk/legislation/erstatningsansvarsloven.html
[herein after Erstatningsansvarsloven].
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come from? These flexible and open‐ended legal rules, the sources of what
I’ve been calling “home‐made”(i.e.) Danish‐made private law.
First, I’d like to highlight the word for “law” in the Scandinavian le‐
gal systems. The Scandinavian languages are very close on this point: the
word for law is “ret” in Danish, “rett” in Norwegian, and “rät” in Swedish
(we have a Swede here in the audience today: am I doing this well?). In‐
terestingly, all these versions of the word mean more than just “law,”
they also mean right. The Scandinavian word for law is the same as the
Scandinavian word for right. There’s something nice about that. Maybe
I’m being a bit sentimental, but I think there’s something nice about that.
What about statutes and legislative codifications? The word for
“law” can also be used to mean (a) “formal law” in the sense of a legisla‐
tive enactment, a statute. That helps explain why my heading on this
point is: Make love, not codes. I took a copyright on that phrase (by tag‐
ging a © to it in my Power Point), because I thought it was quite cute. (I
used to be a copyright lawyer at United Artists Corporation, you know.)
Well, the fact is that the plural of the Danish word for law happens to be
“love,” but this plural form is pronounced—not like you pronounce “love”
in English, but rather—as a two syllable word: low—vuh. Say the word
for law in the singular, and it’s pronounced “low.” Say the plural, how‐
ever, and you can hear the “v” (in vuh).
But my main point here is that Danes make laws; they don’t make
Codes. Danish legislators have been enacting statutes on private law sub‐
jects for centuries, but they have never enacted a comprehensive Civil
Code. As I said earlier, the Roman Empire (and Roman law) stopped at
32
the Eider River, and that helps explain why we never got a general Civil
Code, as in France and Germany and other Civil law systems. These days,
when the European Union is moving, step by step, towards a European
33
Civil Code, we Danish jurists are nervous about that. We have never had
a Code; we don’t have the tradition for it; and we are worried about it.
What we do have at the “home‐made” level are a few basic pieces of
legislation within the private law area, the most notable being the Danish
34
Sales Act. It’s quite similar in its coverage to Article 2 of the American
35
UCC. Another key Danish statute is the Contracts Act, which has a

32. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
33. See generally Towards A European Civil Code (Arthur Hartkamp et al. eds., 3d ed.
2004). The seemingly innocuous “Common Frame of Reference” is, in my view, just the first
slice of the coming, fully codified pie. For recent developments, see, e.g., Study Group on a
European Civil Code, http://www.sgecc.net/pages/en/home/index.welcome.htm (last visited
Oct. 5, 2008). See also infra notes 50, 69 and accompanying text.
34. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
35. U.C.C. art. 2 (2004).
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broader field of application: it applies not just to sales transactions; it
also covers other contractual topics (which the UCC covers with respect
to sales), such as contract formation. The prohibition against unreason‐
36
able contract terms, which I mentioned previously, is in the Contracts
37
38
Act. And then there’s the Liability for Damages Act, which tells judges
how to measure liability, particularly in tort cases. The Liability Act also
39
contains the general liability‐limitation I told you about, so that plain‐
tiffs don’t get unreasonable compensation (in contract or tort).
These, I think, are our main private law statutes. But we also have
judge‐made law in Denmark. Indeed, since we have relatively little (de‐
tailed) statutory regulation, we have to rely on quite a lot of judge‐made
law. That probably doesn’t surprise the American audience here. But our
judge‐made law might well surprise a Civilian jurist. We Danish jurists
don’t regard our judges as do the French, for example, as the “bouche de
la loi”—the mouthpiece of the (French) legislature. Our Danish judges
really make law, and everyone recognizes it. But they make it in a way
that is different from the way it’s made here in the States. It’s made in a
way that is less obvious.
For one thing, our judges write very brief decisions. The longest part
of a Danish judgment simply accounts for the facts of the case and the ar‐
guments of the opposing lawyers. The decision itself and the rationale un‐
derlying that decision—the ratio, sometimes also referred to as the
premises (præmisserne)—are very briefly stated, usually fitting within a
single paragraph. The premises need only send a brief “signal” as regards
the main factors that have gone into the judge’s decision, because the judge
is not trying to “set a precedent,” he’s trying to decide the concrete case.
I know a fair amount about this aspect of Danish law, because I of‐
ten work with judges. I work with them not only because Danish judges
also sometimes serve as arbitrators (and so I sometimes get to sit on ar‐
bitration tribunals with them), but also because Danish judges also serve
as external examiners (censors), helping us grade Danish law school ex‐
ams. When we talk about the solutions to a complicated problem on an
essay exam in the law of contracts, for example, or in the law of tort, the
judges often have the outcome in mind. These judges are, of course, not
ignoring the applicable rules, but it’s not necessarily the rules that push
them towards the outcome. It’s rather as if they first sense the outcome—
what they feel is just and right (which goes back to the fact that they too
went to law school)—and then they test that result by looking at the
36.
37.
38.
39.

See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
See Aftalelov, supra note 28.
See Erstatningsansvarsloven, supra note 31.
See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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premises (the ratio—which in an exam situation is set forth in the “model
answer”) to see if the premises do indeed “lead” to that just result. Is that
putting the horse before the cart or the cart before the horse? I’m not
sure. It’s something which Patrick Attiyah from England (I think he’s
been at this law school as well), has called reasoning backwards. It’s not a
concept to which we claim copyright, but it’s something which we adhere
40
to in practice.
I think the result of all of this is that Danish private law is made up
of two main components, statutory law and judge‐made law, each in a
special Danish variation, what you might call “legislation light” and
“precedent light.” For these reasons, among others, the Danish system is
an unusual system.
I can see that I have to move along now if I want to get to some con‐
crete examples, so that I can illustrate how Danish law is characterized
by pragmatism as well as realism.
41
My first example, inspired by a real Danish case, concerns a guy
named Mr. Skov. He’s a farmer who runs an egg business, producing eggs.
He sells the eggs to “Bilka”, a large Danish supermarket (a bit like Wal‐
Mart), and two consumers (named Jette and Michael) who buy those eggs
from Bilka and make what Danes call an “egg cake.” As it turns out the
eggs are tainted with salmonella, and the consumers become seriously ill.
Who can they sue?
Well, if we apply traditional (pre EC/EU) Danish judge‐made (pro‐
42
consumer) rules to decide this one, the consumers don’t need to locate
the egg‐producer (Mr. Skov, whose name isn’t on the box anyway). They
just go right to the supermarket (Bilka) and let that middleman‐seller
worry about who ultimately might be left holding the bag (i.e., Bilka or
Mr. Skov). This product liability action against the supermarket is not a
43
contractual action under Danish law. It’s a tort action based on Danish
judge‐made rules of law. I suspect the nature of the judge‐made law un‐
derlying this action was later misunderstood by the European Court of
44
Justice, but please excuse me if I’m wrong about that.
40. See Joseph Lookofsky, The Limits of Commercial Contract Freedom: Under the
UNIDROIT 'Restatement' and Danish Law, 46 Am. J. Comp. L. 485, 490 & n.33 (1998).
41. The facts here are inspired by Danish (City and High Court) decisions which led to
the preliminary ruling issued on 10 Jan. 2006 by the European Court of Justice. Case C402/03, Skov Æg v Bilka Lavprisvarehus, 2006 E.C.R. I-00199.
42. As did the lower (City) court judge. Id. para. 16.
43. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
44. See Skov, 2006 E.C.R. I-00199. Although a detailed explanation of the basis for my
disagreement with the ECJ ruling lies outside the scope of the present (lecture) discussion,
my main point is that a better understanding of the nature of the Danish judge-made rules of
(tort) liability by the ECJ might well have led to an interpretation of Article 13 of the Product
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Another example, also based on a real Danish case: Two Danes pre‐
pare to go on a hunting trip. They find each other by way of a hunting jour‐
nal in Denmark. They rent a car in Scotland and buy insurance there in
accordance with Scottish law. They have an accident, and the passenger
dies due to the driver’s negligence (no question about that). The widow
then tries to sue the Danish driver in Denmark, but the defendant argues
that the action is time‐barred under Scottish law, because the lawyer hired
by the widow waited more than three years before commencing legal ac‐
tion against the driver. But the action is not time‐barred under Danish law,
because here we have a five year statute of limitations. How should the
judges in the Danish Court of Appeal decide?
If we translate the essence of the decision—it fills no more than a
small paragraph—we see that the judges quickly list the main factors
which they found relevant, and then briefly add their conclusion (the out‐
come) to that. It goes something like this: the accident occurred in Scotland
in a car registered there, and the driver was covered by compulsory Scot‐
tish insurance. For these reasons, the dispute should be governed by Scot‐
46
tish law, and so the action is time‐barred.
Now you might not like the reasoning or the result, but you have to
think about it. In the well‐considered view of one Danish professor (who
later became a Danish Supreme Court judge), the outcome (time‐bar) in
this case was hardly “dictated” by the formalistic application of choice‐of‐
law rules. Quite the contrary: the outcome was quite likely rather the result
47
of pragmatic considerations and the principle of reasonableness.
In other words, it was not so much a question of how to make the
(formal) choice of law between Scottish and Danish law (and their respec‐
tive time‐bars), but rather a question of how to reach the “best” result, i.e.,
Liability Directive which preserved the viability of the Danish (middleman-liability) rule. See
infra note 56 and accompanying text.
45. Based on the decision of the Danish High Court, reported in [B] Ugeskrift for
Retsvæsen 886 (1982).
46. For a more accurate translation, see Joseph Lookofsky & Ketilbjorn Hertz, Eupil.
European Union Private International Law In Contract And Tort (forthcoming 2009), which
reads as follows: The accident occurred in Scotland while [defendant] and [plaintiff] used a
car registered in that country, which was covered by compulsory liability insurance according
to Scots law. Therefore, the dispute should be governed by Scots law. The [plaintiffs] are debarred from starting legal proceedings in Scotland pursuant to section 17 of the Prescription
and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973, as the statutory 3-year period has elapsed. The High
Court finds that this provision cannot be disregarded in proceedings commenced in a Danish
court even though it is [or at least was, when this decision was rendered] a procedural rule
under Scots law. Consequently, the High Court finds for [the defendant].
47. See Jørgen Nørregard in [B] Ugeskrift For Retsvæsen 47 (1985). “Should the fact
that the lawyer chosen by the plaintiff (herself) did nothing (for more than 3 years) affect the
outcome of the plaintiff’s case, especially considering that this same failure removed the defendant from the shelter of Scottish insurance coverage?”
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the most reasonable result, or the “least unfair” result. Should the court let
the widow suffer because of the negligence of the driver? Or should it let
the driver suffer because the widow chose a lawyer who took no action
48
against that driver until the insurance protecting him had expired? Tough
decision. The judges in the Danish High Court of Appeal made what they
thought was the “right call,” and they could do it that way because the ap‐
plicable (Danish) judge‐made rule of private international law was flexible,
so as not to “dictate” an unreasonable result in a difficult situation. I can’t
give you all the details of this, I haven’t got the time. Too many of you will
leave if I did it.
This was, at any rate, the (pre‐EU) way Danish judges used to handle
many cases like these. If we imagine a time‐line depicting the development
of Danish private law, we would see how Denmark moved from a period
where we made all our own laws to the year when Denmark joined the EC.
That was in 1972. Twenty years later, the concept of subsidiarity was in‐
troduced in response to the Danish “no” to the European Union (in 1992).
Later, Denmark joined that Union (with 4 notable “reservations” or “opt‐
49
outs”), and the Union subsequently moved Denmark and the other Mem‐
ber States further in the direction of private law federalization. Ultimately, I
fear we may get “total” private law harmonization: a European Civil Code.
50
We are certainly moving in that direction. I’m in the minority on
this, one of the relatively few academics resisting the creeping federaliza‐
tion of Danish private law. And since we in the minority can hardly with‐
stand the “full‐court press” being exerted by our European opponents, I
know we can’t win the game.
Where is this process of federalization taking us? We’re moving away
from the Danish rule which simply says that contracts are unenforceable if
the enforcement would be unreasonable, taking into account all the cir‐
51
cumstances. That’s our Contracts Act rule from 1976. Here’s where we’re
going: to a list of 17 presumptively unfair terms from Directive 93/13/EEC
52
on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts.

48. Id.
49. The recent Irish “no” to the Lisbon Treaty, supra note 8, has had the effect of cementing the Danish opt-outs, at least for the time-being. See Bruno Waterfield, Denmark
Calls Off Vote on EU Opt-outs, Telegraph (U.K.), Aug. 8, 2008, available at
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/denmark/2522903/Denmark-calls-offvoteon-EU-opt-outs.html.
50. See generally Joseph Lookofsky, The Harmonization of Private and Commercial
Law: “Towards a European Civil Code,” 39 Scandinavian Stud. L. 111 (2000), available at
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/lookofsky14.html.
51. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
52. See Council Directive 93/13, art. 3(3), 1993 O.J. (L 095) (EC).
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That’s the way the EU does things like that, by listing detailed exam‐
ples. They tell you, “this is unfair, this is unfair, this unfair” and so on. To be
sure, we in Denmark don’t necessarily disagree with these EU details. We’d
agree, for example, that arbitration clauses in consumer contracts are pre‐
53
sumptively unfair. But we don’t want to clutter our Contracts Act and
“pollute” its legislative simplicity with all these details. So Denmark and
Sweden decided to implement the Directive of Unfair Contract Terms with
out including all these details, by simply continuing to ban (all) unreason‐
able contract terms. We got sued by the EC for not including the “Grey List”
of seventeen (17) unreasonable terms from the Directive in our legislative
text, and luckily we won, since the European Court of Justice agreed that
our non‐inclusion of the grey list in the black letter of our statute did not
54
provide proof that we planned to ignore the list.
Now, how would our example about the salmonella‐tainted eggs
turn out now that the EC court has issued a preliminary ruling on that?
55
Not the same result as before. These poor consumers cannot sue the
supermarket on the basis of our traditional judge‐made rules, because
we now know, having been brought into the EC court twenty years after
56
our implementation of the Product Liability Directive, that Article 13 of
the Directive does not leave room for the Danish judge‐made rules which
would allow the consumers to sue the supermarket. This is the way that
the EC court interpreted the Directive, and I think that they may have in‐
terpreted it in this way because they didn’t fully understand the nature of
tort liability under Danish judge‐made law. They said we could make a
57
supplementary fault‐based rule. We could also make a contractual rule,
as England has, and I think we’re going to have to do it now because we
need to reinstate an action against sellers, but I doubt whether we’ll get
58
back to our previous pro‐consumer state.
What about the decision reached by the Danish court in the case of
59
the accident in Scotland? We would not be able to make that kind of deci‐

45.

53. Id. at Annex (q).
54. See Case C-478/99, Comm'n v. Sweden, 2002 E.C.R. I-4147, para. 24.
55. See Case C-402/03, Skov Æg v Bilka Lavprisvarehus, 2006 E.C.R. I-00199, para.

56. Council Directive 1999/34/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10
May 1999 amending Council Directive 85/374/EEC on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning liability for defective
products, 1999 O.J. (L141/20) (EC).
57. Denmark has now done so (in a recent revision of the Danish Product Liability Act)
by basing the seller's liability on fault, although with a “reversed burden of proof” on the fault
issuethus creating a (pro-consumer) rule which might not be able to withstand scrutiny in
the ECJ.
58. See supra note 57.
59. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
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sion anymore, at least not under Rome II. The judges can’t make their call
as to what they think is the right decision in this kind of case, because the
EU wants to have more “certainty” when it comes to choice of law. They
want every judge in the European Union to make the same decision—it
doesn’t matter whether it’s a good decision or a good result. They want all
judges in a situation like this to base their decision on lex communis. Since
the two parties concerned come from Denmark, it should be Danish law
61
which applies, so the action would not be time‐barred today.
I’m overdramatizing to be sure. But, I don’t like the idea that we can‐
not continue to decide a case like this on the basis of what is right: on the
basis of the result, by putting the result before the more technical premises.
In fact, I have even complained to the Ministry of Justice, arguing that the
62
Rome I Regulation (on the law applicable in contractual matters) would
put us into a “straight jacket.” And the same certainly goes for Rome II (on
63
the law applicable in tort).
Unfortunately, I don’t have time to tell you more about that. The
global situation, at least, is better. The global situation is better because it’s
64
more flexible. Denmark ratified the New York Convention, as did the
United States, and the Convention requires that each Contracting State rec‐
65
ognize an arbitration agreement “in writing.” There’s a big debate about
this rule these days (those of you who do arbitration know about this):
what’s “in writing,” and what’s not? We in Denmark don’t much care, since
under Danish law, no agreement (of any kind) needs to be in writing. And
luckily most people interpret the New York Convention to allow for that.

60. See Commission Regulation 864/2007, art. 4(2), 2007 O.J. (L 199) 40, 44 [hereinafter Rome II]. The purpose of the Rome II Regulation, adopted in 2007, is to harmonize (and
thus replace) the national conflict-of-laws rules previously applied by the courts of the individual EU Member States. The Rome II Regulation will enter into force in all EU Member States
except Denmark on 11 January 2009, and the Regulation will remain inapplicable in Denmark, unless and until Denmark withdraws its reservation to the EU treaty as regards legal
and home affairs. The Danish situation as regards the Rome II Regulation is thus the same
as regards Denmark's position vis-à-vis the Rome I Regulation. Regarding Rome I and Rome
II, see generally Lookofsky & Hertz, supra note 46.
61. See Rome II, supra note 60, art. 4(2). There is a narrow safety valve in Article 4(3)
of the Rome II Regulation, id. art. 4(3), which would hardly affect the outcome in a case like
this. See Lookofsky & Hertz, supra note 46.
62. See Europa, Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome
Convention), http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l33109.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2008).
63. See Europa, The law applicable to non-contractual obligationsThe Rome II Regulation, http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l16027.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2008).
64. United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, June 10, 1958, 21, U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38.
65. Id. art. II.
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You must at least respect arbitration agreements in writing, but you can
66
also respect arbitration agreements which are not in writing.
At the global level of commercial harmonization we also have the
CISG—the Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods. I’ll
just mention Article 16 (in CISG Part II) which says until a contract is con‐
cluded an offer may be revoked. And you know about this rule—it’s similar
to the American (Common law) rule which permits the offeror to revoke
until an acceptance has been dispatched. Well, since an offer is a kind of
promise, the CISG rule means that (some) promises are not binding. And
67
since that runs counter to the general Danish rule, Article 16 might have
stood in the way of Denmark’s ratification. But the CISG allowed Denmark
to ratify subject to a reservation under Article 92, a declaration saying we
would not be bound by CISG Part II.
I myself have argued that we should retract that CISG reservation,
68
since I think it causes more harm than it’s worth. But the reservation does
show that it’s possible to create a system of minimum harmonization
which allows Contracting States to breathe freely, to take account of local
traditions, even as we join forces with the larger legal world.
Where do we go from here? Should we continue to seek subsidiarity,
perhaps even Desperately (with a capital D)? Well, I’ve written a bit about
69
private law harmonization with one of my Danish colleagues, and we’ve
tried to emphasize that there is, as yet, no real subsidiarity in Europe—nor
has any cost‐benefit analysis been undertaken, so as to determine whether
these harmonizations are “profitable” or otherwise necessary.
But, as I’ve said, we skeptics are in the minority. Most jurists in
Europe are seeking (or at least content with) more harmonization; some
70
are even seeking a European Civil Code. The jurists who prefer to empha‐
71
size the virtues of harmonization are numerous and well‐organized, and
so I think the skeptical minority is quite likely to lose.
Fortunately, I’ve got an alternative to my desperate (and probably fu‐
tile) search for subsidiarity. It’s what you might call my Danish “Plan B,”

66. See U.N. Comm'n on Int'l Law, Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on the Work of Its Thirty-Ninth Session, Annex II, U.N. Doc. A/61/17
(June 19-July 7, 2006).
67. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
68. See generally Joseph Lookofsky, Alive and Well in Scandinavia: CISG Part II, 18
J.L. & Com. 289 (1999).
69. See Mads Bryde Andersen & Joseph Lookofsky, “Nationale Aftaleregler og EUIntegration: Problemer & Løsningsmodeller”, Ugeskrift for Retsvæsen, Dept. B., p. 211 (2002).
70. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. But see generally Pierre Legrand,
“Against a European Civil Code,” 60 Mod. L. Rev. 44 (1997).
71. See, e.g., Study Group on a European Civil Code, supra note 33.
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and it’s simply this: Don’t worry, be happy! As I said earlier in this lecture,
72
we Danes are Number One in that.
I’m going to stop here and just tell you this: I have wonderful memo‐
ries of my five visits at Duke and of the great times that I spent with Her‐
bert Bernstein and with his wife Waltraud and my wife Vibeke. We were a
nice foursome. And we were together in many places: in Hamburg, New
York, Athens, Bristol, and—last but not least—here at Duke Law.
Thank you very much.

72. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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